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Abstract 
This thesis examines the continuity and the changes in 
Lacan's elaboration of psychoanalytic ethics. It 
focuses in particular on the shift from Lacan's 
classic formulation of psychoanalytic ethics in 
relation to the criminal figures of Sade and Antigone 
in Seminar VII, to his later formulation of a 
psychoanalytic ethics based on a re-elaboration of the 
concept of symptom 
- 
the sinthome 
- 
in the 1970s. By 
illustrating the way in which psychoanalytic ethics is 
constantly, from Freud to Lacan, defined against a 
critique of civilization, and by engaging with a 
number of contemporary clinical readings of Lacan's 
work, this thesis argues that the development of 
Lacan's understanding of psychoanalytic ethics should 
be seen as an attempt to adapt the practice of 
psychoanalysis to a major change in the structure of 
contemporary civilization. In this way, this thesis 
also insists on the importance of maintaining a 
distinction between Lacan's theory of ethics and, on 
the other hand, the ethical effects of psychoanalytic 
practice, and aims to explore the dialogue, the 
exchanges and the tensions between psychoanalytic 
practice and contemporary culture. 
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Note on References and Translations 
All notes and quotations throughout the thesis follow 
MLA style, as detailed in the fifth edition of the MLA 
Handbook for Writers of Research Papers. I have made 
an exception for all quotations from Lacan's seminars 
and added a reference to the seminar number (e. g. 
SVII, SX, SXXIII, etc. ) in each parenthetical page 
reference, regardless of whether the seminar title is 
mentioned in the body of the sentence or not. For each 
foreign language work cited (mostly French), I have 
tried to use translations whenever they were 
available, with the exception of Lacan's work. Given 
that not all the texts by Lacan I refer to have an 
English translation and that the translations 
available vary considerably in quality and 
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terminology, I have decided to work exclusively on the 
original French texts. The list of works cited, 
consequently, contains only French editions and 
references to titles of Lacan's works are given in 
French in the body of the text for consistency, except 
when seminars are referred to as Seminar VII, Seminar 
X, etc. (in the body of the text), and as SVII, SX, 
etc. (in parenthetical page references). All 
translations from Lacan's texts are mine. I have 
omitted footnotes and parenthetical breaks reporting 
the original text, as the frequency of my references 
to Lacan would have made this impractical. 
Introduction 
In his seventh seminar, L'ethique de la psychanalyse, 
Lacan defines ethics as a "judgement on our actions" 
and reminds us that a "return to the meaning of 
action" is also the most basic definition of what 
constitutes psychoanalytic practice (SVII 359-60) 
. 
By 
making the analysand recollect and interrogate the 
meaning of his or her past actions, psychoanalytic 
practice enables ethical judgement, yet it would be 
wrong to assume that the role of psychoanalysis is 
only instrumental to an ethical judgement that would 
proceed from a system of values external to the 
psychoanalytic process. Contrary to ego-psychology and 
to other psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic 
orientations, Lacan does not suggest that the analytic 
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process should aim at the adaptation of the ego to 
external reality, nor does he indentify ethical value 
with Oedipal normativity. For Lacan, rather, it is the 
analytic process itself that enables the subject not 
only to formulate an independent judgement on his 
actions, but also, eventually, to discover the 
fundamental ethical value of his own freedom, autonomy 
of judgement and autonomous desire qua outcomes of the 
analytic process. As Lacan explains, this outcome is 
only possible if the analyst is ready to "pay" a 
triple fee involving his own words, whose meaning is 
sacrificed to the work of interpretation, his own 
person, which is taken away from him in the 
transference, and, finally, his own judgement, which 
must give way to the lack of a final truth and allow 
desire, instead, to articulate on this lack its own 
signifying law (SVII 237). Consequently, we may say 
that because psychoanalysis does not refer to any 
value external to its practice and to its effects, the 
ethics of psychoanalysis can be defined as comprising 
two different sets of values. On the one hand, we find 
those values that, within the psychoanalytic ethical 
framework, emerge at the end of analysis and ground 
ethical judgement 
- 
for example, the autonomy of the 
subject and the autonomy of his desire. On the other 
hand, we find those values that enable ethical 
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judgement by assisting the psychoanalytic process 
itself 
- 
for example, interpretation, the articulation 
of unconscious knowledge and the critical 
interrogation of meaning. We may say that the first 
set of values represents the "what" of the ethics of 
psychoanalysis (e. g. psychoanalytic ethics is an 
ethics of desire, of the subject, of the real towards 
which the autonomous desire of the subject is 
oriented, etc. ). The second set of values, on the 
other hand, represents the "how" of the ethics of 
psychoanalysis (e. g. psychoanalysis should proceed 
through interpretation, sublimation, transferential 
love, construction, etc. ). 
This thesis is about the development of psychoanalytic 
ethics in Lacanian theory. It examines the continuity 
and the changes of the "what" and of the "how" of 
psychoanalytic ethics in Lacan's teaching, focussing 
in particular on the shift from his classic 
formulation of psychoanalytic ethics in Seminar VII, 
L'ethique de la psychanalyse, to his later formulation 
of a psychoanalytic ethics based on a re-elaboration 
of the concept of symptom 
- 
the sinthome 
- 
in the 
19`70s. More specifically, it looks at the practice of 
psychoanalysis itself (the "how") as the privileged 
arena for psychoanalytic ethics (the "what"), and aims 
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at exploring the dialogue, the exchanges and the 
tensions between psychoanalytic practice and the 
culture in which it takes place, and with contemporary 
culture in particular. By illustrating the way in 
which psychoanalytic ethics is constantly, from Freud 
to Lacan, defined against a critique of civilization, 
I argue that the development of Lacan's understanding 
of psychoanalytic ethics should be seen as an attempt 
to adapt the practice of psychoanalysis to a major 
change in the structure of contemporary civilization. 
My conclusion will be that the relevance of 
psychoanalysis for the contemporary world can only be 
articulated starting from this type of historical 
reading of psychoanalytic practice and on the ground 
of the "how" of psychoanalytic ethics as defined by 
the later Lacan and by contemporary analysts. As I 
will demonstrate in the course of my argument, it is, 
in fact, precisely and only at this level, and not at 
the level of its otherwise stable foundational ethical 
values (its "what"), that psychoanalytic ethics can 
not only define the specificity of its subversive and 
political implications, but also engage with the 
structural coordinates and unique discontents of 
contemporary life. 
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This thesis may also be defined as a study of the 
possible ways in which the concept of psychoanalytic 
ethics and the other three key Lacanian concepts of my 
title, the criminal, the sinthome and contemporary 
life, are connected to and define each other in 
Lacan's work. I use the concept of the criminal to 
define Lacan's classic theory of psychoanalytic ethics 
as it appears in Seminar VII, where the question of 
ethics is approached from the standpoint of the 
signifying law and its transgressions and in relation 
to the criminal figures of Sade and Antigone. As early 
as 1950, in the kcrit "Introduction theorique aux 
fonctions de la psychanalyse en criminologie, " Lacan 
insists on the "symbolic" and "dialectical" nature of 
the criminal and distances himself from any 
"instinctual" or "utilitarian" understanding of the 
criminal ("Introduction" 131,134). For the early 
Lacan, the criminal is opposed dialectically to the 
law and associated with the regressive, "obscure, 
blind and tyrannical" instance of the superego, 
"grounded on the effects of unconscious censorship" 
and manifested in the formation of symptoms 
("Introduction" 130,137). By the time of Seminar VII, 
however, although it still maintains its constitutive 
and dialectical relation to unconscious censorship 
and, more broadly, to the symbolic displacements of 
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signification, the criminal is no longer associated 
exclusively with the agency of the superego and 
becomes ethical: the criminal is also seen as a 
manifestation of the ethical tendency of the death 
drive towards a lost jouissance (a lost good) that 
transcends not only the symbolic law but also the 
superegoic jouissance of the symptom. I use the second 
key concept of my title, the sinthome, to define the 
later theory of psychoanalytic ethics formulated by 
Lacan during the 1970s, and particularly in his 1975- 
1976 seminar, Seminar XXIII, where the ethical good of 
jouissance is no longer located beyond the signifying 
structures of the law and of the symptom but within a 
particular linguistic formation that Lacan calls 
sinthome. As Luke Thurston explains, the sinthome 
- 
which Lacan distinguishes from the symptom [symptöme] 
by adopting an archaic spelling 
- 
"designates a 
signifying formulation beyond analysis, a kernel of 
enjoyment immune to the efficacy of the symbolic" 
(100). The introduction of the concept of the sinthome 
thus suggests a shift from an ethics based on the idea 
of criminal transgression or transcendence of symbolic 
structures (the law and the symptom) to an ethics 
based on a certain savoir-faire with language, a 
pragmatic ethics based on the production of the 
sinthome through the isolation of that part of the 
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symptom that resists meaning and signification. Having 
identified the conceptual shift from the criminal to 
the sinthome as a crucial development in 
psychoanalytic ethics, finally, I use the third key 
concept of my title, contemporary life, to illustrate 
the social and historical conditions of this shift. 
Lacan elaborates the notion of "contemporary life" in 
his 1970-1971 Seminar, Seminar XVII, and uses it to 
refer to a distinctively modern discursive regime 
marked by a radical change in the symbolic mechanism 
of repression, whose productive side 
- 
its ability to 
produce surplus jouissance ciphered in symptoms 
- 
comes to subordinate its once primarily defensive 
function in relation to jouissance. From Lacan's point 
of view, and from the point of view of the particular 
reading of Lacan proposed by Jacques-Alain Miller and 
by the analysts of the Ecole de la Cause freudienne, 
this discursive change is homologous to the conceptual 
breakdown of the boundary between signification and 
jouissance that leads to the definition of an ethics 
of the sinthome (Miller, "Milanese Intuitions 2" 9). 
The shift from an ethics of the criminal to an ethics 
of the sinthome emerges, in this sense, as a response 
to a fundamental change in the structure of 
contemporary civilization, while the practice of 
isolating the sinthome from the symptom, on the other 
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hand, also emerges in this way as a new strategy to 
enable an ethical orientation for the contemporary 
subject who can no longer conceive jouissance in terms 
of transcendence or transgression and suffers from an 
inhibition of the symbolic function. 
My approach to Lacan's work and, to a large extent, 
the overall direction of my argument, has been shaped 
and oriented by a crucial methodological problem. This 
is the problem of how to read 
- 
write, speak about 
- 
Lacan in an academic, rather than clinical setting, 
and, more specifically, the problem of how to 
articulate knowledge about psychoanalytic discourse 
from within the boundaries of academic discourse. As 
is well known, in Lacan the term "discourse" does not 
refer to a distinctive body of knowledge but to a set 
of structural relations that determine, among other 
things, the way in which knowledge is treated in a 
particular social setting. The distinctively, if not 
constitutively, academic disposition to articulate 
knowledge about Lacan and to apply Lacanian concepts 
to the study of culture and society emerges, from this 
perspective, as highly problematic, given that such a 
disposition presupposes a specific use of knowledge 
that not only conflicts with but also obscures the 
underlying logic of psychoanalytic discourse. This 
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methodological crux may be grasped better if we 
consider briefly Lacan's illustration of the place of 
knowledge in discourse. Knowledge is, according to 
Lacan, only one of the four discursive "functions" 
that compose the structural relations of a given 
configuration of the social bond and, as such, it is 
always found in a specific, but by no means necessary, 
relation to the function of the subject, to the 
function of the signifier that represents the subject 
in the field of knowledge, and to the function of the 
object that embodies the gap between the signifier and 
the subject as well as the shifting boundaries of 
knowledge itself (SXVII 105). According to Lacan, the 
difference between one type of discourse and the other 
depends on the particular "positions" occupied by 
these functions, so that, for example, the "discourse 
of the university" is defined as the discourse that 
puts knowledge in a "dominant" position, while in the 
"discourse of the analyst" the "dominant" position is 
assigned to the object that incarnates the limit of 
the field of knowledge (SVII 47). The notion of 
discourse thus comes to designate not only a social 
link organised around a particular dominant function, 
but also, by extension, a particular way of 
approaching and articulating knowledge. In more 
concrete terms, we may say that the discourse of the 
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university can refer to a social setting where 
scientific, theoretical, bureaucratic or statistical 
knowledge rules over people and things (occupying the 
structural function of objects), but also to the 
underlying logic of a body of knowledge that is 
essentially only preoccupied with expanding the limits 
of its grasp over people, things or concepts. 
Psychoanalytic discourse, on the other hand, refers to 
a social bond where the object rules and the limits 
and impotence of knowledge are highlighted in the 
analyst's gesture, already recalled at the start of 
this introduction, of paying the price of his words, 
person and judgement 
- 
in short, the price of a "full" 
knowledge 
- 
so as to enable the analysand to form an 
autonomous judgement on his own actions. More subtly, 
however, psychoanalytic discourse also designates the 
underlying logic of the type of knowledge articulated 
by Lacan in his teaching, which is not a knowledge 
about something 
- 
not even a knowledge about decentred 
knowledge 
- 
but a knowledge that bares its limit in 
order to establish and mark the fundamental rules of 
psychoanalytic discourse itself, precisely as a 
discourse that has no rules. 
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The opposition between the discourse of the university 
and analytic discourse, therefore, is not merely a 
matter of different ways of understanding knowledge, a 
matter of, let's say, systematic academic knowledge 
against decentred psychoanalytic knowledge, but, much 
more radically, a matter of the underlying logic of 
what one does whenever knowledge is articulated, of 
whether knowledge is used to know an object or 
decentred in order to allow the formulation of a 
groundless judgement (the analysand's ethical 
judgement on his actions) and the marking ex-nihilo of 
the principles of a practice that can make such 
groundless judgement possible (Lacan's writing and 
teaching) 
. 
There is, consequently, a fundamental, and 
perhaps inevitable, contradiction inherent to the very 
act of taking "Lacan" as an object of academic 
knowledge, to the extent that whatever is articulated 
about "Lacan" would immediately be rejected by 
analytic discourse, even if a non-systematic and 
decentred understanding of knowledge is adopted. This 
inevitable contradiction would, however, become a 
crucial methodological error, and thus also something 
to avoid, if, in writing or talking about "Lacan, " we 
also had to assume that Lacan is trying to articulate 
knowledge about an object, and decided to approach 
Lacan as a "theorist" 
-a theorist, for example, of 
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sexuality or subjectivity or culture. In this case, 
our knowledge about (what) Lacan (says about 
sexuality, subjectivity, language, etc. ) would call 
itself into question by ignoring and obscuring the 
very nature, purpose and discursive logic of Lacan's 
writing and teaching. 
It is interesting to note that this methodological 
problem has been discussed to a certain extent by 
Lacan himself and specifically in relation to the 
publication of the first doctoral thesis about his 
work in 1970. The thesis was written by a Belgian 
student, Anika Lemaire, and was subsequently also 
translated into English in 1977 (with the title 
Jacques Lacan), remaining one of the standard academic 
references to Lacan's work. Lacan wrote a preface to 
the first edition (now published in Autres ecrits as 
"Preface a une these"), and also re-stated his views 
on the enterprise during his 1970-71 seminar, Seminar 
XVII. Lacan presents Lemaire's thesis as an "example" 
of the "obligatory distortion" that "the translation 
into academic discourse of something that has its own 
laws" inevitably produces (SXVII 46). The translation 
from analytic to academic discourse thus "erases by 
showing" something that Lacan wants to "designate" in 
what he writes and in what he says: not only the 
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unconscious (the very limits of knowledge), but also 
the dimension of discourse itself, which is not of the 
order of knowledge ("Preface" 393-94,398). Lacan 
insists that although his "prestigious" position of 
enunciation ex-cathedra implies the risk of an 
"element of refraction" that can easily hand over his 
discourse to the discourse of the university, he does 
not conceive his teaching as a matter of "what am I 
going to tell them this time, " but as a matter of 
"tracing" or "cutting" the laws of psychoanalytic 
discourse (SXVII 46) 
. 
It is significant that Lacan 
should uses the French verb "frayer" (literally, "to 
cut a trace") for the act of formulating the laws of 
psychoanalytic discourse, since "frayer" not only 
usually translates the term used by Freud to describe 
the inscription of memory traces in the psychic 
apparatus in one of the foundational texts of 
psychoanalysis, the Project for a Scientific 
Psychology, but also points to Lacan's later 
understanding of writing and of the written "letter" 
as an inscription that "opens a hole" and destabilises 
knowledge from within ("Lituraterre" 14-5). The 
writing of the laws of psychoanalytic discourse is in 
this way recalled as an autonomous creative gesture 
that has nothing to do with the articulation of 
knowledge and signification and does not rest on the 
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authority of an "academic" knowledge produced through 
signification (a knowledge about something). Lacan's 
preface to Lemaire's thesis confirms this point by 
claiming that psychoanalytic discourse is 
"asymptomatic" 
- 
that is, foreign to the substitutive 
signifying economy of a discourse that strives to talk 
about something 
- 
and that his Ecrits are "antithetic" 
to academic theses as it is only possible to "take" 
what they "formulate" or "let them go" altogether 
(393-94). The incompatibility of the discourse of the 
analyst and of the university thus generates a problem 
of translation 
- 
the translation of a writing of 
psychoanalytic laws into psychoanalytic knowledge - 
but also, and perhaps more crucially from the point of 
view of the university, the problem of whether there 
might actually be anything 
- 
any knowledge at all - 
that academic discourse may want to "take" from a 
discourse that refuses to submit knowledge to any 
criteria of truth other than the subjective marking 
(writing) of a law at the edges of knowledge. 
In order to start to clarify the way in which I have 
tried to find a solution to these problems, I would 
like to emphasise that my reading of Lacan does not 
orient itself on a distinction between systematic and 
decentred or "deconstructed" knowledge. The (Lacanian) 
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problem of the translation from one discourse to the 
other and from writing into knowledge does not, in 
fact, equate to the (poststructuralist) problem of the 
erasure of presence by writing and cannot be addressed 
simply by exposing the destabilising play of 
difference within a given "open" textual system. To be 
sure, the act of systematizing Lacan's teaching 
involves a certain degree of what Lacan calls 
"refraction" into academic discourse, but 
systematization and textual closure as such do not 
imply a conversion of the discursive logic of Lacan's 
teaching and of the formulation of rules relative to a 
specific social practice into the articulation of 
knowledge about an object. On the other hand, any 
attempt to preserve and reveal the non-systematic 
nature of Lacan's work, and even more any attempt to 
"deconstruct" it and expose its inherent 
contradictions and inconsistencies, by approaching 
Lacan's work as a more or less consistent body of 
"knowledge" does necessarily miss the whole point of 
what Lacan is trying to do with knowledge, and may 
thus be rightly considered an academic "translation" 
and a "distortion" or "refraction" of Lacan's work. A 
very clear example of this type of reading of Lacan 
may be found in David Macey's Lacan in Contexts, a 
book which attempts to demolish the systematic 
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wholeness imposed on Lacan's work by his followers, in 
order to expose a variety of textual and contextual 
layers through which the value of Lacan's supposed 
theories of sexuality and language may be subjected to 
critical examination. In the first chapter, Macey 
offers a review of the three most influential 
approaches to Lacan's work in English speaking 
countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Macey's book 
was published in 1988), arguing that all three are 
equally guilty of transforming Lacan into a 
"systematic theoretical entity" whose authority is 
never challenged or questioned critically (10,24-25). 
The first approach is identified with Jacques-Alain 
Miller's editorial re-fashioning of Lacan's writings 
and seminars, which, of course can only be seen as an 
indirect influence (Macey 7-11). The other two are the 
"strikingly instrumental" readings of Lacan proposed 
by the journal Screen for film studies and by Juliet 
Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism for feminist 
studies (Macey 15-23). While I think Macey is right in 
criticising the instrumental character of feminist and 
film theoretical readings of Lacan, I would like to 
suggest that his criteria for deciding what may 
constitute a "correct" way of reading knowledge are, 
at least in Lacan's case, fundamentally misplaced. If 
we agree, in fact, that Lacan's teaching was 
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formulated as a definition of the principles of 
analytic practice, rather than as a theory of language 
or sexual difference, we may also be able to see that 
Macey's will to submit Lacan's (supposed) theories to 
critical scrutiny is no less blind to the letter of 
Lacan's text than the uncritical appropriations of the 
same (supposed) theories deployed by feminism and film 
theory. Miller's editorial systematization of Lacan's 
work, on the other hand, may be perceived as the 
lesser evil, to the extent that, far from ignoring the 
discursive coordinates from which Lacan was writing 
and speaking, is engaging in the hard task of giving 
order and relief to a writing that, as we have seen, 
cannot be translated from one social discourse to the 
other without also being erased and mistaken. 
I think I have, by now, given a sufficient impression 
of what is at stake in the act of reading Lacan to try 
and propose a definition of the particular methodology 
I have chosen to adopt in this work in order to find 
my way around the problem of the discursive status of 
knowledge in Lacan' work. Without trying to avoid the 
constraints of the academic discourse that allows me 
to produce this thesis 
- 
after all, I too must write 
about Lacan 
- 
and maintaining a constant commitment to 
critical thought, I have chosen to give a particular 
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emphasis to psychoanalytic practice in my reading of 
Lacan, as a way to avoid, as far as this may be 
possible, the "refraction, " "distortion" and "erasure" 
implied in the act of translation of analytic 
discourse into academic discourse. In my view, 
practice is equivalent to discourse, since discourse 
is the dimension where the practical rules of the 
relations between subject, knowledge and object are 
laid down and followed. Lacan's work should be 
approached, as we have seen, as the place where the 
rules of a specific discursive practice are 
formulated, so to say, from within, according to the 
structural logic of psychoanalytic discourse itself. 
In writing about Lacan, my thesis and, in general, 
academic discourse cannot avoid adhering to their own 
underlying structural logic and thus turning Lacan 
into an object of knowledge. Academic discourse, 
however, can at least reflect critically on Lacan's 
formulation of the laws of psychoanalytic discourse 
and, by always relating Lacan's ideas to the logic of 
psychoanalytic discourse and to the practice of 
psychoanalysis, refuse to reduce psychoanalysis to the 
status of a mere theory of language, culture, 
sexuality and subjectivity. The choice of writing 
about psychoanalytic ethics may be seen, in this 
sense, as determined by the methodological 
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complications inherent in the very act of treating 
psychoanalysis as something other than a practice, 
which means that, in a way, one can only write about 
ethics when writing about psychoanalysis because it is 
only when psychoanalysis is approached as an ethics 
that its practical and discursive specificity is 
acknowledged. We should remember, moreover, that not 
only is the dimension of ethics, by definition, the 
dimension of a practice, but also that in Lacan the 
"ethics of psychoanalysis" refers to psychoanalysis 
primarily as an ethical practice, rather than as a 
simple theory of ethics. This last point allows us to 
specify further what "emphasising practice" might 
mean: it means refusing to turn Lacan into a body of 
knowledge and also, once this is achieved, avoiding 
turning psychoanalytic practice into an abstract 
theory of ethics by insisting on the concrete 
specificity of ethical practice. We encounter again, 
at this point, the distinction between the "what" and 
the "how" of psychoanalytic ethics we introduced 
above. In the light of the problem of "translation" 
that Lacan's work imposes on its academic readers, 
this distinction acquires a special methodological 
import as it is clear that the discursive specificity 
of Lacan's work can be preserved not only by 
emphasising practice, discourse and ethics, but also 
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by acknowledging and engaging critically with the 
difference between the level where ethics and 
discourse are theorised, and the level where the 
concrete social practices that constitute 
psychoanalytic ethics and psychoanalytic discourse are 
defined. 
My approach to Lacan should emerge in this way as 
significantly innovative and original, not through 
choice but as a consequence of the particular problem 
it strives to confront. I have already marked my 
distance from the film theoretical and feminist trends 
in Lacanian studies on the grounds of their 
instrumental appropriation and theoretical reduction 
of Lacan's work. My brief critique of David Macey's 
book on Lacan, moreover, has allowed me to define the 
limitations of poststructuralist readings of Lacan in 
terms of a problematic of "visibility" investing the 
letter of Lacan's writing (another famous 
poststructuralist reading of Lacan that may be 
approached from this direction, and which deals 
specifically with the question of the letter and its 
visibility is, of course, Derrida's critique of 
Lacan's seminar on Poe's "Purloined Letter, " "Le 
seminaire sur `La Lettre volee', " in The Post Card) 
In opposition to film theory, feminism and 
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poststructuralism, we can identify a fourth approach 
to Lacan, which over the past twenty years has become 
hegemonic in Anglo-American universities, and which 
has been shaped by the influential work of two 
contemporary European Lacanian thinkers: Slavoj Zizek 
and Alain Badiou. The Lacan filtered through Zizek and 
Badiou is certainly truer to the letter of Lacan's 
teaching than the Lacan reconstructed by film theory, 
feminism and poststructuralism, since both Zizek and 
Badiou are broadly focussing their readings not on 
Lacan's "knowledge, " but on Lacan's formulation of the 
structural/practical coordinates of discourse (the 
subjective relation to knowledge, truth and the 
object) in order to elaborate their theories of 
subjectivation and structural change. On the other 
hand, however, Zizek's and Badiou's accounts of the 
subject's ethical engagement with the functions of 
discourse are characteristically unconcerned with the 
technicalities of a practice that may enable this 
engagement, and move instead from abstract 
theorisation to the discussion of accomplished 
examples of ethical practice drawn from politics or 
culture. Through the mediating influence of Zizek and 
Badiou, the tendency to neglect psychoanalytic 
practice has become a generalised trend in 
contemporary Lacanian studies, which typically 
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concentrate exclusively on the "what" of 
psychoanalytic ethics and treat the "how" as 
irrelevant. In this respect, my approach can be 
considered as different also from this fourth, 
Zizekian-Badiouian orientation, and my reading of 
psychoanalytic ethics may thus be seen as departing 
significantly from the example set by recent seminal 
discussions of Lacanian ethics such as Alenka 
Zupancic's Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan, Alain 
Badiou's Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of 
Evil, or Joan Copj ec' s Imagine There's No Woman : 
Ethics and Sublimation. Zupancic, for instance, is 
concerned mostly with producing a new reading of 
Kant's ethics through Lacan's theory: a reading that 
manages to outline the links between Kant's critique 
of practical reason and Lacan's formulation of the 
laws of psychoanalytic discourse but remains alien to 
the implications of psychoanalytic practice for 
psychoanalytic theory. Badiou, on the other hand, 
engages in a polemical illustration of the difference 
between the theoretical stakes of a Lacanian-inspired 
ethics that confronts the subject with his truth and 
the contemporary mainstream ethics of otherness and 
difference, avoiding, again, any engagement with the 
concrete "how" of an ethics of truth. As for Copjec, 
her main concern is with producing a series of 
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readings of cultural and artistic works which, again, 
present artistic sublimation as an ethical fait 
accompli, an illustration of the end product of an 
ethical practice of the subject that leaves us none 
the wiser on the exact modalities of this practice. 
In consideration of the particular emphasis that my 
reading of Lacan wants to put on the "how" of 
psychoanalytic ethics, I have tried, instead, to model 
my own approach to Lacan not on the work of Zizek, 
Badiou and their followers, but, instead, on the work 
of contemporary analysts and, in particular, of 
Jacques-Alain Miller and the other analysts of the 
Ecole de la Cause freudienne (the school of 
psychoanalysis founded by Lacan just before his death 
and after the dissolution of the tcole freudienne de 
Paris, which he directed in the years between 1964 and 
1979) 
. 
As I will demonstrate throughout my argument, 
far from being a simple presentation of clinical cases 
and technique, this type of work introduces a unique 
and novel articulation of the logic that connects the 
"what" and the "how" of psychoanalytic ethics to each 
other and, more widely, to the structure of culture 
and its historical permutations. It does not 
constitute, as Macey suggested above, a dogmatic 
systematization of Lacan's knowledge, but a constantly 
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self-renewing elaboration of psychoanalytic discourse 
based on the real of a clinical practice that is 
always related to its socio-historical conditions. It 
is, consequently, an essential reference for anyone 
wishing not only to develop an appropriate grasp of 
psychoanalytic concepts but also to explore their 
social and cultural significance. It should be said, 
however, that even when it takes as principal 
reference the work of contemporary analysts, this 
thesis also preserves a necessary edge of originality; 
firstly, because, differently from Zizek and Badiou, 
the work of the tcole de la Cause freudienne has had 
little or no direct influence on the British and 
American reception of Lacan; secondly, because my own 
academic writing position is different from the 
clinical position of the members of the Ecole de la 
Cause freudienne and my reference to their work thus 
requires an effort of epistemological mediation and 
the definition of a position of research that is 
significantly new and unusual. 
From this particular point of view, this thesis also 
attempts to articulate an indirect critique of the 
readings of Lacan presented by Zizek and some of his 
followers (I engage with Zizek rather than with Badiou 
for the obvious reason that, although they are both 
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influential on the way Lacan is approached today in 
the UK and US, Zizek is the only one who insists in 
trying to "explain" and discuss Lacan directly) 
. 
This 
critique is by no mean central to the argument of the 
thesis itself but is consistent throughout and has the 
main purpose of demonstrating the importance of 
engaging with analytic practice by showing how the 
characteristic form of theoretical reduction of 
psychoanalytic ethics that marks the work of Zizek and 
his followers has a radical impact on the very way in 
which Lacan is understood by these theorists. The 
problem with contemporary readings of Lacan, 
therefore, is not merely that they emphasise the 
"what" over the "how" of psychoanalytic ethics, but 
that this emphasis ends up affecting and distorting 
everything else in their texts, including, of course, 
the way in which they present the "what" of 
psychoanalytic ethics. While these readings, 
particularly in Zizek's work, often self-consciously 
strive to negotiate their entanglement with academic 
discourse, by not engaging with the clinical 
implications of the analytic relation they contradict 
the psychoanalytic principle that puts practice 
(discourse) before theory (knowledge), so that their 
accounts of psychoanalytic ethics also eventually 
emerge as disconnected from any sort of clearly 
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defined practice or socio-historical condition, in 
striking contrast to the theoretical elaboration of 
ethics that we encounter in contemporary analytic 
literature. By contrasting the different versions of 
Lacan that emerge from academic and analytic 
literature, it is thus possible to show that there is 
nothing innocent and unproblematic about the gesture 
of separating psychoanalytic theory from 
psychoanalytic practice, as this separation is bound 
to overdetermine heavily our reading. This particular 
type of critical distortion 
- 
in which theory 
compromises its own insight by prioritising itself 
over practice 
- 
extends, as we will see, to some of 
the main tenets of the ' izekian" Lacan: from the 
understanding of subversion (the analytic act) as a 
moment of radical rupture with the social link, to the 
subordination of desire to drive and the refusal to 
acknowledge a historical change in the structure of 
the big Other in contemporary culture. 
Given my claims of originality and the polemical slant 
of this introduction (which, I repeat, are not pursued 
for their own sake but reflect my engagement with a 
specific methodological problem) I would like to 
clarify three "points concerning my own position as a 
reader of Lacan to prevent some possible 
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misunderstandings regarding my approach. In the first 
place, my position does not imply a critique of 
academic discourse per se, but only a critique of the 
way in which academic discourse can distort analytic 
discourse and, even more precisely, a critique of the 
way in which Lacan has been read from the perspective 
of academic discourse in the past. As I insisted 
above, not only did Lacan himself acknowledge his 
necessary reliance on the discourse of the university, 
but I recognise that my own writing position is made 
possible and requires that I abide by the rules of 
this discourse. Even less, moreover, does Lacan's or 
my critique of the discourse of the university imply 
that any discourse, and particularly analytic 
discourse, should seek to prevail over or eradicate 
the others, since not only the knowledge that academic 
discourse elaborates is essential to psychoanalysis, 
but psychoanalysis itself, as Lacan has famously put 
it, can only exist as the "other side" of a social 
link based on the functions of language (SXVII 61). 
In the second place, my position by no means implies a 
rejection of critical thought in favour of a discourse 
that chooses to formulate its own laws ex-nihilo and 
rejects knowledge as empty. As I hope will become 
clearer in the course of my argument, critical 
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thinking is just as essential to analytic discourse as 
it is to academic discourse. The difference is that 
academic discourse sustains critical thinking through 
an imperative to know while analytic discourse puts 
critical thought to work by stimulating a desire to 
know (Lacan, SXVII 120-21). Analytic discourse thus 
does not suspend critical thinking but interrogates 
the very ground of critical thought, making thought an 
instrument of subjective freedom (one knows when to 
stop thinking in order to formulate an independent 
judgement) rather than the instrument of a compulsion 
(one must never stop knowing, one must be the slave of 
knowledge). 
In the third place, my position attempts to 
accommodate the rules of academic discourse (to 
articulate, critically, knowledge about an object) 
with the rules of analytic discourse (to decentre 
knowledge and allow autonomous judgement by 
articulating, critically, one's desire to know an 
object at the limits of knowledge) by following a 
particular method of composition. I have, to start 
with, organised rather tightly the different units of 
my thesis - chapters and sections - around a set of 
very specific questions: what is the link between 
social discontent and ethics? Is there an ethical 
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crime? Is the ethical crime internal or external to 
the social link? Does social change imply the 
definition of a new type of ethics? What is the ethics 
of contemporary life? What is the contemporary ethics 
of psychoanalysis? In each chapter or section I have 
then worked critically on one of these separate 
questions, up to the point when the production of a 
particular signification or "answer" allowed me to 
close the unit and move on to a different question. In 
this way, I was able to adapt loosely my method of 
composition to the structure of the analytic session, 
where a symptom is subjected to interpretation and the 
production of a signification determines the logical 
conclusion of the session, as well as the isolation, 
as Lacan puts it, "from behind the signification" of a 
"non-sensical signifier" "essential for the advent of 
the subject" (SXXI 279). This "non-sensical signifier" 
of analytic interpretation is the original signifier 
that the enigmatic formulation of the symptom 
displaces and which eventually refers and leads to the 
traumatic kernel of the letter as a hole that 
decentres and undermines knowledge from within. In a 
similar fashion, then, although I have also eventually 
organised all my chapter and section units within a 
coherent narrative and argument, the significations or 
"answers" I have produced at the end of each unit do 
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not, in any way, totalise Lacanian knowledge but 
isolate, instead, a series of self-standing Lacanian 
signifiers 
- 
the letter of Lacan's teaching 
- 
that 
ground the possibility of a (my own) subjective act of 
interpretation on the very absence of a final "truth 
about Lacan. " 
A last question concerning the particular approach 
adopted in this work may revolve around the specific 
advantages and general relevance for the field of 
critical theory of emphasising analytic practice in a 
reading of Lacan. What we have seen above as the 
problem of writing about Lacan from within the 
boundaries of academic discourse is not merely a 
problem of "translation" but also a problem of whether 
eventually there might be any non-clinical interest in 
a reading that strives to be faithful to the letter of 
Lacan's teaching. After all, as Lacan reminded us, a 
letter can only be "taken or left" and many may object 
that the contingent technicalities of clinical 
practice have no relevance for critical theory and 
cultural studies since they do not provide any insight 
or valid contribution to broader theoretical, 
political and cultural debates. In response to this 
type of objection, we may reiterate one of the points 
we already made and say that an emphasis on practice 
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is essential to all critical studies of Lacan because, 
given the particular articulation of theory and 
practice in psychoanalytic discourse, only by 
emphasising practice and discourse we can arrive at a 
correct and consistent theoretical appreciation of 
Lacan. 
The relevance of an emphasis on practice, however, is 
not limited to the definition of a correct theoretical 
approach. Psychoanalytic practice is not a mere 
therapeutic treatment of individual symptoms, it is 
what enables the configuration of a social relation, a 
social relation where the subject, according to 
Lacan's own definition, is brought to formulate an 
independent judgement on his actions. As one Lacanian 
analyst has recently suggested, given the absolute 
rule of scientific and economic knowledge in 
contemporary society, the analytic link may even be 
seen today as the only social relation capable of 
guaranteeing that the subject thinks independently as 
a subject, rather than as a slave of scientific and 
economic imperatives (Gueguen 136) An emphasis on 
psychoanalytic practice is thus not only relevant to 
wider debates on culture, politics and society, but 
even invested with a certain degree of political 
urgency. By insisting that psychoanalysis be seen as a 
40 
social relation, in fact, psychoanalytic practice 
foregrounds the links between psychoanalysis and the 
discontent of culture, rather than downplaying them; 
it outlines a viable and concrete emancipatory project 
for the contemporary subject; it also allows, as we 
will see, a reconfiguration of the relation between 
politics and ethics by articulating the politics of 
the analytic link as well as its political 
consequences. This is precisely the direction in which 
I have tried to develop a more practical academic 
approach to psychoanalysis in this thesis: not towards 
the discussion of technique and clinical cases, but 
towards the appreciation of the analytic social link 
in its relation to culture and to the emancipation and 
autonomy of the subject. 
This thesis is divided in two parts. Part One is 
titled "The Criminal" and examines psychoanalytic 
ethics from the standpoint of its relation to social 
structures and to the discontents of civilization. It 
develops and proposes a critical definition of 
psychoanalytic ethics as a criminal ethics opposed to 
the ethics of civilization by focussing on three main 
aspects of Lacan's Seminar VII, L'ethique de la 
psychoanalysis: Lacan's reading of Freud's 
Civilization and Its Discontents, his discussion of 
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the Marquis de Sade and his reading of Sophocles' 
Antigone. The first part also distinguishes Freud's 
and Lacan's critique of civilization from the question 
of historical change and may thus also be seen as 
adopting a "synchronic" approach. Part Two is titled 
"The Sinthome" and mirrors thematically the first by 
systematically re-examining the question of 
psychoanalytic ethics in the light of its developments 
in the work of the later Lacan and of contemporary 
analysts. In contrast to part one, it adopts a 
"diachronic" and historicized approach and tries to 
assess the status and role of psychoanalytic ethics in 
relation to contemporary ethics and contemporary 
discontents by endorsing a new definition of 
psychoanalytic ethics based on Lacan's later 
conceptualisation of the sinthome. 
Chapter I concentrates on Lacan's reading of Freud's 
Civilization and Its Discontents in Seminar VII. It 
starts by considering Freud's hypothesis on the 
discontent of civilization and looks at some of the 
ways in which this hypothesis has been elaborated in 
the field of social theory, particularly in the work 
of Marcuse and Deleuze and Guattari, which is then 
opposed to Lacan's own elaboration of Freud's 
hypothesis on the grounds of Lacan's introduction of 
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the concept of jouissance. The chapter then moves on 
to consider Lacan's identification of the ethical 
drive towards jouissance with the criminal death drive 
at the heart of the discontent of civilization, 
contrasting not only Freud's and Lacan's different 
ethical endorsements of the drive, but also Lacan's 
and Levinas' understandings of neighbour and of the 
Other in order to illustrate how Lacan conceives the 
possibility of a separation of the criminal and 
ethical tendency of the death drive from the 
repressive and aggressive violence of civilization. 
The last part of the chapter looks at this possibility 
from the perspective of Lacan's re-elaboration of the 
concept of sublimation in Seminar VII, distinguishing 
between the social violence and aggression that 
follows the sublimation of the drive into the common 
good and the ethical relation to the good of 
jouissance that the subject can find in love and art 
when the drive is sublimated from the common good and 
a criminal good is pursued in a practice that defuses, 
rather than fuelling, social aggression. 
Chapter II concentrates on Lacan's discussion of the 
Marquis de Sade 
- 
in Seminar VII and in the Ecrit 
"Kant avec Sade" - in order to establish how a 
criminal act of negation - an ethical crime - may or 
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may not enable the ethical sublimation of the drive 
from the common good and thus help us to define the 
practical condition - the "how" - of psychoanalytic 
ethics. The chapter starts from a comparison between 
Lacan's and Bataille's readings of Sade's definition 
of the ethical crime - an absolute act of negation 
capable of outdoing even the structural violence and 
destruction of natural laws 
- 
which is understood by 
Bataille as sovereign expenditure and by Lacan as an 
overcoming of the drive by desire. It then traces a 
genealogy between Lacan's a Klossowski's readings of 
Sade, showing how Lacan borrows from Klossowski a 
distinction between Sade's thought and the underlying 
structure of Sade's fantasy which, by functioning as a 
practical Kantian principle for Sade's actions, 
undermines Sade's philosophical insight and the 
ethical crime by turning the negation of the drive 
into a structural law. On the grounds of this 
critique, the chapter then proposes a practical 
definition of the ethical crime as a matter of taking 
up a particular position within the structure of 
fantasy in a specific modality of the social bond, and 
contrasts this definition with Zizek's popular 
definition of the ethical act as a matter of 
"traversing the fantasy. " 
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Chapter III moves from this definition of the ethical 
crime in order to question its political stakes and 
ask how the ethical crime may not only free the 
subject from the repression and aggression of 
civilization but also allow the reconstitution of the 
social link around the analytic bond. In order to do 
so, it engages with Lacan's commentary of Sophocles' 
Antigone, first by situating it within the more 
general critical tradition of Freudo-Hegelian readings 
of Antigone (including Hegel, Derrida, Irigaray, 
Zizek, Grigg, Zupancic, Copjec and Butler) and then by 
looking closely at Lacan's text. The chapter argues 
that while most of the post-Hegelian and Lacanian 
readings of Antigone insist in different ways on the 
radical externality of the criminal ethical drive 
(Hegel's "divine law") to the civilizing bond (Hegel's 
"human law"), Lacan presents Antigone's parable as an 
illustration of the way in which the dynamics of 
transference can operate not only to separate the 
drive from the common good, but also to forge an 
analytic social bond centred on the criminal 
orientation of the drive. The last part of the chapter 
proposes an alternative definition of psychoanalytic 
politics based on the practical handling of power 
within the transferential bond and on the transmission 
of desire within a wider social network, arguing that 
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psychoanalytic ethics should not be looked at and 
theorised merely as a framework for politics but as 
political practice tout court. 
Chapter IV opens the second part of the thesis by 
introducing the logic of Lacan's diachronic account of 
civilizing structures and by arguing that the 
innovations of Lacan's later account of psychoanalytic 
ethics should be approached not so much as theoretical 
revisions but as attempts to adapt the practice of an 
otherwise consistent set of ethical principles to the 
changes of modern civilization. After explaining 
Lacan's use of the concept of "contemporary life" 
(from Seminar XVII) as a historical category that 
identifies the discursive structure of modernity and 
post-modernity with a series of radical alterations in 
the status of jouissance, power and knowledge, the 
chapter draws on contemporary clinical literature and 
on some of Lacan's later work in order to arrive at a 
definition of the discontent of contemporary life as 
an inhibition of the symbolic (signifying) mechanism 
of repression and symptom-formation. The remaining 
part of the chapter compares the Lacanian and clinical 
account of contemporary discontent with the readings 
of contemporary culture produced by Lacanian theorists 
like Zizek and Todd McGowan, developing a critique of 
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Zizek and McGowan's attempts to translate 
psychoanalytic ethics into wider political practice on 
the grounds of their unethical suppression of 
subjectivity and misrecognition of the inherent 
political import of psychoanalytic ethics itself. 
Chapter V returns to the question of ethics from the 
standpoint of contemporary life, and, by continuing to 
move between Lacan's work and the work of contemporary 
Lacanian analysts, defines the ethics of contemporary 
life as a utilitarian ethics. It then considers two 
alternative ethical orientations emerging from the 
contemporary trends of religion (fundamentalism, 
terrorism, etc. ) and addiction (substance misuse but 
also food, technology and other forms of surplus- 
jouissance), arguing that although these types of 
ethics are in excess of utilitarian ethics and seek to 
find a solution to its discontents (either by 
altogether rejecting surplus-jouissance or by 
rejecting any involvement in a productive system that 
would put a limit to it), they eventually also 
reinforce the utilitarian discourse of contemporary 
life and should then be seen as complementary limits 
of contemporary ethics, rather than as autonomous 
ethical positions. The chapter also offers a' brief 
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critique of the treatment of addiction in contemporary 
life as representative of the contradictions of 
utilitarian ethics and its limits. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis by finally addressing 
the question of contemporary Lacanian ethics. It 
proceeds by means of a comparison between the account 
of Lacan's later understanding of ethics popularised 
by academic theorists close to Zizek's position and 
the account proposed by Jacques-Alain Miller and the 
analysts of the Ecole de la Cause freudienne, showing 
that while the Zizekian side insists that Lacan's 
later ethics is defined by a theoretical shift from 
desire to drive, the Millerian side insists that 
Lacan's later theoretical revisions do not imply an 
alteration of the relation between drive and desire in 
ethics, but simply a different way of finding the same 
criminal and ethical articulation of desire and 
jouissance 
- 
defined by the later Lacan in terms of 
the bare structure of the symptom, or sinthome 
- 
in 
relation to a different type of signifying structure. 
On the grounds of the arguments proposed in the rest 
of the thesis, the chapter chooses to endorse Miller's 
account and argues that the concept of the sinthome 
defines the contemporary ethics of psychoanalysis not 
so much against the criminal ethics elaborated by 
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Lacan in Seminar VII, but against the utilitarian 
ethics of contemporary life and in relation to the 
inhibition of repression and signifying structures 
associated with the rise of the contemporary Other. 
Part One 
The Criminal 
Blank Page 
Chapter I 
From Civilization and Its Discontents to 
the Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
1. Freud's Hypothesis 
A preliminary articulation of the link between 
psychoanalytic ethics and social critique is essential 
for a research project that aims at exploring not only 
the subversive and political potential of 
psychoanalytic ethics, but also the impact of social 
change on psychoanalytic ethics as such. This first 
chapter thus aims at illustrating how Lacan's ethics 
of psychoanalysis is defined against a very specific 
type of social critique: the Freudian hypothesis on 
the discontent of civilization. More specifically, I 
will try to reconstruct how Lacan arrives at the 
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formulation of psychoanalytic ethics as a "criminal" 
ethics via a particular reading of Freud's 
Civilization and its Discontents. I will start with a 
short summary of the main tenets of Freud's argument, 
and discuss briefly how Lacan's reading differs from 
other seminal readings and responses to the questions 
raised by Freud's text. I will suggest that at the 
heart of the conceptual distance between Lacan's and 
other readings of Freud there is a fundamental 
methodological difference, and that the originality of 
Lacan's approach lies precisely in the fact that it 
confronts the Freudian hypothesis on the discontent of 
civilization as a primarily ethical, rather than 
exclusively socio-critical or political problem. In 
this way, I also hope to define further the 
methodology of Lacan's critique of civilization, a 
methodology that does not amount to a privileging of 
the ethical over the social and the political, but, 
rather, as will become clear in the course of my 
argument, to the positing of ethical practice as the 
condition for a set of social and political effects 
that concern the subject's autonomy, the containment 
of the intertwined violence of drive (transgression; 
aggression) and civilization (repression), and the 
possibility of an alternative type of social bond. 
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In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud isolates 
three causes of human suffering: the superior power of 
nature, the frailty of the human body, and our 
relations with others (17). Freud observes that while 
the first two causes of suffering are readily accepted 
as inevitable 
- 
and perhaps more readily in Freud's 
time than in ours 
- 
the common attitude towards the 
suffering that arises from our relations with others 
is more ambivalent and on the whole different. On the 
one hand, we tend to regard social suffering as a 
contingent accident, a "superfluous extra, " and "we 
cannot see why institutions that we ourselves have 
created should not protect and benefit us all" 
(Civilization 29,31). On the other hand, we often 
find that "much of the blame for our misery lies with 
what we call our civilization, and that we should be 
far happier if we were to abandon it and revert to 
primitive conditions" (Civilization 30). This 
ambivalence means that, from the moment that our 
relations with others are regulated by social 
institutions, two opposed attitudes towards social 
suffering become possible: we either blame it on the 
absence or inadequacy of social institutions and 
believe that it may be avoided through social and 
political reform; or we blame it on social 
institutions as such and believe that it may be 
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avoided through a return to a mythical pre-civilised 
and "natural" state. As the original title of Freud's 
work, Des Unbehagen in der Kultur, and its French 
translation, Le malaise dans la civilization, suggest, 
therefore, the discontent of civilization can be 
understood both as an "uncivilized" social aggression 
that is in civilization 
- 
in der Kultur 
- 
in the sense 
that civilization is affected by it and strives to 
contain it, and, on the other hand, as a "civilized" 
social aggression that is in civilization, in the 
sense that it constitutes the violent and repressive 
side of civilization itself. 
We may say that the originality, and the challenge, of 
Freud's stance lies in his full acceptance of the 
paradox that these two positions try to conceal and 
which leads him to posit that social institutions 
prevent and cause social suffering at the same time. 
Freud, in other words, does not chose between the two 
meanings that distinguish between an "external" and an 
"internal" discontent of civilization but maintains 
the ambiguity expressed by its title as the key 
characteristic of social suffering. The Freudian 
notion of the discontent of civilization could thus be 
captured effectively through the Lacanian category of 
the extimate, referring to what is simultaneously 
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internal and external: discontent is extimate to 
civilization; "in der Kultur" signifies that social 
aggression is simultaneously external and internal to 
social institutions. As a reader of Freud has 
observed, this logical catch in Freud's theory of 
civilization depends on the fundamental hypothesis of 
a "primitive" and "independent" aggressive drive 
- 
the 
death drive 
- 
that would not only exclude the 
possibility of a "rational" and "utilitarian" 
reconciliation between drive and civilization, but 
also suggest that "the set of prohibitions and 
requirements that regulate social relations in 
civilization, [... ], had to include some that from the 
perspective of self-interest, even enlightened self- 
interest, appear unreasonable" (Deigh 296). To be 
sure, the institutions of social life protect us from 
the aggression of our neighbours, and yet, so goes 
Freud's famous argument, this protection is also 
always experienced, and resented, at the same time as 
a sacrifice, as a "cultural frustration, " and as a 
renunciation of the "satisfaction of powerful drives" 
(Civilization 44). Moreover, civilization is not 
simply repressing or frustrating a deep seated 
aggressive drive, but is actually, and paradoxically, 
relying on the aggressive drive itself in order to 
implement its civilizing project, leading Freud to 
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conclude that "there are some difficulties that are 
inherent in the nature of civilization and will defy 
any attempt at reform" (Civilization 66). 
In order to understand better this last, but crucial, 
claim made by Freud we need to turn to the last 
chapters of Civilization and Its Discontents, where 
Freud explains how the violence of the drive becomes 
associated with the superego as the primary civilizing 
agency that the civilizing process sets up within the 
individual psyche. Freud explains how the violence of 
civilizing structures depends on a mechanism of 
"introjection" whereby frustrated aggression is 
internalised and "taken over by a portion of the ego 
that sets itself up as the super-ego, in opposition to 
the rest, and is now prepared, as `conscience' to 
exercise the same severe aggression against the ego 
that the latter would have liked to direct towards 
other individuals" (Civilization 77). There is, in 
this way, no escape from the aggression of the death 
drive. Civilization is caught between destructive 
violence and violent repression. Frustrated aggression 
is passed on and attributed to all civilizing figures 
of authority, so that civilization, eventually, can 
counteract aggression only by appropriating it for its 
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own psychic and social agencies, rather than by 
putting a stop to it. 
As is well known, Freud is, of course, interested in 
exposing the link between the aggression of what he 
refers to as the "cultural super-ego" and the social 
incidence of neurosis as a major symptom of cultural 
"discontent" (Civilization 102-3). The central 
question posed by Freud's text, however, is not so 
much that of the social cause of neurosis, but remains 
the much broader one of the ambivalent cultural 
repression and exploitation of a constitutive violence 
that emerges as internal/external (extimate) to 
civilization itself. This question is central not only 
to Lacan's reading but also to some of the most 
seminal readings of Freud produced within the field of 
psychoanalytic social theory in the last sixty years. 
2. Eros, Schizophrenia, Jouissance 
It is easy to note that the reception of Freud's 
theory of civilization within psychoanalytic social 
theory depends to a great extent on whether the 
Freudian thesis of a primary and constitutive 
aggressive drive, the death drive, is accepted or not. 
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The hypothesis of a discontent that is "extimate" to 
culture depends, as we have seen, precisely on whether 
one accepts the idea that the death drive is 
constitutive 
- 
of the individual, of civilization 
- 
and thus not susceptible to be eliminated by the 
progress of civilization. Only those readers of Freud 
who accept such an understanding of the drive, 
therefore, may be seen as engaging with the problem of 
the discontent of civilization as it was formulated 
originally by Freud. In order to indicate what a 
position that rejects the constitutive status of the 
death drive involves, I would just like to point out, 
with Slavoj Zizek, that the well-known debate between 
the Freudian revisionists - including Eric Fromm - and 
the members of the Frankfurt School in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s revolved precisely around the 
revisionists' attempt to reduce the aggressive drive 
to its social and historical determinants, with the 
effect of also reducing the problem of the discontent 
of civilization to a mere hindering or frustration of 
the full "creative" development of the individual ego 
(Metastases 9-10). Among the readings of Freud that 
have accepted the Freudian thesis of an originary and 
constitutive drive we can find, on the other hand, not 
only the work of the Frankfurt School critical 
theorists but also the post-structuralist critique of 
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psychoanalysis offered by Deleuze and Guattari in the 
1970s and, of course, Lacan's own "return to Freud. " 
In spite of their relative and significant 
differences, all these theorists refuse, in different 
ways, to subordinate or reduce the drive to direct 
socio-historical causality and, consequently, manage 
to engage critically with the Freudian question of the 
discontent of civilization in its full implications, 
rather than avoiding or simplifying it. 
As social theorist Anthony Elliott has explained, in 
spite of its central concern with the "imbrications of 
historical and social factors in the structuring of 
the psyche, " the Frankfurt School maintained a 
fundamental theoretical investment in Freud's 
"instinctual conception of the ego" and was thus able 
to preserve the double-edged complexity of Freud's 
critique of civilization in its main theoretical 
statement, Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, as well as in all the subsequent work 
produced by its members (48-49). A good example of the 
particular way in which the members of the Frankfurt 
School developed Freud's hypothesis in the direction 
of a critique of contemporary civilization can be 
found in Adorno's famous essay "Freudian Theory and 
the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, " where the idea of 
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the introjection of the aggressive drive by the 
superego is used to explain the violence of Fascism 
precisely as an example of the "reproduction of the 
archaic in and by civilization itself, " in a way that 
follows closely, and explicitly, Freud's argument in 
Civilization and Its Discontents (137). 
The main response to Freud's theory of civilization 
within the Frankfurt School, however, is without a 
doubt Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization. Marcuse 
works with a fastidiously literal understanding of 
Freud's definition of the death (conservative) and 
life (aggregative) instincts 
- 
the death drive and 
Eros 
- 
and defines them as biological tendencies 
opposed to the historical process of civilizing 
repression, a process that, according to Marcuse, is 
not only, as in Freud's account, exploiting the 
aggressive tendency of the death drive but also 
weakening the socialising tendency of Eros and thus 
unleashing even more aggressive violence (26-27; 52; 
83-87). Alongside Marcuse's Eros and Civilization, but 
outside the Frankfurt School, the other major text to 
repropose and revive the problematic of Civilization 
and Its Discontents is perhaps the first volume of 
Deleuze and Guattari's Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Anti-Oedipus. The link between Anti-Oedipus and 
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Civilization and Discontents is less obvious than that 
between Civilization and Its Discontents and Eros and 
Civilization, especially because Deleuze and 
Guattari's book not only presents itself as an open 
attack to psychoanalysis but also insists on a 
"materialist" understanding of desire (the drive) as 
what coincides with, rather than precedes social 
production (28-29). The conceptual revisions to which 
Deleuze and Guattari submit psychoanalysis are such, 
however, that ultimately the Freudian principle of the 
constitutive and primary character of the drive is 
preserved, since "social production" is understood by 
Deleuze and Guattari as a free "schizophrenic" play of 
libidinal "connective" (Eros), "disjunctive" (death 
drive), and "conjunctive" (subjectivation) syntheses 
which are then historically "organised" (repressed) in 
a particular system of production (civilization) (8; 
12-13; 16; 28-29). In this way, Deleuze and Guattari's 
famous argument that capitalism relies on and fosters 
the same schizophrenic and disjunctive syntheses that 
it also represses may be read, mutatis mutandi, as an 
updated version of Freud's original theory of the 
instrumental introjection of frustrated aggression by 
the civilizing superego. 
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Beyond their more or less dramatic conceptual 
revisions and adjustments, I would like to suggest 
that the main difference between the theorists quoted 
above and, on the other hand, Freud and Lacan, should 
be identified methodologically, rather than 
conceptually, at the level of the different ways in 
which they approach the same fundamental problem or 
question about civilization. Deleuze and Guattari and 
the Frankfurt School theorists, in fact, approach 
Freud's hypothesis on civilization from the point of 
view of their underlying concern with social critique 
and political transformation. The question of the 
discontent of civilization, therefore, becomes for 
them a primarily political question. This is 
particularly apparent in Marcuse's and in Deleuze and 
Guattari's negative emphasis on the idea of repression 
- 
which for them is almost synonymous with 
civilization - and in their parallel attempt to 
rediscover, against Freud and psychoanalysis more 
broadly, a positive, at once revolutionary and 
socially binding aspect of the drive through their 
promotion of the concepts of Eros and schizophrenia. 
We may say that in Marcuse and in Deleuze and Guattari 
Eros and schizophrenia emerge as political, socially 
constitutive and revolutionary categories, and are 
used to formulate an answer to a political reading of 
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the question originarily posed by Freud. For Marcuse, 
the "liberation" of the erotic component of 
instinctual life has in itself the capacity of 
"generating lasting erotic relations among 
individuals" in an advanced, "non-repressive" society 
that has "mastered the struggle for existence, " while 
the most violent manifestations of the death drive 
should be seen as by-products of the "surplus 
repression" and "frustration" of sexuality imposed by 
civilization, rather than as necessary consequences of 
a release from civilizing constraints (198-202). 
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 
schizophrenic character of the unconscious connective, 
disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses has the ability 
of continuously undoing their rigid social/Oedipal 
organization and of continually opening up the 
possibility of new social connections and ""nomadic" 
subjectivities, while, again, the aggressive and 
destructive quality of schizophrenia and of the 
disjunctive synthesis (the death drive) is for them 
only an effect of the way in which the three libidinal 
syntheses have been historically organised within the 
capitalist mode of production (335-36). 
Although Lacan definitely shares this concern with the 
emancipatory potential of desire and with the 
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possibility of alternative and non-repressive socio- 
political arrangements of the drive, the method of his 
approach to Freud is essentially different and should 
not be confused with the overtly political approach 
adopted by Marcuse and Deleuze and Guattari. Lacan 
gives us his most extensive reading of Freud's 
Civilization and Its Discontents in Seminar VII, 
L'ethique de la psychanalyse, which is also, as is 
well known, the seminar where Lacan offers his first 
sustained discussion of the concept of jouissance. 
Next to Marcuse's Eros and Civilization and Deleuze 
and Guattari's Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Lacan's 
Seminar VII may be thus hypothetically re-titled 
Jouissance and Civilization, as it is precisely 
through the concept of jouissance - rather than 
through "Eros" or "schizophrenia" - that Lacan reads 
the Freudian hypothesis of the discontent of 
civilization. Lacan's specific use of the concept of 
jouissance, in turn, introduces the main 
methodological difference between Lacan and the 
theorists discussed above. 
As Nestor A. Braunstein explains in his book on 
Lacan's elaboration of the concept of jouissance, 
Lacan's understanding of jouissance comes from Hegel's 
philosophy of right, and refers to "enjoyment" in the 
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legal sense of the "particular" and "subjective" 
"usufruct" of a good that is owned or possessed, and 
thus, by implication, also always stolen, lost, or 
appropriated by others (12-13). In Lacan's concept of 
jouissance, Braunstein continues, 
the theory of rights and the theory of 
psychoanalysis meet, since from the very 
beginning we need to confront the question of 
the original property of each subject, the 
body, and of the relationships of this body 
with the body of the other as they are made 
possible by a certain discourse or social 
link. [... ] Does my body belong to me or is it 
consecrated to the jouissance of the Other, of 
the Other of the signifier and of the law, who 
is depriving me of this property that cannot 
be mine if I do not snatch it in the same way 
from the arbitrary ambitions of the Other? [... ] 
As we can see, this is the history of the 
barriers to jouissance, of the licit and of 
the illicit. (13) 
As we will explain in the next sections of this 
chapter by following Lacan's own words, jouissance is, 
just like "Eros" and "schizophrenia, " a concept that 
relates to the more general Freudian notion of the 
drive, and thus also to the discontent of 
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civilization: it is through the destructive and 
aggressive drive that the subject attempts to "snatch" 
the jouissance of his body from the social order 
- 
the 
"Other of the signifier" 
- 
that has taken it away in 
the first place. 
In this way, the concept of jouissance characterises 
the conceptual and methodological specificity of 
Lacan's approach to the question of the discontent of 
civilization. On the one hand, conceptually, the 
notion of jouissance adds a new dimension to Freud's 
critique of civilization: civilization is not seen by 
Lacan simply as repressing and exploiting the 
aggressive drive but also as structuring the 
aggressive drive through its original dispossession of 
the subject's body. Lacan thus maintains the Freudian 
idea of the death drive as an original and primary 
orientation (causality is still assigned to the drive, 
rather than to civilization), but does not think, like 
Marcuse and Deleuze and Guattari, that the drive may 
be conceived as a "positive" force separated from its 
civilizing repression. On the other hand, 
methodologically, the notion of jouissance also 
transforms the question of the discontent of 
civilization into an ethical, rather than political, 
problem, since it also implies the idea of a choice 
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between the desire of the civilizing Other which takes 
possession of the body and its jouissance, the 
pleasure that one gets in return from accepting to 
lose one's body to civilization, and the jouissance, 
which, as Braunstein also points out, is opposed to 
both desire and pleasure, and, being found outside the 
civilized domain of the pleasure principle, is closer 
to pain or to a certain type of "pleasure-in-pain" 
than it is to mere "enjoyment" (12). 
We could sum up by saying that while Marcuse and 
Deleuze and Guattari offer a political reading of 
Freud centred on the concepts of Eros and 
schizophrenia as political concepts, Lacan offers an 
ethical reading of Freud centred on the concept of 
jouissance as an ethical concept. This distinction is 
of capital importance to grasp not only the method but 
also the originality and the specificity of Lacan's 
reading of Freud, a reading that starts and is 
informed precisely by Lacan's elaboration of the 
category of jouissance. Differently from "Eros" and 
"schizophrenia, " jouissance cannot be treated as a 
political concept, at least not in the sense that 
jouissance may be understood as a revolutionary or 
democratic force susceptible to be placed at the heart 
of a progressive political project. This is due to the 
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"legal" connotation that, as we have seen, marks 
Lacan's understanding of this concept and that 
suggests that jouissance is always in some way 
"stolen" and "owned, " either by the civilizing Other 
or by the subject who steals it back from the Other as 
something that is constitutively owned. 
Although jouissance is always, as we will have the 
chance to insist, criminally opposed to the Other of 
civilization, the act of reappropriating one's 
jouissance is thus not necessarily politically 
subversive, as it would still imply a certain degree 
of ownership, which cannot be avoided unless we are 
ready to forsake the idea of subjectivity as such (the 
subject being simply an effect of the loss of 
jouissance). For the same reason, moreover, jouissance 
is also not likely to be "liberated" or "shared" in 
any way, because, being constitutively and 
dialectically owned by a subject or by an Other, it 
must always be subjective and particular. We must 
insist, however, that the non-viability of jouissance 
as a political concept does not imply that jouissance 
may not, for Lacan, still function as an ethical 
category and embody a "criminal good" beyond the 
common good of civilization, in relation to which the 
subject may redefine his ethical conduct with 
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significant social and political consequences. Rather 
than endorsing the reappropriation and private 
enjoyment of jouissance, in fact, the ethical 
orientation towards jouissance proposed by Lacan aims 
precisely at overcoming the alienating and isolating 
effects of jouissance, as well as creating the 
conditions for a more effective type of social 
subversion (analytic subversion) and for the forging 
of a less repressive form of the social link (the 
analytic link). In Chapter II and Chapter III I will 
discuss in more detail these social and political 
consequences of the ethical orientation towards 
jouissance. Now we need to turn to Lacan's text in 
order to follow the letter of his reading of Freud's 
Civilization and Its Discontents in L'ethique de la 
psychanalyse. 
3. From Freud to Lacan 
It easy to see how in his examination of the paradox 
that lies at the heart of civilization's discontent 
Freud finds himself confronted with a problem that is 
essentially ethical. It is, on the one hand, clear to 
Freud that the ineradicable discontent of civilization 
suggests that we should reject social institutions and 
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seek happiness outside them, orienting us towards a 
type of ethics that Freud identifies as regressive and 
natural, insofar as it emerges through the negation of 
the constraints that define civilised life: "it is 
contended, " writes Freud, "that much of the blame for 
our misery lies with what we call our civilization, 
and that we should be much happier if we were to 
abandon it and revert to primitive conditions" 
(Civilization 30). On the other hand, however, Freud 
is also well aware that such an ethical orientation 
cannot result in the resolution of social suffering 
within a happy natural or "edenic" state, because the 
"powerful drives, " forming what Freud calls "man's 
inborn tendency to wickedness, to aggression and 
destruction, and therefore to cruelty", can only 
result in even more violence and destruction when they 
are not checked, repressed or sublimated by the 
pacifying forces of civilization (Civilization 72). 
Faced with the ethical conundrum, so essential to 
psychoanalytic thought, of man's desire to go against 
what protects him from destruction and death, Freud 
finds no other way out than to reconfirm a civilising 
and pacifying ethics of the common good at the expense 
of the destructive and regressive pursuit of 
individual freedom outside civilization: "given this 
fundamental hostility of human beings to one another 
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[... ] civilization has to make every effort to limit 
man's aggressive drives" (Civilization 61). 
Freud's "choice" and his rejection of a primitivist or 
anarchic ethics depends, of course, on his hypothesis 
of an originary destructive drive. We have seen how 
this hypothesis can be, and has indeed been rejected 
and contested in different ways, giving rise to 
different readings that either reduce the drive to its 
social and historical determinants or strive to 
recuperate a constructive and emancipatory side of the 
drive. While such readings may be criticised for 
simply changing the conceptual coordinates of Freud's 
original question without really attempting to answer 
it, they also, however, fail to grasp the originality 
of Freud's ethical position, a position that in no way 
amounts to a mere conservative apology of 
civilization. Even if he ends up upholding 
civilization against the aggressive and anarchic power 
of the drives, in fact, Freud's insistent awareness 
that, as he puts it, human beings will never "change 
their nature and become like termites" and will always 
"defend their claim to individual freedom against the 
will of the mass" also suggests that his ethical 
ground is different from that underlying other 
conservative or progressive endorsements of social 
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institutions (Civilization 42). Freud's ethical 
position cannot be mistaken for an unconditional 
apology of the common good of civilization because it 
remains based on a fundamental intuition of the 
ineradicable reality of human desire, on the idea that 
although civilization must be upheld to prevent 
violence and unhappiness, men will never be happy 
within civilization. 
Lacan's attempt to extract a psychoanalytic theory of 
ethics out of Freud's hypothesis on civilization 
starts precisely from this attitude of ethical 
indecision and hesitation that emerges very clearly in 
Freud's text and that Lacan tries to articulate by 
comparing Freud's ethical position to the ethical 
positions of the knave and of the fool. When in 
Seminar VII Lacan introduces his famous distinction 
between left- and right-wing intellectuals in terms of 
the difference between the figure of the fool and that 
of the knave, we can see how these two terms function 
to indicate two ethical attitudes towards desire which 
bring out by contrast the specificity of Freud's 
stance in his defence of social institutions. 
Lacan presents the left-wing intellectual as a fool 
because his place in society is similar to that of the 
73 
medieval court jester who can attack institutions 
while remaining a servant of institutions, "giving 
voice to so many heroic truths without ever wanting to 
pay the price for them" (SVII 215-16) 
. 
The right-wing 
intellectual, on the other hand, is described by Lacan 
as a knave because, in his acceptance and defence of 
the social status quo, "he does not hesitate in front 
of the consequences of what one calls realism, that 
is, he is ready, when necessary, to admit that he is a 
crook" (SVII 215) 
. 
If we look at these two characters 
from the point of view of an ethics of desire we can 
say that the figure of the (leftist) fool embodies a 
disavowal of the "destructive" face of desire and of 
the price of death and destruction that freedom 
demands against social institutions, replacing, so to 
say, the cost of freedom with a "foolish" belief that 
it is the progress of civilization that will liberate 
human beings from suffering. The figure of the knave, 
on the other hand, is also marked by a certain 
disavowal of desire, although this time it is the 
"human" face of desire and the dignity of the human 
quest for freedom against civilization that are not 
acknowledged: the knave does not care about the 
discontent of civilization; rather, he tries to 
exploit it for his own good, thus giving up on his 
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freedom in favour of a total acquiescence with social 
institutions. 
According to Lacan, in his diagnosis of the 
discontents of civilization, Freud does not manifest 
any of the traits of the fool and of the knave: he 
acknowledges the destructive nature of the drives but 
he also appreciates the suffering involved in their 
social repression. So, even if Freud did end up 
choosing civilised life against the dangers of the 
unrestrained drives, the fact that his defence of 
social institutions sprang from an intuition, rather 
than from a denial, of the contradictory structure of 
desire makes it inappropriate to describe his ethical 
attitude as either progressive or conservative. The 
Freudian hypothesis of the discontent of civilization, 
therefore, manifests an impasse of conservative and 
progressive ethics in front of desire. As Lacan puts 
it, "Freud was neither a crook nor an imbecile [... ] and 
this is why it is possible to say of him these two 
things, disconcerting in their juxtaposition and 
opposition - he was a humanitarian but not a 
progressivist" (SVII 216). 
The distinction between the fool and the knave is 
important for Lacan insofar as it allows him to point 
75 
towards an impasse also within Freud's own ethical 
position and to start defining the specificity of his 
own approach against Freud. For Lacan, Freud's 
endorsement of a conventional civilizing ethics of the 
common good and good functioning of social 
institutions represents a disavowal of the 
possibility, implicit in Freud's own formulation, of a 
criminal and all-destroying ethics of desire against 
the laws of civilization. In front of this possibility 
Freud "stops, " as Lacan puts it, "as if in horror, " 
and ultimately leaves the problem of the discontent of 
civilization unresolved (SVII 216). To paraphrase 
Lacan's point, we could say that Freud's insight into 
the nature of the discontent of civilization was, so 
to say, enough to prevent him from being a knave or a 
fool, but also too much for him to face up to its 
consequences, which would have made of him a criminal 
if he had just acknowledged the death drive as an 
ethical force. 
Caught between these three positions 
- 
the position of 
the fool, that of the knave and that of the criminal 
- 
Freud thus reached a point of impasse. Lacan imputes 
Freud's inability to move beyond a traditional ethics 
of the good to his reliance on classical notions of 
reason and need, which are "inadequate to appreciate 
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the field of human realisation, " but also to the 
unavailability of a structural logic of signification 
on which to ground a full understanding of the 
function of desire (SVII 247). Lacan's own proposed 
task in Seminar VII, I'ethique de la psychanalyse is 
precisely to question and develop the criminal ethics 
of desire which follows from Freud's diagnosis of the 
discontents of civilization. This criminal ethics 
depends, in turns, on Lacan's broader structuralist 
reformulation of Freud's hypothesis, a reformulation 
that is based on the Freudian notion of the death 
drive and that enables Lacan to introduce and 
articulate the difference between the concepts of 
jouissance, pleasure and desire as the cornerstones of 
psychoanalytic ethics. 
As we have noted in the first two sections of this 
chapter, in Civilization and Its Discontents Freud 
grounds his theory of "cultural frustration" on the 
idea, already introduced in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, of a fundamental destructive drive or death 
drive operating in addition and in contrast to the 
life-preserving and civilising tendency of Eros: while 
civilization is "a process in the service of Eros, 
whose purpose is to gather together individuals, " the 
programme of civilization is "opposed by man's natural 
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aggressive drive, the hostility of each against all 
and all against each, the descendant and principal 
representative of the death drive" (Civilization 74). 
Recasting Freud's theory in the new language of 
structural linguistics, Lacan redefines the death 
drive, and thus also the very cause of the discontent 
of civilization, in relation to the logic of the 
signifier: "the idea of the death drive [... ] depends on 
that structural element which, as soon as we are 
dealing with something presenting itself under the 
form of a signifying chain, produces, somewhere, and 
certainly outside the world of nature, the beyond of 
this chain, the ex-nihilo on which the chain grounds 
and articulates itself as such" (SVII 252). 
According to Lacan, human beings are primordially and 
constitutively "caught" [pris] within the logical 
structure of signification, suffering a fundamental 
splitting or Spaltung which alienates and locates 
their jouissance 
- 
the bodily kernel of our being, 
"defined as what defines the human" (SVII 150) 
- 
precisely in this inaccessible void produced beyond 
the signifying chain (SVII 247). This empty structural 
"place, ". containing the jouissance that has been 
stolen from the subject by the signifying Other of 
civilization, becomes thus the gravitational field 
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orienting desire and the death drive towards 
nothingness and "beyond the pleasure principle, " that 
is, towards destruction and death, "insofar as it 
calls into question everything that exists" (SVII 
251). Moreover, the articulation of the drive to the 
signifying chain allows Lacan to identify the 
destructive and negative tendency of the drive not 
only as a criminal but also an ethical tendency. 
Criminal because the destructive drive is clearly 
defined as a direct dialectical effect of its social 
prohibition through a contingent articulation of the 
signifying chain: "the dialectical relation between 
desire and the Law, " writes Lacan, "enflames our 
desire only in its relation to the Law, through which 
it becomes desire of death" (SVII 101). Ethical 
because this desire of death is essentially the desire 
for a certain good - identified by Lacan with the lost 
and radically other jouissance of das Ding - that is 
found beyond the good (and bad) of civilization, 
beyond the pleasure and pain that civilization trades 
for it, and, eventually, beyond the symbolic chain 
itself: "the subject [... ] cannot bear the good that das 
Ding can bring to him any more than he can take it for 
something bad, [... ] he can cry, blow up, curse, he 
cannot understand - nothing can be articulated, not 
even through metaphor" (SVII 89). 
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Most significantly in terms of Lacan's recasting of 
Freud's hypothesis on civilization, the criminal and 
ethical relation of the subject to jouissance must 
pass, for Lacan, not simply through the death drive 
but, more specifically, through a distinctively social 
relation to a neighbour who comes to occupy the 
structurally empty place of jouissance created by the 
signifying chain. As a site of radical otherness that 
confronts the subject with his lack or loss of a good 
that exceeds the limits of pleasure and signification, 
the place of jouissance becomes the place of the 
subject's neighbour, the place in relation to which a 
first and ambivalent social relation to the other, 
characterised by hostility, aggression and the death 
drive on the one hand, but also by the desire for a 
primordially lost jouissance on the other, is 
articulated. According to Lacan, Freud's "horror" in 
front of the ethical injunction to love the neighbour 
stems precisely from his inability not so much to 
understand as to accept the component of social 
aggression and hostility involved in an ethics of 
desire. As Lacan explains: 
Each time that Freud stops, as in horror, in 
front of the consequences of the commandment 
of the love of the neighbour [1'amour du 
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prochain], what comes up is the presence of 
that fundamental hostility that inhabits the 
neighbour. On the other hand this same 
hostility also inhabits myself. And what is 
closer [plus prochain] to myself than that 
kernel of jouissance in myself to which I 
don't dare approach? Because as soon as I move 
closer to it - and this is the meaning of 
Civilization and its Discontents 
- 
this 
inscrutable aggressivity arises, in front of 
which I step back. (SVII 219) 
Our ambivalent, conflictual and social relation to 
jouissance paves the way for a "scandalous" ethics 
that finds goodness and happiness in the transgression 
of the law and in the aggression of the neighbour. The 
destructive death drive, that is, is not only directed 
against or transferred to the Other of civilization 
that originally steals and appropriates the jouissance 
of the body. Precisely because it is constitutively 
lost, jouissance embodies, as such, a type of 
otherness that is distinct from the symbolic otherness 
of the civilizing Other of social institutions and 
distinct also from the imaginary otherness of the 
"fellow man" [le semblable] (SVII 223). Jouissance 
embodies the other as neighbour rather than as fellow 
man, the other as "prochain" rather than as 
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"semblable, " the neighbour that is myself and other to 
myself, the neighbour that enjoys the jouissance I 
have lost and whose body, in turn, I want to enjoy, 
the neighbour that makes me suffer and that, in turn, 
I love and torture for making me suffer. In this way, 
the subject's relation to jouissance comes to 
determine the social impact of the death drive on 
multiple levels: at the level of the subject's 
aggression against civilization, of civilization's 
aggression against the subject, and of the subject's 
aggression against the neighbour. 
Moreover, for Lacan the aggressive tendency of the 
death drive and the discontent of civilization are 
also related to the way in which the symbolic law ties 
up jouissance to the common good by asking the subject 
to give up his jouissance and by locating this 
jouissance in an object which then becomes the driving 
force of the social war around the possession of 
goods. In Lacan's account, the process that locates 
jouissance in the common good reverses the logic of 
Freud's original definition of sublimation. While 
Freud had simply argued that the "natural" death drive 
could be sublimated and directed towards the common 
good of civilization (Civilization 43-44), Lacan 
suggests that it is precisely in the production and 
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circulation of the common good qua social sublimation 
of jouissance that the death drive finds its support 
and becomes a discontent of civilization: "the true 
nature of the good, " says Lacan, "its inherent 
duplicity, lies in the fact that it is not purely and 
simply a natural good, the answer to a need, but 
possible power and power to satisfy" (SVII 274). There 
is, in other words, much more to the common good than 
its use value, there is also what Lacan calls its "use 
of jouissance, " the possibility for the common good to 
sublimate and embody an inaccessible and all-important 
satisfaction which will justify not only its economic 
circulation but also the "social war" around its 
(impossible) possession (SVII 269-275). 
"The relationship of man to the real of the goods, " 
says Lacan, "is organised in relation to a power that 
is that of another, of another who deprives us of it" 
(SVII 274). This means that, because for human beings 
the jouissance sublimated in goods must be 
structurally the jouissance of someone else, the 
jouissance of the neighbour who deprives us of it, 
nobody eventually enjoys anything, the good reinforces 
the civilising "barrier against jouissance" and 
everyone is also constantly at war against everybody 
else (SVII 270). For Lacan, the death drive thus also 
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sustains the "necessary dialectic of the struggle over 
goods, of the conflict between goods, and of the 
necessary catastrophe that it generates" (SVII 275). 
We may say then that the logic of the signifier allows 
Lacan to sketch a topology and an ontology on which to 
ground theoretically Freud's joint claim about the 
"natural" social aggressivity of human beings and the 
suffering caused by the social control of this 
aggressivity. In this respect, however, Lacan's 
reading also marks an important departure from Freud's 
original formulation. On the one hand, where Freud had 
talked about a "natural" and "original" aggressivity 
of human beings, Lacan's structural explanation, while 
maintaining the original character of human social 
hostility, redefines the death drive as an effect of 
the socio-cultural order of signification (the 
Symbolic Other), and, consequently as an effect of 
civilization, rather than as a natural condition. Of 
course, Lacan does not contradict Freud's idea that a 
certain discontent of civilization 
- 
which we can call 
"neurotic" suffering 
- 
is produced by the social 
repression or introjection of this aggressivity, since 
for Lacan, as for Freud, the function of civilization 
qua symbolic structure is primarily that of producing 
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a barrier against the destructive effects of the 
drive. 
The relation between drive and civilization in Lacan 
remains, however, dialectical, so that not only is the 
drive a direct effect of the law that forbids it, but 
the law itself cannot be invested with the dignity of 
a causal principle as it can only be the effect of a 
contingent, rather than necessary, articulation of the 
signifying chain with the body of the subject and its 
jouissance. The second main difference between Lacan 
and Freud is that Lacan, as we have seen, also 
overcomes Freud's embarrassment in front of an ethics 
of desire and, building on the ambiguity of Freud's 
ethical position, proposes an explicit identification 
between the death drive and the ethical drive. Freud 
had attempted to keep love and death neatly separated, 
acknowledging to some extent the link between the 
death drive and individual freedom and also opening up 
to the possibility of a social sublimation of the 
drive, but eventually reacting with horror to the idea 
of a "love of the neighbour" (e. g. the idea of a 
direct love of death). Lacan, on the other hand, 
manages to acknowledge more bravely and fully the 
fundamental link between love and death, presenting 
the criminal and ethical orientation of desire towards 
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death as a structural effect of a 
signifying/civilizing law rather than as a deviation 
from the civilizing purposes of Eros. 
4. The Ethical Drive and the Other 
At this point, Lacan's identification of the death 
drive as the ethical drive also raises an important 
question, particularly in relation to the problem of 
the discontent of civilization. Is Lacan suggesting 
that the violence and aggression of the drive should 
be simply accepted, and even embraced, as part of an 
ethical tendency towards the good of jouissance? Is 
Lacan implying, in other words, that the discontent of 
civilization is ethical? In fact, although Lacan does 
insist on the negative force of the death drive, the 
social aggression and violence that accompany it are 
always clearly distinguished from the ethical tendency 
of the drive as such. What Lacan refers to when he 
talks about a criminal ethics centred on the death 
drive cannot be reduced to the simple criminal 
transgression of social rules taking place in the 
struggle over power and jouissance that marks all 
civilized life. These more or less common aggressions 
and transgressions cannot constitute a criminal ethics 
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because, in spite of their apparent rejection of 
common civilized values, at a much deeper level they 
remain nevertheless subordinated to the Other's law 
and to the principle of the common good. 
For Lacan, there is an inherent "flaw" [une faille] in 
a social law that is not only born out of a 
paradoxical act of negation of authority 
- 
the totally 
contingent and groundless act of signification that 
articulates the body to the symbolic chain 
- 
but also 
gets transgressed all the time; nevertheless, it is 
precisely this "flaw" that makes the law difficult to 
break, since every transgression can only "lean on its 
opposite" and eventually reinforce the law (SVII 207- 
08). As Lacan repeatedly reminds us, the effectiveness 
of social rules in cutting off the access to 
jouissance depends on them being transgressed just as 
much it depends on them being respected: "we spend our 
time breaking the ten commandments, and this is why a 
society is possible" (SVII 84). Besides, as we have 
already seen, for Lacan the death drive is always tied 
up with, rather than opposed to the common good, so 
that even if criminal violence and aggression do, of 
course, always in a way manifest the ethical 
orientation of the drive by targeting the jouissance 
sublimated in the common good, their ethical 
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allegiance must remain, for this very same reason, 
with the common good rather than with a jouissance 
that could never be attained by the simple possession 
of objects. The "love of death" and the aggression 
against the neighbour as well as the aggression 
directed against and perpetrated by the Other 
(civilization) are thus seen by Lacan as symptoms of 
an orientation towards jouissance that betrays an 
ethics different from the ordinary, common ethics of 
civilized pleasure and interest. They are not, 
however, ethical as such. The death drive as ethical 
drive should therefore not be confused or equated with 
violence, aggression and transgression even when 
violence and aggression reflect the ethical agency of 
the death drive. 
In order to start to clarify further Lacan's 
identification of the death drive with the ethical 
drive, it may be useful to add some brief remarks on 
the difference between Lacan's theorisation of the 
Other and other, perhaps more popular, ethical 
elaborations of the concept of the Other, such as the 
one proposed, for example, by Emmanuel Levinas. On a 
superficial level, Levinas' analysis of the structure 
of the subject's relation to the Other seems rather 
close to Lacan's. In one of his most representative 
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later essays, "God and Philosophy, " Levinas describes 
how through a phenomenological relation to the 
neighbour the subject can "awaken" to a transcendental 
relation to the "other" [autrui] and to a desire that 
is not only "beyond satisfaction" and "of another 
order than the desires involved in hedonist or 
eudaemonist affectivity, " but also fundamentally 
traumatic and "nondesirable, " capable of "disturbing" 
and "devastating" the signifying order of thought, 
subjectivity, presence and being (175-77). 
For Levinas, the love of the neighbour is "a dazzling, 
where the eye can takes more than it can hold, an 
igniting of the skin which touches and does not touch 
what is beyond the graspable, and burns" (177). These 
formulas may sound rather close to those used by Lacan 
to describe the subject's relation to the neighbour 
and to the structural place of das Ding. There is, 
however, a radical difference between Lacan's and 
Levinas' way of conceptualizing the otherness of the 
neighbour. In Levinas, the relation to the neighbour 
becomes a relation to an otherness that is primary and 
absolute, to the point of being explicitly 
transcendent and religious, to the point also that the 
relation to the neighbour can be defined as a 
religious experience, as the "latent birth of religion 
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in the other" (181). For Lacan, on the other hand, the 
shattering power of the otherness that the subject 
experiences in his relation to the neighbour is 
divested of all religious transcendence and necessity 
only to become the effect of a contingent articulation 
of the signifying chain. While for Levinas the 
otherness of the neighbour points to the Otherness of 
a God that is "other with an alterity prior to the 
alterity of the other" (179), and thus capable 'of 
imposing its Law on the subject, for Lacan there is, 
according to the famous formula proposed in 
"Subversion du sujet et dialectique du desir dans 
1'inconscient freudien, " "no Other of the Other: " if 
the Other is the "place of the signifier, " Lacan 
argues, "any statement of authority can only be backed 
up by its own enunciation, as it is pointless that it 
should try to find its guarantee in another signifier, 
which in no way may be found outside this place" 
(813). 
The Lacanian big Other is nothing more than an 
inconsistent, incomplete set of signifiers that carves 
out the empty place of the small other/neighbour but 
does not hold, as such, any power over the subject, 
who is ultimately (albeit not, of course, consciously) 
the only one responsible for its articulation and for 
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the enounciation of the law. It is true, therefore, 
that for Lacan the death drive does, essentially, 
constitute an ethical relation to otherness 
- 
to the 
otherness of jouissance and of the neighbour 
- 
but the 
ethical responsibility and the obligation that the 
subject feels towards this otherness beyond his 
pleasure and understanding do not have the absolute 
and binding character of a law that pre-exists the 
subject. On the other hand, the fact that the place of 
the neighbour is constituted by a contingent social 
act 
- 
the articulation of the signifying chain and the 
supposed subtraction of jouissance from the subject by 
the Other 
- 
implies that the relation to the neighbour 
is marked not only by the purely ethical excess of a 
"mystical" experience but also by a whole set of 
unethical motives (envy, fear, resentment, revenge) 
that determine the aggression and violence of the 
relation to the neighbour. 
These unethical motives, and the violence and 
aggression that accompany them, are not necessary 
attributes of the death drive but consequences of the 
subject's supposition of an all powerful, law-giving 
and jouissance-depriving Other, and may be overcome 
only at the cost of the subject's ability to 
acknowledge the inconsistency of the Other and to take 
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responsibility for the positing of the law that led to 
his loss of jouissance. Lacan, in short, suggests not 
only that the death drive can be isolated from the 
violence and aggression of civilization, but also that 
the very possibility of a purely ethical relation to 
the neighbour depends on the non-existence, rather 
than on the existence, of an Other acting as the 
guarantor of the Law of civilization. 
The entanglement of the death drive with the 
discontent of civilization depends, therefore, on the 
existence of the Other, since it is the symbolic other 
and its law that triggers a displacement of jouissance 
from the body to the common good and determines, in 
turn, the overlapping of the ethical drive with social 
aggression. Lacan's ethics, however, questions the 
existence of the Other and argues that the authority 
of the symbolic law is only supposed by the subject. 
From a purely linguistic point of view, the 
metaphorical articulation of the symbolic chain with 
the jouissance of the body can only be the result of 
an absolutely contingent and by no means necessary act 
of signification that produces the subject and the 
Other only retroactively. 
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In Seminar VII, moreover, Lacan finds the same logic 
at work in Freud's myth of the primal horde in Totem 
and Taboo, where the existence of the Other and its 
civilizing law are given only as the apres coup effect 
of a murder that needs to pass through the 
disappearance of the Other in order to signify its 
power 
- 
as Lacan succinctly puts it: "there has never 
been a father except in the mythology of the son" 
(SVII 207-9) 
. 
The non-existence of the Other has then 
a crucial importance for the possibility of 
formulating a psychoanalytic ethics based on the death 
drive because, if the subject can eventually find a 
way to acknowledge that there is not an Other 
responsible for the jouissance that is lost or gained, 
the ethical drive can also be deflected from social 
conflict and aggression. By taking responsibility for 
whatever is signified through the symbolic chain, on 
the other hand, the subject can also start to question 
the ethical values proposed by the Other and learn to 
locate his jouissance where it belongs, not in the 
common good, not in the pleasure principle, not in the 
jouissance of violence and pain, not in any object 
that may be bought or stolen, but in the nothingness 
carved out by the symbolic chain, beyond the common 
good, beyond pleasure and pain. 
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From this position, of course, ethics still involves a 
relation to a point of otherness; this otherness (the 
place of jouissance), however, is essentially empty 
and does not pre-exist or hold any sway over the 
subject. In being directed towards this essentially 
empty target, the death drive becomes autonomous from 
the law and from the common good and, consequently, 
leaves the aggressions and transgressions of the 
social dialectic behind. It becomes ethical and 
criminal not by virtue of its transgression of the 
law, but by virtue of its focus on jouissance as a 
good that transcends any good that the law may define, 
propose, circulate or forbid. As Lacan puts it, the 
separation of jouissance and the drive from the common 
good implies a "radical repudiation of a certain ideal 
of the good" which opens up the way for what Lacan 
calls a "relation to the criminal good: " a criminal 
ethics (SVII 270; 281). In Seminar VII, Lacan 
describes this process whereby the death drive can be 
separated from the common good - and from the 
discontent of civilization 
- 
as a process of 
sublimation. In this particular sense, sublimation 
inverts the dynamic of the sublimation of jouissance 
into the common good which grounds the social war over 
the possession of goods, and finds its most typical 
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manifestations, as we will see in the next section, 
in the practices of art and love. 
5. Sublimation and the Common Good 
Lacan devotes the whole of the second part of Seminar 
VII to a reassessment of the concept of sublimation. 
The first three sessions ("Drives and Lures, " "The 
Object and the Thing, " and "On Creation Ex Nihilo") 
concentrate on the definition of the concept of 
sublimation in the context of a re-reading of Freud's 
theory of the drives and against previous definitions, 
including Freud's and Melanie Klein's. The other three 
sessions ("Marginal Comments, " "Courtly Love As 
Anamorphosis, " and "A Critique of Bernfeld"), focus on 
art and on the cultural and historical implications of 
sublimation, offering the case of courtly love 
literature as example. Lacan starts from Freud's 
definition of sublimation as a certain form of 
satisfaction of the drive in which the drive is 
deflected from its natural and original aim (SVII 
110) 
. 
He rejects, however, both Freud's and Klein's 
explanation for this paradoxical satisfaction of the 
drive away from its aim: the drive is neither simply 
"desexualised" and turned away from its natural 
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genital/instinctual aim (Freud) nor satisfied thanks 
to the substitution of an imaginary object for the 
lost body of the mother (Klein). The drive, Lacan 
argues, is satisfied precisely because it misses its 
aim. The sublimation that provides the drive with a 
satisfaction different from its aim is, says Lacan, 
"precisely that which reveals the nature of the drive 
insofar as it is not simply instinct, but has a 
relation to das Ding as such, to the Thing insofar as 
it is distinct from the [imaginary] object" (SVII 
111) 
. 
How is this possible? Simply "by raising the 
object" 
- 
Lacan's formula for sublimation 
- 
"to the 
dignity of the Thing, " that is, by introducing a split 
in the object, so that the object is itself (e. g. 
imaginary) and other than itself (e. g. the real Thing 
that provides satisfaction) at the same time (SVII 
112). 
For Lacan, then, sublimation is not simply one 
particular form of satisfaction of the drive but it 
defines the very nature of the drive as a "drift, " as 
a circular path around the erogenous zones as gaps or 
"points de beance" on the surface of the imaginary 
body (SVII 93). The libidinal economy of the drive is 
opposed to the direct genital cathexis of the 
instinct, to the indirect economy of signifying 
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substitution of the symptom, and to the metonymical 
lack of satisfaction of desire (Lacan, SVII 94) 
. 
This 
is why sublimation becomes a crucial ontological 
rather than psychological concept. The Freudian Trieb, 
Lacan insists, "can in no way be limited to a 
psychological notion" and should be considered instead 
as an "absolutely fundamental ontological notion" 
(SVII 127) 
. 
Lacan, in fact, is very cautious regarding the 
Kleinian myth of the primordial lost object as the 
body of the mother and prefers instead to qualify das 
Ding as a primordial ontological "nothing, " an after- 
the-fact hypothesis that functions as an operational 
concept to formulate a theory of the subjective 
constitution of knowledge (SVII 104). The primordial 
Thing is what "suffers from the signifier, " meaning 
that the opposition between the Thing and the 
representations or Vorstellungen through which the 
Thing can be known is not merely one of separation 
between thinking and being, but, rather, a loss of 
enjoyment and, consequently, the creation of a void, 
of the ontological nothing of enjoyment as void 
(Lacan, SVII 118). If, by consequence, the real of the 
Thing, "the real that we do not have to limit, the 
real in its totality, " is irreparably lost, we still 
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nonetheless have access to the partial real of the 
drives that get their satisfaction from circling 
around little nothings, gaps or voids that may be 
filled by any particular object (Lacan, SVII 118). The 
Thing, its nothingness and its enjoyment are still 
there but they are always also already cut up and 
veiled by the semblant of the Vorstellungen, objects- 
semblants, signifiers or representations. This is what 
allows Lacan to say that, essentially, "there is 
nothing between the organisation of the signifying 
network in the network of Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen 
[the representatives of the representation, the 
unconscious as a chain of signifiers] and the 
constitution of the central place in which the field 
of the Thing as such presents itself to us: " because 
the Thing is always, by nature, represented by 
something else, the Thing is also the Other thing, the 
unconscious network of signifiers as the place of the 
Thing (SVII 118) 
. 
Even if the search for enjoyment 
"follows the path of the signifier, " this search is, 
as Lacan puts it, a radically "antipsychic" search, 
because it operates, by means of sublimation, to 
arrest the sliding of signifiers that regulates the 
functioning of the psychic apparatus in order, so to 
say, to "purify" the signifier from its symbolic 
function, allowing it to become a representative of 
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the Thing by being a thing, that is, a little piece of 
nothingness (SVII 119). 
If we turn now more specifically to the question of 
art we find that for Lacan the ontology of the drive 
is exactly what grounds sublimation as a creative 
process. It is only, in fact, the creative 
manipulation of a signifier or of an object that can 
put the subject into relation with an object that 
represents the Thing: "an object, insofar as it is a 
created object, may fill the function that enables it, 
not to avoid the Thing as a signifier, but to 
represent it" (Lacan, SVII 119). Not only, then, does 
sublimation create a new object by impeding its 
signifying function (what the object is, its 
definition by means of other signifiers), but it 
creates it as a partial ontological nothingness that 
represents a (lost, impossible) total nothingness. 
Referring to the classic philosophical example of the 
vase as the first created object, Lacan points out 
that the emptiness of the Thing "represented in the 
representation" of the vase "presents itself as a 
nihil, as nothing: " this is the reason why it is also 
possible to say that the artist-potter "creates the 
vase with its hands around this emptiness, creates it, 
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just like the mythical creator, ex nihilo, starting 
with a hole" (SVII 121). 
Lacan thus offers a psychoanalytic theory of art that 
is radically (although also somewhat ambiguously) 
anti-mimetic. Works of art imitate the objects they 
represent, "but their end is certainly not to 
represent them" because "in offering the imitation of 
an object, they make something different out of that 
object" (SVII 141). Works of art "only pretend" to 
imitate the object because their true end is "to 
establish it in a certain relationship to the Thing 
which it is intended to encircle and to render both 
present and absent" (Lacan, SVII 141). 
The positing of sublimation and the drive at the 
centre of the creative process has major consequences 
for Lacan's views on the historical and social status 
of the artwork. In the first place, Lacan rejects the 
possibility of a "history of art, " that is, the 
possibility of relating art to what he calls a 
"substructure" (SVII 141). Because every operation of 
sublimation "consists in overthrowing the illusory 
operation so as to return to the original end, which 
is to project a reality that is not that of the object 
represented, " Lacan concludes that "the relation of 
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the artist to the time in which he appears is always a 
contradictory one. It is against the current, in 
opposition to the reigning norms 
- 
including, for 
example, political norms, or indeed, systems of 
thought 
- 
that art attempts to operate its miracle 
once more" (SVII 141-2). Sublimation is thus presented 
as an anti-historical moment of discontinuity (a 
"miracle"), capable of, literally, purifying the 
created aesthetic object from its dominant social 
value by tying it closely to the ontological 
nothingness of the death drive. 
It is very important to note that, in spite of this 
position, Lacan does not contradict Freud's thesis 
that the operations of sublimation are always morally, 
culturally, and socially valorised, but specifies, 
instead, the particular sense in which Freud's claim 
should be understood. While Freud simply argued that 
sublimation redirects the libido towards objects of 
public utility, socially approved and valorised, Lacan 
asserts that "at the level of sublimation the object 
is inseparable from imaginary and especially cultural 
elaborations, " yet, at the same time, he also insists 
that "it is not in the approval that society gladly 
accords it that we must seek the power of sublimation" 
(SVII 99). On the one hand, sublimations can be 
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socially acceptable and welcome to the extent that the 
collectivity can find in them a defensive and 
comforting "space of relaxation where it may delude 
itself on the subject of das Ding and colonise the 
field of das Ding with imaginary schemes" (Lacan, SVII 
99). On the other hand, however, Lacan is very clear 
on the importance of separating idealisation (e. g. the 
production of social values), from sublimation, on the 
ground that sublimation, by definition, operates 
outside and beyond the domain of the pleasure 
principle, that is, beyond the domain of the law and 
of the imaginary ideals set up by the Other. 
Sublimation can indeed produce systems of rules and 
values, but these are not, strictly speaking, social 
and moral, but, rather, ethical values insofar as they 
concern the subject's desire in the real and not its 
subjection to the demands of the Other (Lacan, SVII 
142-45). The example chosen by Lacan, courtly love, is 
very significant in this respect. Firstly, courtly 
love shows how art can produce, from nothing, a 
codified ethics that stands in total contrast with the 
social values of the time (Lacan, SVII 147-49). 
Secondly, it illustrates how two very distinct 
processes, idealisation (the Lady as an imaginary 
narcissistic ideal) and sublimation (the Lady as 
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"inhuman partner, " a stand-in for the Other Thing) can 
overlap (Lacan, SVII 150-51). Thirdly, it reveals that 
the nothingness embodied by the Lady is not a 
universal and transcendental structure but is 
contingent and historically specific: because the Lady 
is often described as a cruel and arbitrary master (a 
"domna"), Lacan notes that what courtly poems really 
do is "to locate in the place of the Thing certain 
discontents of the culture" (SVII 150). It is, in 
other words, the very underside of the dominant social 
law (arbitrary cruelty) that is acknowledged in the 
act of sublimation, while sublimation also enables a 
purification or separation of the drive from the 
aggression and violence that accompany its 
articulation with objects, customs and social 
relations sanctioned by the Other. 
To return to the more general scope of our discussion, 
we may say that Lacan thus distinguishes between a 
sublimation of the drive into the common good and a 
sublimation of the drive from the common good. The 
first type of sublimation corresponds to what Lacan 
calls "idealization" and describes the properly 
Freudian process whereby the drive is put at the 
service of civilization: civilization directs the 
drive towards certain objects that in this way achieve 
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a certain "jouissance value" and can circulate and be 
shared socially. Lacan acknowledges that this type of 
sublimation results in a certain regulation and 
pacification of the drive within the register of the 
pleasure principle, but also insists that since this 
regulation is sanctioned by the Other it is also 
always associated to a certain degree of violence and 
aggression in the social struggle over the possession 
of goods. 
The second type of sublimation of the death drive, the 
sublimation from the common good, on the other hand, 
is specific to Lacan's theory and describes the 
process whereby a subject can direct the drive towards 
an object that would index or embody the lost place of 
his jouissance directly, that is, without the 
mediation of the Other and beyond the received social 
value or meaning of that object. Lacan insists that 
this is a process of creation, a creation, however, 
that works in two directions: the creation of a new 
object by the subject from or around the nothingness 
of the Thing and the simultaneous creation of a new 
set of ethical values (a Law) that define the 
subject's independent and autonomous relation to the 
space of his jouissance. 
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As Gerard Pommier has pointed out, this two-way 
creative movement is particularly apparent in Lacan's 
examples of love and art, where the "creating work" 
and the "created creator" exchange places: the lover 
and the artist create the loved one and the work of 
art as narcissistic semblants of the empty space of 
jouissance at the heart of their beings, but in this 
way the loved one and the work of art also appear as 
the very cause and content of the lover' s name and of 
the artist's signature, "creating the creator" and 
allowing him to exist as a subject that relates to his 
jouissance independently from the Other (64-66). 
Sublimation thus becomes literally a form of 
purification of desire from the common good and thus 
also a separation of the ethical tendency of the death 
drive from the discontents 
- 
violence, aggression, 
envy, resentment, etc. - that the subject experiences 
when he relates to his jouissance through the Other 
and its Law, rather than through his own "name" or 
"signature. " 
In conclusion to this section and to this chapter, we 
may observe that Lacan redefines the Freudian concept 
of sublimation in a way that brings it much closer to 
the Kantian notion of the sublime as formulated in the 
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Critique of Judgement, and, more broadly, to the 
sublime as a distinctively aesthetic category, than to 
Freud's original psychological understanding of 
sublimation as a form of desexualisation of the drive. 
This aspect of Lacan's teaching has received extensive 
attention in many recent studies that have emphasised 
the centrality of the concept of sublimation for a 
Lacanian understanding of art. These studies include 
Joan Copjec's Imagine There Is No Woman and Read My 
Desire, Darian Leader's Stealing the Mona Lisa, 
Parveen Adams' The Emptiness of the Image, as well as 
many collections of essays such as Art: Sublimation or 
Symptom? (edited by Parveen Adams) and Lacan and 
Contemporary Film (edited by Todd McGowan and Sheila 
Kunkle). By focussing on the singularity of the 
creative process of sublimation within each individual 
text, many of these books and essays have managed to 
move away from the most conventional types of 
psychoanalytic reading 
- 
which typically reduce texts 
to Oedipal narratives or imaginary ideological lures 
- 
and insist instead on the essentially ethical value of 
the artwork as the site of a subjective engagement 
with the place of jouissance. 
This approach has been illustrated effectively with 
particular reference to film studies by Benjamin Noys 
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in the introduction of a recent special issue of Film- 
Philosophy, Lacan, Encore. According to Noys, 
contemporary Lacanian film criticism is marked by a 
concentration on truth, on the Lacanian truth as 
"half-saying" ("mi-dire"), a truth which "takes places 
in the impasse of saying" (III). This impasse of 
saying corresponds, in film, to an impasse of 
signification and representation which takes the 
designation of the Real and which is not a mere "inert 
block to signification, " but, as Noys explains using 
the terminology of Alain Badiou, an "evental site" of 
possible transformation which the reading of film must 
learn to "cultivate" (III-IV). However interesting and 
significant Lacan's theory of sublimation may be for 
the study of art, we must remember, however, that in 
the context of Lacan's reading of Freud's Civilization 
and Its Discontents in Seminar VII, the concept of 
sublimation is far from exhausting Lacan's engagement 
with the ethical and social problematic raised by 
Freud's hypothesis. Lacan in no way reduces ethics to 
aesthetics or suggest a reductive identification of 
ethical practice with artistic practice and love. 
Lacan's discussion of sublimation, rather, has only 
the function of illustrating the structural logic of 
the separation of the death drive from the discontents 
of civilization and, occupying only the second part of 
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Seminar VII, leaves open a series of questions 
concerning the nature and consequences of the ethical 
act in relation to the social link. We will now turn 
to these questions continuing to follow closely 
Lacan's argument in part three and four of Seminar 
VII. 
Chapter II 
Sade and the Ethical Crime 
1. The Ethical Crime 
In Chapter I we have tried to reconstruct how Lacan' s 
reading of Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents 
leads him to the conclusion that, in relation to the 
common good that orients the ethics of civilization, 
the ethics of psychoanalysis must be defined as a 
criminal ethics. Two particular theoretical steps were 
essential to this conclusion. The first was the 
identification of the death drive with the ethical 
drive. The second was the distinction between, on the 
one hand, the merely criminal agency of the death 
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drive sublimated into the common good and, on the 
other hand, the ethical criminal agency of the death 
drive sublimated from the common good. In more 
concrete terms, we have seen how the first, non- 
ethical (for Lacan if not for Freud) sublimation of 
the drive into the common good fuels the criminal 
violence of the social struggle for the possession of 
goods, while the second, ethical sublimation of the 
drive from the common good identifies the criminal 
disregard for the common good one can encounter in art 
and love. We have thus seen the process of sublimation 
emerge as the element that allows one to discriminate 
between the common crime and the ethical crime, 
between the crime that partakes of the discontent of 
civilization and the crime that the criminal ethics of 
psychoanalysis defines against the good of 
civilization. At this point we cannot avoid, however, 
remarking that this distinction between common crime 
and ethical crime also seems to have the effect of 
somehow undermining the very "criminality" of the 
ethical crime. If, in fact, the ethical crime 
corresponds to a sublimation of the drive from the 
common good, it seems clear that the criminal and 
destructive value of this process is only a secondary 
and accidental effect of the drive's goal, which is 
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primarily that of circling around and enjoying a void 
and not that of destroying the common good. 
As Lacan's examples of art and love show very well, 
the criminality of the ethical sublimation of the 
drive appears to be only a secondary consequence of 
the drive's indifference towards the common good 
because the drive does not aim at destruction per se 
but at enjoying a remainder of Das Ding in the object. 
This point has been illustrated in different ways by 
Lacanian theorists. Alain Badiou, for example, has 
developed it in the context of a critique of the 
contemporary ethics of difference, suggesting that 
ethics is not so much against what in a particular 
situation is identified as good, as it is in-different 
towards differences, indifferent, that is, towards the 
very system of differential values that constitute a 
situation (Ethics 27). It would seem, therefore, that 
a certain non-reversibility exists between the ethical 
and the criminal in psychoanalytic ethics: the ethical 
must also somehow be criminal because it implies a 
destruction and a disregard for the good, but, at the 
same time, the criminal as such cannot define the 
ethical since the ethical is not concerned with a mere 
"negation" of the good, but with the articulation of a 
position of jouissance. 
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What I would like to suggest, however, is that the 
non-reversibility of the criminal and the ethical in 
Lacan's theory of ethics is only apparent, since it is 
also clear that the very possibility of the 
articulation of the position of jouissance - the 
relation to Das Ding - which defines the ethical in 
psychoanalysis depends on a criminal act, while the 
process of sublimation itself is also nothing but a 
criminal act of negation. Although ethics might 
rightly be deemed to be indifferent, rather than 
opposed, to the common good, this indifference must be 
born out of an act that can only define itself in 
relation to the Other and to the law that it negates. 
We will argue then that the criminal not only cannot 
be explained simply as a secondary effect of the 
ethical but must be recognised as the very "practical" 
condition of the ethical in Lacan's theory. 
In this chapter I will try to clarify how this is the 
case by reversing the terms of my analysis: rather 
than interrogating 
- 
as I have done up to this point - 
the way in which the ethical sublimation of the drive 
must be distinguished from the criminal vicissitudes 
of the drive within civilization, I will follow 
Lacan' s reading of Sade 
- 
in Seminar VII and in "Kant 
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avec Sade" - in order to establish how, conversely, a 
criminal act of negation may 
- 
or may not 
- 
enable the 
sublimation of the drive. The question will be, in 
other words, more specifically that of how a subject 
may arrive at the ethical sublimation of the drive: 
can this be achieved through a simple "criminal" act 
of negation capable of projecting the subject beyond 
the common good of civilization? Lacan's discussion of 
art and love in the second part of Seminar VII 
illustrated how sublimation can structure the relation 
of the subject to jouissance beyond the common good 
but did not disclose what particular gesture can make 
such sublimation possible. In his discussion of Sade, 
which occupies the third part of Seminar VII and is 
continued in one of Lacan's most famous Ecrits, "Kant 
avec Sade, " Lacan interrogates the very possibility of 
this gesture, not only from the point of view of its 
possible definition as an ethical crime, but also, and 
especially, from the point of view of the conditions 
of its practice for the subject. 
Lacan gives us a very explicit definition of the 
ethical crime towards the end of Seminar VII. Although 
at this point he is talking about Sophocles' Antigone 
and not about the Marquis de Sade, Lacan returns to 
Sade for a moment in order to present his audience 
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with a theoretical definition of the ethical crime, 
which he borrows and adapts from a passage of Sade's 
Juliette quoted earlier in the seminar, the "system of 
Pope Pius VI" (SVII 248-50) 
. 
Following Sade, Lacan 
defines the ethical crime as a type of transgression 
which becomes ethical because it manages to outdo the 
structural violence and destruction of civilization by 
aiming directly at the nothingness of jouissance: 
The thought of Sade arrives at giving shape to 
this truly singular type of excess 
- 
that 
through crime it is in the power of man to 
free nature from the chains of her own laws. 
The reproduction of forms around which her 
possibilities at once harmonious and 
irreconcilable come to a halt in a conflicting 
impasse, this is all that one needs to put 
aside in order to force her, if we may say so, 
to start again from nothing. This is the aim 
of the crime. (SVII 302) 
In Lacan's reading of Sade, the "chains of nature" 
stand for the signifying chain of the symbolic order 
that governs civilization by means of a functional and 
socially useful alternation of opposites 
- 
vice and 
virtue, violence and altruism, creation and 
destruction 
- 
"possibilities at once harmonious and 
irreconcilable. " The Sadean notion of crime becomes 
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for Lacan the structural definition of the ethical act 
because, by preserving the sense of Sade's quest for 
an extreme and ultimate transgression, the ethical act 
would similarly manage to fully realise the course of 
the death drive towards the "criminal good" 
- 
the 
place of jouissance, the nothingness beyond the 
signifying chain 
- 
bypassing the structural violence 
of civilization. But how exactly does Lacan understand 
this fundamental ethical gesture? 
Lacan emphasises how the logic of the ethical crime is 
not one of simple and all-embracing annihilation 
because the deadly void targeted by the drive is also 
the living core of human subjectivity: the death drive 
aims at a nothingness that is between life and death, 
a "second death, " "death impinging upon the domain of 
life, life impinging upon death" (SVII 291,341). This 
is why, as Lacan points out, the Sadean crime never 
results in the simple death of its victims but rather 
turns the victim into an "indestructible support" of 
torture and destruction, unveiling the fundamental 
relation of the subject to his jouissance as a 
neighbourly and torturing void at the heart of 
subjectivity (SVII 303). 
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The Sadean crime thus manages to confront the subject 
with his jouissance, but the unveiling of the 
subject's relation to his violent neighbourly core, 
however, is not sufficient to free the subject from a 
jouissance that remains structural even when it is 
detached from the common good. For Lacan, the ethical 
crime can only come full circle when the subject 
negates his own subjection as "victim" to the 
jouissance of the drive by articulating an 
indestructible desire that sustains itself on nothing, 
opening up the possibility of, as Lacan puts it in the 
quote above, "starting again from nothing, " from a 
pure and objectless desire. We may say that in this 
way the ethical crime complements the "reversed" 
process of sublimation of the death drive from, rather 
than into, the common good by negating even the 
jouissance of the drive itself and by adding a further 
degree of sublimation of the drive into desire. 
As Lacan clearly states in the last pages of Seminar 
VII, the ethical act is, essentially, the act of being 
faithful to one's impossible desire for jouissance by 
sacrificing the (fake) jouissance embedded in or even 
extracted from the common good: "you can sublimate 
everything you want but you need to pay for it with 
something, [... ] this something is called jouissance, 
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[... ] this is the object, the good that one has to pay 
in order to satisfy desire, [... ] the share of goodness 
sacrificed in the name of desire 
- 
and you can observe 
that this corresponds to the share of desire that is 
lost in the name of what is good" (SVII 371). In 
short, therefore, because there cannot be any "free" 
jouissance for the subject (not even the jouissance of 
the drive sublimated from the common good), for Lacan 
the ethical crime must intervene to liberate the 
subject from the stronghold of the symbolic Other not 
by liberating the drive 
- 
which eventually remains 
tied up with the controlling power of the Other 
- 
but 
by putting the barrier of desire between the subject 
and jouissance. 
Lacan's definition of the ethical crime thus insists 
not so much on how the subject may find an ethical 
position in relation to his jouissance beyond the 
common good of civilization, but on how the subject 
may reclaim his freedom and autonomy from the 
structural constraints of civilizing structures and 
from the power of jouissance itself. In this sense, 
Lacan's definition recalls in many ways Georges 
Bataille's famous theory of the "sovereign" nature of 
crime and transgression. As Elisabeth Roudinesco has 
pointed out in her biographical study of Lacan, as 
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well as having strong family ties 
- 
Lacan married 
Bataille's first wife Sylvia and subsequently acted as 
a father for Bataille's daughter Laurence 
- 
Lacan and 
Bataille had been friends since the early 1930s, were 
inspired by the same ideas and concepts, and shared a 
number of formative intellectual experiences, 
including an active involvement with surrealism and 
with the Nietzschean and Hegelian revival of the 1930s 
(130-39). Indeed, as David Macey has also suggested, 
Lacan's tendency to value the subversive and 
liberating side of crime and transgression may be 
taken, among other things, also as a persisting legacy 
of Surrealism's own avant-garde cult of criminals (70- 
74). 
The link between Bataille and Lacan, however, goes 
beyond the mere range of their common influences and 
concerns and includes a direct influence of Bataille 
on Lacan. According to Roudinesco, in fact, it was 
Bataille that "initiated him [Lacan] to a new 
understanding of Sade, whose writing would later lead 
him to formulate a non-Freudian theory of pleasure, " 
while Lacan "also borrowed Bataille's ideas on the 
impossible and heterology, deriving from them a 
concept of the `real, ' seen first as a `residue' and 
then as `impossible "' (136). As is well known, 
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Bataille's work turns around the concept of limitless 
and wasteful expenditure [depense) as the primary 
attribute of the sovereign element which, in relation 
to a given closed, social, psychic and signifying 
economy, disregards all considerations of utility, 
reason and meaning in order to open up to the freedom 
of a boundless general economy and to expenditure 
itself as a form of "being in excess of being" 
(Eroticism 173). Gratuitous crime, destruction and 
violence are, for Bataille, privileged instances of 
such sovereign expenditure, and it is precisely this 
idea of the criminal gesture as a gesture that can 
happen in excess of the values and functional rules of 
a particular system (including their "utilitarian" 
transgression) that marks the point of contact between 
Lacan's and Bataille's thought. 
Just like Lacan, moreover, Bataille also considers 
Sade a fundamental reference for the theoretical 
elaboration of this type of criminal ethics. In one of 
his major works, Eroticism (published in 1957), 
Bataille presents the Sadean man (rather than Sade 
himself) as the ideal embodiment of the "sovereign 
man" whose criminal acts of destruction reach beyond 
the common good and "control sovereign attitudes in 
ourselves, attitudes that is to say that are 
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gratuitous and purposeless, only useful for being what 
they are and never subordinated to ulterior ends" 
(185). Crucially, for Bataille, the Sadean man pursues 
crime even beyond his own interest and egoism and 
asserts his sovereignty by means of an "enormous 
denial" which also involves his own personal self and 
leads to the motif of the "pleasure" of apathy and 
impersonality in crime (171-76) 
. 
In another work, La 
litterature et le mal (also published in 1957), 
Bataille pushes this analysis even further and argues 
that this negation of self and other, which defines 
the Sadean crime as a form of "disenchainment" 
[dechainment] (compare Lacan's reference to the 
"chains of nature" in the quote above) from the social 
laws of utility, reason and meaning, can enable man to 
transcend the limits of his own individuality and lead 
him to an identification with being as "what is, " as 
"the indefinite totality that we cannot know" (254- 
55). 
It is easy to discern the (Lacanian) logic of the 
death drive behind Bataille's notion of expenditure. 
More precisely, sovereign expenditure qua wasteful 
destruction of goods may be taken to illustrate what 
for Lacan is the ethical functioning of the death 
drive: a functioning that, by means of a sovereign 
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disregard for the common good, shatters the symbolic 
signifying "chains" that structure civilization and 
orients itself, instead, towards the lost good of Das 
Ding 
- 
which in Bataille becomes, as we have seen, a 
"being in excess of being" and an "indefinite totality 
that we cannot know. " The interest of drawing a 
parallel between Lacan and Bataille, however, lies, 
for the purposes of our work, less in the similarities 
than in the differences between their respective 
understandings of the criminal. My parallel exposition 
of Lacan's and Bataille's notions of the ethical crime 
should have already disclosed, at least implicitly, an 
important point of divergence in their way of 
developing an ethical system out of a rather similar 
conceptual configuration. It is, in fact, apparent 
that while for Lacan ethical crime - understood as 
death drive 
- 
aims primarily at a purification 
(sublimation) of desire and thus reasserts the 
fundamental separation of the desiring "empty" subject 
from the lost being of Das Ding, for Bataille criminal 
expenditure aims fundamentally at a dissolution of all 
boundaries, including that between the subject and the 
"indefinite totality" of being: far from simply 
detaching his desire from false goods, through 
expenditure, as Bataille puts it, man "loses himself" 
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and "'becomes equal to what is" (Bataille's italics) 
(Litterature 255). 
We may say that while for Lacan the criminal act aims 
at putting the subject in front of the nothingness of 
his jouissance as a lost good, what is truly ethical, 
what psychoanalysis proposes as a measure for our 
actions, is not the possibility of losing oneself in a 
sovereign jouissance of the nothingness at the heart 
of the drive, but, rather, the subjective ability to 
assume this loss and find a freedom and a dignity in 
the autonomy and singularity of the process of 
subjectivation itself. I will return to the 
peculiarities of Lacan's understanding of the ethical 
crime in the last section of this chapter. For the 
moment, what I want to underline is that Bataille's 
theory suggests that it is expenditure (the crime) 
itself that is ethical; Lacan, on the other hand, sees 
the criminal work of the death drive as ethical only 
insofar as it allows the subject to sublimate his 
desire and to rearticulate his position in relation to 
the truth of his jouissance, rather than in relation 
to the common good. 
In this respect, Bataille's ethics seems to be closer 
to a deconstructive ethics of difference 
- 
in Writing 
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and Difference, for example, Derrida has shown how 
Bataille's expenditure can work also like an 
inexhaustible textual drift 
- 
or even to the 
"schizophrenic" ethics of desubjectivation proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari in their Anti-Oedipus 
- 
particularly in relation to Bataille's references to 
the possibility, for the subject, of identifying with 
the unregulated order of being as an "indefinite 
totality" or "general economy. " The distance between 
Bataille's and Lacan's understanding of the criminal, 
therefore, is noteworthy since it may also serve to 
acknowledge the difference between Lacan's ethical 
reading of the death drive and other theories of 
subversion and transgression akin to the work of 
Derrida or Deleuze. In all these different instances 
the Lacanian position marks its specificity by 
articulating transgression with the positing of 
subjectivity, rather than with desubjectivation. 
By comparing and contrasting Lacan's and Bataille's 
theories of the criminal we have thus come to 
establish that, as far as the ethical status of the 
death drive is concerned, one further specification is 
required for Lacan: the drive needs to be articulated 
with a lacking, desiring subjectivity. We can thus 
already anticipate one major point of Lacan's 
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understanding of what does not constitute an ethical 
crime: the mere enjoyment of the nothingness of the 
drive "beyond good and evil" and beyond the subject- 
object distinction which the drive eventually also 
tears down cannot be an ethical end in itself. We can 
see now how Lacan's quest for an ethics capable of 
providing an answer to the problem of the discontent 
of civilization passes through a series of exclusions: 
first, the exclusion of the traditional ethics of the 
good which represses the destructive drives of the 
individual; then, the exclusion of an ethics centred 
on the violent drives that cause social conflict when 
they are engaged in the struggle over the possession 
of goods; finally, the exclusion of an ethics centred 
on the death drive as a pure de(con)structive agency 
operating beyond the realm of the common good. 
Lacan's discussion of Sade, which we will examine in 
the rest of this chapter, will explain the reasons for 
this last exclusion and demonstrate why the 
realisation of a pure desubjectivised drive not only 
cannot be proposed as an ethical project, but would 
also prove inadequate in tackling the problem of 
civilization's discontent. This is, indeed, a crucial 
point, particularly because Lacan has sometimes been 
read or misread as a proponent of precisely this type 
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of radical desubjectivation, particularly, as we will 
see, by theorists like Slavoj Zizek. The crucial point 
that we shall advance in this chapter is that, in 
order to become ethical, the criminal act of negation 
needs to be able to negate also its own necessity as 
an ethical principle, returning to the subject the 
full responsibility of his desire rather than 
enslaving it to the imperative of jouissance of the 
drive. Without this conclusive "coda" to the ethical 
crime, the death drive becomes "perverted" and crime 
only arrives to articulate the subject's relation to 
jouissance, without ever enabling him to transcend it 
autonomously through desire. The function of Sade's 
figure within Lacan's teaching, and within the general 
context of the question of psychoanalysis' stance in 
relation to the discontent of civilization, is 
precisely that of illustrating how a criminal act of 
"pure" negation can articulate the subject's 
fundamental relation to his jouissance but, at the 
same time, also come short of becoming ethical by 
tying the subject to a forced and endless imperative 
of transgression. 
125 
2. Sade: History, Thought, Structure 
Lacan's discussion of Sade in Seminar VII (taught 
between 1960 and 1961) and in "Kant avec Sade" (first 
published in 1963) is articulated on different levels, 
which all address the problem of the ethical crime 
from different angles. Sade is approached successively 
as a historical figure, as a thinker and as the 
subject of a particular structure or position of 
jouissance. As a historical figure, Sade is shown to 
manifest the consciousness of the structural 
persistence of crime at the heart of civilization. As 
a thinker, Sade is credited with the definition of a 
modality of crime capable of freeing man from the 
chains of civilization as well as from the violence 
that is endemic to it. As the subject of a particular 
psychic structure, finally, Sade is used to 
demonstrate the impasse inherent in the attempt of 
realizing this "ethical" modality of crime through the 
pursuit of an absolute negation taken as a practical 
imperative. Lacan's reading of Sade is disseminated 
with numerous, generally critical or dismissive, 
allusions to the work of other Sade scholars (see, for 
example, Lacan's reference to other readers of Sade as 
"do-good existentialists" and "ready-made 
personalists" in "Kant avec Sade" (778)). Only three 
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names, however, are mentioned explicitly: Bataille, 
Blanchot and Klossowski. 
In "Kant avec Sade" Lacan praises the "extreme 
perceptiveness" of Klossowski's work on Sade (15). 
Although Lacan does not say exactly in relation to 
what he considers him "extremely perceptive, " a 
reading of Klossowski's Sade My Neighbour, a text 
first published in 1947, reveals that many of the 
themes developed by Lacan in Seminar VII and "Kant 
avec Sade" 
- 
particularly the analysis of neighbourly 
love and the structure of perversion 
- 
had already 
been articulated by Klossowski in his book. Most 
interestingly, however, Klossowski also lends to Lacan 
the particular method of his reading of Sade, which 
approaches the figure of Sade from three different 
angles: as a historical figure, as a thinker and as a 
psychological "case. " As far as Bataille and Blanchot 
are concerned, their names appear in Seminar VII, in 
the context of a passage where Lacan interrogates the 
overall value of Sade's work. Bataille is dismissed by 
Lacan for suggesting that Sade's work, as Lacan puts 
it, "finds its value from giving us access to an 
assumption of being as dereglement" (SVII 236). Openly 
paraphrasing one passage of Blanchot's Lautreamont and 
Sade (published, like Klossowski's Sade My Neighbour, 
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in 1947), Lacan endorses, on the other hand, 
Blanchot's idea that the value of Sade's work lies in 
its unique and unsurpassed ability to reach the 
"absolute of the unbearable in what can be expressed 
through words concerning the transgression of all 
human limits" (SVII 236). 
In Lacan's terms, this means that the value of Sade' s 
work lies in its ability to trace a limit for the 
subject, not in its illustration of a "dereglement" 
that may liberate being, but in the reactions of 
"ennui" it produces, in its unbearable excess, which 
manifests, as Lacan says, "precisely the response of 
being 
- 
the being of the reader or the being of the 
author 
- 
to the approach of an incandescent centre, of 
an absolute zero, which is psychically unbreathable" 
(SVII 237). In this opposition between Bataille's and 
Blanchot's judgement on Sade's work we can find the 
gist of Lacan's critique of the Sadean crime, in which 
the dream of sovereign emancipation through gratuitous 
acts of negation is uncovered as a structure of 
subjection, that is, as a structure kept in place by 
the subject's subordination to the jouissance 
- 
or 
unbearable ennui - provided by his fantasy of 
transgression. I will develop this point, which 
concerns the structural position of jouissance defined 
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by the Sadean subject, in the next section of this 
chapter. Before then, however, it is important to 
illustrate the way in which Lacan distinguishes 
between this particular aspect of Sade's work (e. g. 
the particular structure of fantasy that can be 
extracted from Sade's writing) and Sade's position as 
a thinker and a historical figure. 
As we said above, the threefold approach which 
distinguishes between history, thought and (psychic) 
structure, comes to Lacan from Klossowski's Sade My 
Neighbour. Klossowski's book is essential to grasp the 
specificity of Lacan's critique of the Sadean criminal 
at the structural level, as opposed to the historical 
and philosophical levels, where the value of Sade's 
work in relation to the question of a criminal ethics 
and to the discontents of civilization appears to be 
altogether different. According to Klossowski, 
historically Sade represents and reflects in his work 
"a supreme degree of consciousness" of the social 
dialectic that led from the "murder of God, " 
perpetrated at the summit of the social hierarchy by 
the atheist libertine aristocracy, to the "murder of 
the king" (and of the aristocracy that had started the 
process in the first place) perpetrated by the people 
during the French Revolution (53-57). Klossowski shows 
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how Sade's "'utopia of evil" 
- 
the caricature of 
republican freedoms presented in the famous "One More 
Effort" pamphlet attached to the Philosophy In the 
Bedroom, but also, more generally, the vast criminal 
landscape deployed in the whole of Sade's fiction 
- 
gives voice to Sade's idea that the new revolutionary 
order was founded on the criminal "solidarity of the 
parricide" (the murder of the king) rather than on the 
"fraternity of the natural man, " and thus eventually 
serves to "denounce the dark forces camouflaged as 
social values by the defence mechanisms of the 
collectivity" (57,65). 
From this particular historical bias, the Sadean crime 
reflects primarily the crime that grounds the social 
dialectic 
- 
parricide 
- 
and, by consequence, also the 
crime that is inherent to the civilized order, the 
persistence of the death drive at the heart of 
civilization itself. Lacan follows this particular 
reading of Sade when he presents Sade's work as a 
"testimony" of the social status of the aristocratic 
man in the years around the French Revolution and, 
more specifically, as a self-conscious, even ironic, 
reflection on the position of the "man of pleasure, " 
whom Lacan defines as the "master who does not bend 
his head in front of the being of God" (SVII 234). 
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Quoting a passage from Freud's Civilization and Its 
Discontents, Lacan goes on to demonstrate how the 
position of the Sadean aristocratic man of pleasure 
implies, socially and historically, the possibility of 
a criminal jouissance that, on the one hand, 
disregards the limits posed by civilized life but 
remains, on the other hand, conditional on the 
possession of wealth 
- 
in this sense, "crime" refers 
specifically to the possibility of destroying goods 
- 
and thus also on the social dialectic and on the very 
structure of civilization (SVII 235). 
In Lacan, just as in Klossowski before him, therefore, 
Sade emerges as a figure that embodies historical 
consciousness and reflects upon the structural 
persistence of crime at the heart of civilization. 
This reading of Sade, moreover, also suggests a 
parallel between Sade and Freud. As I have insisted in 
the first chapter, in fact, the Freudian conception of 
social discontent goes well beyond the mere idea of a 
frustrating repression of natural drives: especially 
in Lacan's reading of Freud, it is clear that the 
discontent of civilization is also, as Freud's 
original title Des Unbehagen in der Kultur suggests, 
the, discontent in civilization, the suffering caused 
by the violence and destruction of the death drive 
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that civilization harbours within itself and is 
structurally unable to contain. From this particular 
angle, Sade's work may then be seen also as an ante 
litteram Civilization and Its Discontents and as a 
pre-Freudian reflection on the centrality of the death 
drive within civilization. 
The second approach to Sade suggested to Lacan by 
Klossowski consists in looking at Sade as a thinker. 
This approach is logically connected to the historical 
approach we have just examined, to the extent that 
both Klossowski and Lacan present Sade's "system" of 
thought as an attempt to provide a response to what 
historical consciousness has discovered at the heart 
of the social dialectic, i. e., to the recognition of 
crime as the fundamental component of the social link 
between the subject and his neighbour. We can thus see 
how Lacan's reading of Sade unfolds the same 
problematic as his reading of Freud: in both cases, 
the starting point is the recognition of a discontent 
of civilization; from this recognition, one has to 
move to the fundamental question of theorising an 
ethics which would allow the human being, caught 
between his contradictory drives to create and destroy 
civilizing structures, to find a measure for his 
actions. Lacan shows us how Freud and Sade, having 
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reached a similar level of insight, adopt, however, 
very different solutions to the problem of evil in 
civilization: Freud, to recall Lacan's own words, 
"stops as if in horror" at the idea of an ethical 
endorsement of the death drive (SVII 212); Sade, on 
the other hand, does not stop and dares to articulate 
what Lacan calls a new and "unprecedented" theory of 
the ethical crime (SVII 303). 
As we have already explained at the beginning of this 
chapter, in Lacan's reading Sade's theory of the crime 
has nothing to do with a mere "liberation" of 
"natural" criminal instincts, nor with an endorsement 
of the criminal violence that is endemic to the social 
sphere (there is, in fact no difference between 
"natural" and "social" violence for Sade), but 
concerns, rather, the possibility of transcending the 
constraints of civilization and its endemic violence 
through an exceptional criminal act. This is the 
element of Sade's thought that is most interesting for 
Lacan and that leads him to adopt Sade's definition of 
the crime as one of the possible ways to theorise the 
ethical act in psychoanalysis. 
Of course, Sade never formulates his theory of crime 
directly in his fictional work. The numerous, and 
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often contradictory, philosophical "systems" that are 
put forward in Sade's writings belong, in fact, to 
Sade's fictional characters and not to Sade himself. 
This has led some readers of Sade, notably Georges 
Bataille, to argue that it would be pointless to try 
to extract a coherent Sadean theoretical system from 
Sade's work (Litterature 245). In his book on Sade, 
however, Klossowski devotes a whole chapter to 
outlining what he describes as the "different phases" 
of the "dialectical process" of Sade's thought, 
reconstructing a dynamic theoretical system that 
culminates, according to Klossowski, precisely with 
the "system of nature" exposed by the Pope in Juliette 
and containing the definition of crime that Lacan 
refers to in Seminar VII (67). Klossowski underlines 
how the Pope's system is centred around a particular 
idea of nature not only as "enslaved" by her own laws 
of perpetual creation and destruction, but also 
constantly wishing to free herself from these laws 
through an exceptional criminal act of destruction 
that would restore her to her "most active power" (90- 
91). By actively rejecting the laws of human self- 
preservation and multiplication, the Pope's system 
marks, in Klossowski's reading, a "dehumanisation" of 
Sade's thought and an attempt to "integrate cruelty 
into a universal system in which, by recovering its 
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cosmic function, it would figure as pure cruelty" (85- 
88) 
. 
Klossowski thus hands over to Lacan a particular 
reading of Sade's thought where the problem of the 
discontent of civilization 
- 
the problem of the 
constraints posed by civilization to individual 
freedom and the problem of the violence and 
destruction that are inherent to civilization 
- 
finds 
a solution that allows one to go beyond the barrier of 
the common good and to recognise the ethical import of 
the death drive, beyond a simple endorsement of social 
aggression. Lacan accepts this solution - he accepts 
that the suffering that comes to man from civilization 
and from his social relations to his neighbours can 
only be overcome through a criminal act of negation 
capable of investing both the common good and the 
"necessity" of its transgression. At the same time, 
however, Lacan also insists that the Sadean definition 
of the ethical crime can only be accepted 
theoretically and should not be mistaken for an 
ethical practical principle commanding the pursuit of 
a "pure" criminal negation since, if this were the 
case, it would amount, as he puts it, to no more than 
a "laughable fantasy" (SVII 303). 
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For Lacan, Sade's work illustrates precisely this gap 
between a formal definition that successfully locates 
the limits of the common good beyond the register of 
simple transgression and a practice that by taking 
this definition as an ethical principle remains 
trapped within the boundaries of the fantasy of these 
limits. Sade, in Lacan's own words, not only "imagines 
and demonstrates the imaginary structure of the limit" 
but he also ""crosses the limit: " "he does not cross 
it, of course, in the fantasy, [... ] 
, 
but in the theory, 
in the doctrine proffered through words" (SVII 232). 
It is thus only at the level of fantasy 
- 
which is 
also the level of practice insofar as fantasy is what 
drives the actions of the subject 
- 
that the impasse 
of the Sadean theory of ethical crime can be 
registered and that a further step towards the 
definition of a criminal ethics can be achieved. And 
it is precisely with a view to assessing this impasse 
at the level of practice that a third, "structural" or 
more distinctively "psychoanalytic" approach to Sade's 
work is defined by Klossowski and developed by Lacan 
in order to unravel not only the fundamental structure 
of the Sadean mind but the structure of fantasy 
itself. 
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3. The Ethical Crime and the Sadean Fantasy 
After having reconstructed the dialectical "system" of 
Sade's thought through the arguments of his 
characters, in the last chapter of Sade My Neighbour 
Klossowski tries to delineate the psychological 
structure that lies behind this system. Sade's theory 
of nature and his ideal of an ultimate crime capable 
of freeing nature from her self-imposed bondage, are, 
in other words, approached by Klossowski as external 
manifestations 
- 
the term symptoms also seems 
appropriate here 
- 
of a deeper psychic structure 
ascribed to the man Sade in particular and to the 
Sadean man that Sade typifies 
- 
the "libertine great 
lord of the century of the Enlightenment" (100) 
- 
in 
general. For Klossowski, Sade's theory of crime 
expresses the "pathos of the soul enchained, which 
rattles its chains and sees in the universe it 
inhabits only a creation likewise in chains" (99). The 
Sadean mind "discovers its own inner conflict" in the 
dualism of a system of nature that becomes aware of 
itself and aspires to negate its own laws of perpetual 
creation and destruction through a fundamental 
criminal act of destruction (90-91). Now, Klossowski's 
fundamental step consists in reading this criminal 
aspiration as the aspiration of a "fallen soul" that 
not only wishes to destroy the creation that imprisons 
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it and the Creator who has occasioned its fall, but 
also retains a sense of the "purity, " freedom and 
eternity of non-being beyond creation (99). From this 
particular perspective, it becomes apparent that the 
criminal drive to unconditionally negate and destroy 
- 
or, as Maurice Blanchot also puts it, the "complete 
identification with the spirit of negation" that marks 
the Sadean man (36) 
- 
hides, when it is articulated as 
a sovereign drive seeking emancipation from every type 
of law or constraint, a deeper psychological truth. 
This truth is that the unconditional negation of the 
Sadean crime aims not at the negation of the laws of 
creation, but at the destruction and negation of 
everything that appears pure, free and eternal beyond 
creation. It is only in this way that the fallen and 
captive soul can not only deny its own fallen state 
but also, and at the same time, achieve a paradoxical 
affirmation of the very freedom, purity and eternity 
it longs for in the constant failure and endless 
endeavour of its negation. In this way, writes 
Klossowski, "Sade's soul not only compensates for its 
initial defeat but affirms the compensation for it" 
(104) 
. 
Klossowski manages to extract this particular 
psychological structure from what he refers to as 
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Sade's delectatio morosa. Delectatio morosa is a 
theological notion that Klossowski borrows from the 
doctors of the medieval church who used it, as 
Klossowski takes care to explain, to describe a "state 
characteristic of the generations posterior to the 
ages of faith, " and which designates "the movement of 
the soul by which it bears voluntarily toward images 
of forbidden carnal or spiritual acts in order to 
linger in contemplation of them" (113). These images 
towards which Sade's soul "voluntarily bears and 
lingers" form the most characteristic scenario of 
Sade's fiction, in which a cruel torturer confronts an 
innocent and pure victim 
- 
typically a virgin as in 
the Justine novels 
- 
whose pure virtue and innocence 
only become stronger and stronger as the torturer's 
attempts to negate them become more and more terrible 
and extreme. 
In this way, the imaginary scenario of Sade's 
delectatio morosa provides the concrete illustration 
of the ""practical" (in the Kantian sense) possibility 
of the ethical crime, understood as the supreme, 
emancipatory act of negation beyond good and evil 
which Sade also elaborates, as we have seen, 
theoretically. It provides, in other words, an 
illustration - of what it would be like if the ethical 
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crime really happened. Klossowski points out how this 
scenario defines a very precise target against which 
the ethical crime can unleash its effort of absolute 
negation: the figure of the virgin which, as a symbol 
of purity, is fit to embody the ultimate obstacle, the 
ultimate limit that negation must confront. In fact, 
because the purity of the virgin, just like the 
purity, freedom and eternity of non-being, must 
necessarily escape the torturer who is nothing but a 
fallen creature captive to the laws of creation, it is 
only the negation of this purity that could finally 
guarantee the freedom and sovereignty of the Sadean 
man. The problem is, however, that the purity of the 
virgin is nothing else but the effect of negation, it 
is literally what remains after everything has been 
negated and destroyed and is, as such, impossible to 
negate. This is why Klossowski can affirm that "Sade 
elevates and definitively consecrates the virgin by 
this holocaust" and that "cruelty is for him a 
fidelity, and an homage to the virgin and to God, an 
hommage become incomprehensible to itself" (105). 
Even more crucially, by affirming the purity of the 
virgin as a leftover of negation, crime also becomes a 
way for the torturer to affirm the immortality of his 
own soul and to "prove that the insatiability of [his] 
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soul is commensurate with its immortality" (Klossowski 
109). Eventually, therefore, for Klossowski Sade's 
delectatio morosa can be elevated to the level of an 
act of devotion and of a "spiritual exercise" whereby 
the soul can "become conscious of itself" (115-16). 
The limits of this spiritual exercise are, however, 
also marked very clearly by Klossowski, who concludes 
his analysis by pointing out that morose delectation 
is at bottom a "sterile" exercise that rather than 
liberating the soul "welds new chains" for it (118). 
If, in fact, the soul wants to find itself through 
crime, the negation needs to be endless and 
frustration maintained forever. As Klossowski puts it, 
"the powerlessness to reach something that would be 
accomplished once and for all betrays the 
consciousness of the author" (119). This also means, 
of course, that the ethical crime remains a mirage and 
that the subject remains trapped within the net of 
nature and of its laws. 
I have tried to reconstruct in some detail 
Klossowski's analysis of the psychological structure 
behind Sade's delectatio morosa because this analysis 
represents in many ways the blueprint for Lacan's own 
unravelling of the Sadean fantasy. While in 
Klossowski, however, the category of delectatio morosa 
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has a narrower application, and aims ultimately at 
demonstrating that the Sadean mind is, in spite of its 
virulently professed atheism, informed by a religious 
tension towards the divine, in Lacan the religious 
problematic is cast aside and the structure of the 
Sadean fantasy becomes the structure of fantasy as 
such, the very definition of fantasy as a psychic 
formation. Although in "Kant avec Sade" he does 
recognise that "the Sadean fantasy is better situated 
among the fundaments of Christian ethics than 
elsewhere" (789), Lacan is interested mostly in how 
the Sadean fantasy reveals the basic structure of 
fantasy as the psychic formation that links the 
subject to its point of disappearance in the object. 
Lacan, in other words, credits Sade with unveiling the 
bare axiom of fantasy in his fiction, rather than 
simply a form of frustrated religious consciousness. 
The scenario of Sade's delectatio morosa analysed by 
Klossowski, where the soul can become conscious of 
itself as non-being through never-ending negation, in 
Lacan becomes the scenario of fantasy itself, in 
which, as Lacan puts it in "Kant avec Sade, " "the 
object, [... ] 
, 
the object of desire, where we see it in 
its nakedness, is nothing but the residue of a fantasy 
in which the subject does not reappear after blacking 
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out" (780). More generally, for Lacan the logic that 
articulates the interaction between the Sadean 
torturer and his incorruptible virginal victim 
illustrates the logic of the death drive and the link 
between the object-neighbour or object-jouissance and 
the subject ("Kant" 776). This is why, where 
Klossowski talked about "spiritual exercise, " Lacan 
prefers to describe the subject's attempt to capture 
its own nothingness through negation in the scenario 
of fantasy as "a case of necrophilia" ("Kant" 780). 
The coordinates of their analysis are, however, 
essentially the same and Lacan, just like Klossowski, 
underlines the structural impossibility for the 
subject to finally capture, through a conclusive 
negation, an object that "vacillates in a manner that 
is complementary to the subject's vacillation" ("Kant" 
780). 
Even if he stresses how the Sadean fantasy rests upon 
and has the merit of bringing into light the 
structural logic of fantasy as such, Lacan is 
nevertheless also attentive to the specificity of the 
Sadean fantasy. If, in fact, the general logic of 
fantasy is but the general logic of the drive, the 
subject can adopt a variety of different positions of 
jouissance and thus articulate or "enter" the basic 
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structure of fantasy in different ways, creating his 
own particular fantasy. In Lacan's reading of Sade in 
"Kant avec Sade" it is precisely this modality of 
entering or of positioning oneself within the fantasy 
which accounts for the specificity of the Sadean 
fantasy, and therefore also for the particular way in 
which the criminal negation of the death drive is 
adapted to an imaginary "practical" scenario by the 
Sadean mind. Lacan's reading here joins Klossowski's 
once more in trying to assess how Sade's theoretical 
elaboration of the ethical crime hides a deeper 
psychological structure in which the criminal act 
loses its ethical value and functions as a mere 
support for the subject (as opposed to the "soul" in 
Klossowski's analysis), who remains enslaved by the 
necessity of his own perpetually unaccomplished 
negation. 
In "Kant avec Sade" Lacan starts precisely from the 
Sadean criminal ethics of negation 
- 
Sade's idea of 
the ethical crime 
- 
and shows how in Sade' s work this 
negation takes the character of a "will to jouissance" 
and of a universal maxim of practical reason of the 
type described by Kant: "I have the right to enjoy 
your body, [... ], and I will exercise this right without 
posing any limit to the capriciousness of the 
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exactions I may wish to satisfy with your body" (768- 
69,773). I will return later on to the significance, 
of Lacan's juxtaposition of Kant's and Sade's ethics; 
for the moment what matters is that by presenting the 
Sadean crime as the manifestation of a will to 
jouissance and of a universal 
- 
that is to say 
unconditional 
- 
rule of jouissance, Lacan determines a 
very particular point from which Sade - or the Sadean 
criminal 
- 
appears to enter the structure of fantasy. 
This entry point is indicated very clearly by Lacan in 
the first of the two schemas of "Kant avec Sade: " 
VS 
d 
-º a 
The bottom line of the schema presents the Lacanian 
formula of fantasy 
-$fa- where the empty subject $ 
is confronted with an "a" (utre) (small a for other) 
- 
the "little other" which stands for the neighbour or 
for the object-jouissance - and where the fundamental 
orientation of the death drive is given, precisely, as 
the orientation of the subject towards his point of 
disappearance in the nothingness of the object- 
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jouissance. In this particular case, the point of 
access to the fantasy for the Sadean criminal is 
indicated by the arrow pointing to the letter "a" at 
the bottom left of the schema: the criminal does not 
enter the schema as the subject but as the object, as 
the neighbourly figure that tortures the subject, and 
does so by articulating its desire (d in the schema) 
with the death drive of another subject (-+ a). In this 
way, desire is confused with a will to jouissance in 
the "'psychology" of the Sadean criminal. As Lacan 
points out, however, desire can sustain itself as a 
will to jouissance only by becoming the "instrument" 
or the "agent" of a will to jouissance that desire has 
already created in the Other, since otherwise desire 
would remain subject to the limits of the pleasure 
principle and the will to jouissance as such could not 
be sustained ("Kant" 773). 
The whole operation answers, consequently, to what 
Lacan calls a "calculus of the subject, " illustrated 
by the curvy arrow that zigzags across the schema: by 
becoming the instrument of another subject's death 
drive, the torturer can sustain a will to jouissance 
(V in the upper left angle of the schema) that 
produces a subject by isolating it as an empty 
remainder from the full "pathological" subject of 
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pleasure alienated in the Other (S) ("Kant" 775). Just 
as in Klossowski's reading, where the torture of the 
virginal victim had the ultimate goal of affirmg the 
immortality of the torturer's soul, in Lacan's 
analysis, Sade's fantasy thus turns out to be nothing 
less than a strategy to make subjectivity exist 
- 
not 
only the victim's subjectivity, but subjectivity as 
such: "the apparent agent [of the fantasy], " Lacan 
writes, "freezes with the rigidity of an object, in 
view of having his division as a subject entirely 
reflected in the Other" ("Kant" 774). 
If we return to the main thread of our argument, we 
should now be in the position of appreciating the 
significance of the step that led Klossowski first, 
and Lacan after him, to move from a historical and 
theoretical analysis of Sade's work to a 
"psychoanalytic" study of the structure of Sade's 
mind, where the underlying structure is revealed 
through the subjective triangulations of Sade's 
imaginative output (Sade's delectatio morosa or 
fantasy) 
. 
We must, in the first place, recognise that 
Klossowski and Lacan's psycho-structural approach does 
not work to undermine Sade's theory of the ethical 
crime. The thrust of Klossowski's and Lacan's 
arguments is, as we have seen, essentially the same, 
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and in both cases the impasse reached by the Sadean 
mind does not exclude the ethical import of rejecting 
the common good and of transcending the constraints of 
civilization 
- 
or "nature" in Sade's language 
- 
by 
means of an act of negation. Sade's definition of the 
human condition as trapped by the binary chains of a 
Law that commands creation and destruction, virtue and 
crime at the same time remains, in other words, valid 
for both Klossowski and Lacan, along with his 
hypothesis on the ethical necessity of crime that 
would manage to outstrip these alternatives and 
operate on a differet level, beyond the common good 
and beyond common crime. 
What Klossowski's and Lacan's psychoanalytic readings 
of Sade reveal is thus not a flaw in Sade's theory of 
the ethical crime, but, rather, a flaw at the level of 
the practical application of Sade's theory in Sade's 
fantasy. As we have seen, this level coincides with 
the level of fantasy insofar as it is precisely within 
the imaginary scenario of fantasy that the subject can 
stage and determine the fundamental logic of his 
actions. The particular way in which the fantasy will 
determine the hidden logic of the subject's actions, 
moreover, will depend on the way in which the subject 
choses to position himself within the fantasy. To put 
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it simply, therefore, we could say that for Klossowski 
and Lacan the Sadean fantasy constitutes a failed 
attempt to stage a practical imaginary script for a 
theory of the ethical crime. Of course, if we approach 
it simply as a psychic structure, the Sadean fantasy 
could not be described as a failure, since it 
obviously accomplishes what it sets out to achieve, 
that is, a consolidation of subjectivity or 
- 
for 
Klossowski 
- 
an affirmation of the immortality of the 
soul. 
From the point of view of the particular reading of 
Sade in which Klossowski and Lacan include it, 
however, the Sadean fantasy is there to demonstrate a 
particular impasse in the practical application of the 
ethical crime. As Lacan states at the end of "Kant 
avec Sade, " Sade's "apology for crime merely impels 
him to an oblique acceptance of the Law, " turning his 
"promise that nature, [... ], will magically give us ever 
more" into nothing more than a "typical dream of 
potency" (790). Once its logic is dictated by the 
coordinates of the Sadean fantasy, the ethical crime 
ceases to be an ethical act, breaking its promise of 
freedom and committing the subject to sustain his own 
division through a perpetually unaccomplished gesture 
of corruption and division of the Other. 
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In conclusion to this section, we can sum up by saying 
that Klossowski and Lacan not only show us how the 
Sadean theory of the ethical crime must be translated 
into a fantasy scenario before it can be put into 
practice, but also provide us with an illustration of 
how this translation into fantasy may determine an 
impasse of the ethical crime. As Bruce Fink has 
pointed out in his Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis, this impasse corresponds, in clinical 
terms, to a "perversion" of the drive: in the Sadean 
fantasy, the drive is neither sublimated into the 
common good nor from the common good into desire, but 
is extracted from the common good and articulated as 
an instrument of the Other's jouissance, in order to 
deny a lack in the Other and make not only the 
subject, but also the Other as such exist as the giver 
of the law that is transgressed (180-81). Quite beyond 
any consideration of the specificity of the clinical 
structure behind the Sadean crime, however, the 
significance of Klossowski's and Lacan's studies of 
Sade lies in the fact that they also show how every 
theory of ethics and every theory that wants to 
propose itself as the theory of a practice needs to 
consider the level of fantasy as the crucial benchmark 
where its practical failure or success is determined 
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in advance. It is the particular way 
subject chooses to "enter" the 
subject/object structure of the fanti 
determine the inner logic of the act, 
what its theoretical definition or 
intention may be. 
in which the 
fundamental 
isy that will 
regardless of 
its explicit 
4. Entering and Treversing the Fantasy 
Lacan's reading of Sade in "Kant avec Sade" does not 
set itself up only as a critique of classical 
Aristotelian ethics, but also as a critique of the 
modern ethics articulated by Kant in his Critique of 
Practical Reason. The idea that the Sadean motif of 
"happiness in evil" represents a point of subversion 
of the classical principle, or, as Lacan puts it, 
"prejudice" that "each creature is preordained to its 
good" is repeatedly brought forward by Lacan and is 
part of his more general critique of the ethics of the 
good and of the discontent of civilization in Seminar 
VII ("Kant" 765). Lacan's unravelling of the Sadean 
fantasy in "Kant avec Sade, " however, works first and 
foremost as a critique of the modern ethics defended, 
by Kant, whereby it is not the "pathological" object 
as good or bad that can provide the practical rule for 
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ethical action - as Kant specifies in his Critique of 
Practical Reason, in fact, feelings of pleasure and 
pain "can never be supposed to be universally directed 
to the same objects" 
- 
but a universal moral law of 
"pure reason, " which "must be able to determine the 
will by the mere form of the practical rule without 
supposing any feeling" (231) Lacan's statement of 
intention in the first page of "Kant avec Sade" is to 
demonstrate that the Sadean maxim of the categorical 
right to jouissance (the will to jouissance) advanced 
in the Philosophy in the Bedroom "is consistent with, " 
"completes" and eventually "reveals the truth" behind 
the Kantian moral law of pure reason formulated in the 
second Critique (765). If we refer back to the 
structure of the Sadean fantasy it is easy to see what 
this hidden truth of Kantian ethics may be for Lacan: 
the object-jouissance of which the Sadean torturer 
becomes the instrument is nothing else but the double 
of the Kantian law, the law as a non-pathological 
object-voice, or, in Lacan's own terms, a "point of 
emission" that tortures the pathological subject 
demanding that he approaches his annihilation 
endlessly by a "radical rejection of the pathological, 
of all consideration towards the good, towards a 
passion or a compassion, that is, [by] the [same type 
of] rejection through which Kant clears the field of 
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the moral law" (770,772). The Sadean will to 
jouissance, therefore, in Lacan's critique turns out 
to be the truth behind Kant's rational rejection of 
the pathological as a practical principle of the moral 
law. 
This aspect of Lacan's reading of Sade has naturally 
received much attention among contemporary theorists, 
particularly in the work of Alenka Zupancic, who has 
shown very well how the Sadean fantasy illustrates the 
impasse behind the Kantian preoccupation with the 
infinite movement of purification of the immortal soul 
from the pathological (Ethics 81-82). On the other 
hand, Zupancic has also turned to Lacan's commentary 
on the Sadean fantasy to re-evaluate Kantian ethics, 
not only insisting that it is only through a different 
approach to fantasy that the impasse of Kantian ethics 
can be overcome (Ethics 82-83), but also demonstrating 
that the Sadean will to jouissance, far from 
coinciding with the Kantian moral law, should be 
approached rather as its superegoic supplement, so 
that, once separated from it, the Kantian moral law 
would identify simply "desire in its pure state" and 
thus point in the same direction as Lacan's own ethics 
of desire ("What Love" 64-65). 
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To restrict the scope of Lacan's articulation of the 
Sadean fantasy to a critique or reassessment of 
Kantian ethics, would be, however rather limiting. As 
well as revealing the "truth" of Kant's moral law, the 
structure of the Sadean fantasy can also reveal the 
"truth" of any act of negation that may similarly 
claim to provide an ethical response to the 
"pathological" constraints of civilization and of the 
common good by means of an unconditional and 
inexhaustible negation. As we have seen this type of 
negation would be neither the "structural" negation of 
the common crime which is part and parcel of the Law 
of civilization, nor the negation of the ethical crime 
that would enable transcendence of this Law; it is, 
rather, the negation of the will to jouissance, which 
on the one hand moves beyond the common good and only 
wishes to negate 
- 
recognising in gratuitous negation 
the sovereign good of an absolute freedom from virtue 
and crime 
- 
but on the other hand remains confined 
within the limits of the Law by the very necessity of 
this uncompromising and always necessarily 
unaccomplished negation. Even in this case, it is 
essential to point out that the distinction between 
the negation of the ethical crime and the negation of 
this other type of crime identified by Lacan's notion 
of the will to jouissance can only be grasped at the 
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level of fantasy and is not, at any rate, discernible 
from a merely theoretical standpoint. We might also 
suggest that the lack of a distinction between these 
two types of negation is, in fact, apparent within 
theories of transgression that do not account for or 
take into consideration the role of fantasy as a 
"practical" matrix. 
Bataille's ethicisation of the sovereign power of 
boundless expenditure as we have illustrated it at the 
beginning of this chapter is a first clear example of 
this inability to grasp the practical dead end of the 
inexhastible negation of the death drive. Another, 
more general example could be provided by a certain 
variety of deconstructive theories resulting in 
critical practices where the endless undoing of 
signifying structures is oriented towards the 
isolation of an ineffable but persistent remainder 
around which a whole ethics of "otherness" and 
"responsibility" is developed: here, again, ethical 
transgression is confused with the never-ending task 
of corrupting and dividing the Other. If, on the other 
hand, in Lacan's study of Sade the unethical character 
of the will to jouissance becomes apparent, this is 
thanks to the introduction of the structure of fantasy 
as a mediator between theory and praxis. 
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As we have seen, the concept of fantasy allows Lacan 
to show that a will to jouissance -a negation that 
always delineates a new limit for itself - can only be 
sustained and acted out if it becomes the agent of a 
will to jouissance that is already there in the Other 
as a fantasy of the Other. The Sadean criminal, and 
those who follow more or less deliberately its steps, 
like Bataille's sovereign man or the deconstructive 
critic, take up their "parasitical" position not 
theoretically but practically, through the particular 
way in which their transgression is displayed or 
stages itself as the instrument of another - the 
Other's or the "text's" 
- 
fantasy qua point of self- 
annihilation. The scene of fantasy thus gives the lie 
to the will to jouissance and its ethical claims to 
freedom and autonomy, unmasking it as a mere strategy 
to violently extract from the Other the evidence of a 
non-pathological subject, of an immortal soul, or of 
an unfathomable "Other" worthy of our respect and 
ethical consideration. 
The Lacanian notion of fantasy also proves to be 
essential to articulate an answer to the problem of 
the discontent of civilization. We have seen how the 
Freudian hypothesis of a type of suffering that is 
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determined culturally, at the level of the social 
link, leads Lacan to formulate the ethics of 
psychoanalysis as a criminal ethics or an ethics based 
on the necessity of a gesture of negation directed 
towards the order of civilization. The definition of 
this negation, which is also the definition of the 
ethics of psychoanalysis, is not however, an easy 
task: even if we recognise that "common" crimes have a 
structural value and thus can only reinforce the 
constraints of civilization and make social suffering 
worse, the possibility of theorizing a radical crime 
capable of undoing the very structural opposition 
between conformity and crime does not seem to make 
room for much progress. The risk is, in fact, that, 
once translated into practice, this radical ethical 
crime would amount to nothing more than an endless 
process of negation (a will to jouissance) that, far 
from providing an ethical solution to the discontents 
of civilization, would have the opposite effect of 
generating even more violence and even less freedom 
and autonomy for the subject. We have shown how the 
Lacanian understanding of fantasy as a scenario where 
the logic of a particular practice linking the subject 
to the object and to the Other of culture is staged 
and scripted beforehand is what allows us to grasp 
this particular impasse of the ethical crime. However, 
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to the extent that, as we have also shown, this 
scenario is "open" and can be entered and structure 
the desire of the subject in more than one way 
- 
and 
not only as a will to jouissance - fantasy is also the 
necessary starting point to identify what an authentic 
ethical negation or crime may be in relation to a 
particular disposition of the fantasy. 
The idea that the ethics of psychoanalysis must be 
defined at the point of intersection between the 
discontent of civilization and the montage and 
demontage of fantasy is something that has been 
grasped and developed in different ways in the work of 
many contemporary Lacanian cultural and political 
theorists. Seminal texts like Slavoj Zizek's The 
Plague of Fantasies and Joan Copjec's Imagine There's 
No Woman, for example, demonstrate how the structure 
of the Sadean fantasy and its characteristic 
"perversion" of the drive can be read behind a number 
of discontents of contemporary civilization, for 
example behind the ideological violence of 
totalitarian regimes and the fetishism of commodities. 
For the same reason, the understanding of 
psychoanalytic ethics put forward by many of these 
theorists tends to coincide with the Lacanian notion 
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of "traversing the fantasy" popularized by Zizek in 
many of his texts. 
The act of "traversing the fantasy" is normally 
explained as a negation of the Other of civilization 
as such, not in the sense of a direct confrontation 
with it (as in the case of a will to jouissance) 
, 
but 
in the sense of an unmasking of the Other in its 
inconsistency and man-made lack of necessity, up to 
the point where the very structure of fantasy is done 
away with and the subject can manifest itself as a 
pure object-drive. In her already quoted book on Kant 
and Lacan, Ethics of the Real, for example, Alenka 
Zupancic paraphrases directly the Zizek of Enjoy Your 
Symptom! and defines the ethical crime as a "type of 
suicide" whereby we "kill ourselves through the Other, 
in the Other" (84; Zupancic's italics), until "the 
subject passes over to the side of the object" (104) 
. 
Some theorists, for example Joan Copjec in Imagine 
There's No Woman and some of the contributors to the 
collection Art: Sublimation or Symptom, edited by 
Parveen Adams, also emphasise the link between the act 
of negation that deconstitutes the Other and the 
sublimation of the drive, suggesting that the ethical 
crime that challenges the consistency and necessity of 
the Other in its civilizing structure coincides with 
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the act of sublimation itself and its ability to 
relate the subject directly to the lost good of his 
jouissance beyond the barrier of fantasy. 
We can note that this particular way in which Lacan's 
work has been filtered down within contemporary 
cultural theory - and which may be summed up with a 
very simple formula: if ideology=fantasy then 
ethics=traversing the fantasy - can help us to answer 
one question we have left in suspense since the 
beginning of this chapter. We started our discussion 
of the ethical crime by questioning whether the 
criminal negation of the social order is only an 
effect of the ethical process of sublimation that 
allows the subject to isolate a remainder of Das Ding 
from the common good or whether, alternatively 
sublimation can be conceived in itself as dependent on 
or coinciding with a criminal act. Our reading of 
Lacan and the definition of psychoanalytic ethics as a 
matter of "traversing the fantasy" allows us to answer 
this question by saying that the ethical crime that 
suspends and deconstitutes the Other - as opposed to 
the Sadean crime that constitutes the Other through 
negation 
- 
is not a mere effect of sublimation but is 
the act of negation that makes sublimation as such 
possible. The ethical crime is thus brought right to 
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the core of psychoanalytic ethics: psychoanalytic 
ethics is not criminal incidentally, simply because it 
ignores or disregards the common good; psychoanalytic 
ethics is inherently criminal because it depends on a 
criminal act of negation of the Other. 
Having established this, however, it is also important 
to push our argument a little bit further by 
acknowledging that identifying the ethical crime with 
the act of traversing the fantasy raises some 
important questions. The problem is not that this 
widely circulating account of psychoanalytic ethics is 
incorrect, the problem is that it leaves something 
essential behind. The central ideas of suspending the 
symbolic order (the Other) and of traversing the 
fantasy do not, in fact, say anything about how these 
particular acts may be accomplished. The definitions 
of psychoanalytic ethics as "symbolic suicide, " 
"traversing the fantasy" and even "being faithful to 
one's desire" that abound in contemporary cultural 
theory are entirely theoretical and do not explain 
from what particular position or through what specific 
practical rule the subject may arrive at this sequence 
of moments - negation, traversal, fidelity - that mark 
the conclusion, rather than the modality or the 
process of an ethical praxis. 
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To recall a distinction we formulated in the 
introduction, these definitions only cover the "what" 
of psychoanalytic ethics and ignore the "how. " This 
is, indeed, a problem since an ethics cannot be an 
ethics if it is not able to offer a practical 
orientation to the subject. In this sense, we may even 
say that the notion of "traversing the fantasy" as it 
appears in contemporary theory represents yet another 
theoretical definition of the ethical crime, so that, 
in spite of any emphasis on the importance of 
addressing the question of ethics from the point of 
view of fantasy, the specific practical function of 
fantasy we have learnt to recognise in Lacan's reading 
of Sade 
- 
fantasy as what provides the rule of the 
subject's actions 
- 
is missing from these accounts. 
Incidentally, moreover, we can also note that the 
distinctively Zizekian tendency to present the final 
outcome of the ethical crime as a transformation of 
the subject into an object-drive thus seems to reflect 
exactly the same impasse that leads from the Sadean 
theory of the ethical crime to the Sadean fantasy of 
the will to jouissance, insofar as it would be 
difficult, once again, to distinguish between this 
form of de-subjectivised agency and the will to 
jouissance that animates the Sadean fantasy. 
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My suggestion is that, in order to grasp the full 
extent of the ethical crime at the heart of Lacan's 
understanding of psychoanalytic ethics, we need to 
follow carefully the logic of Lacan's distinction 
between the theoretical and the structural 
- 
between a 
theoretical definition that tells us what the ethical 
crime is and a structural definition that tells us how 
the underlying logic of the ethical crime is laid out 
in the practical scenario of fantasy. To put it more 
briefly, I would like to suggest that the ethics of 
psychoanalysis 
- 
and the ethical crime 
- 
be defined 
structurally not as a matter of "traversing the 
fantasy, " but as a matter of "entering the fantasy" in 
a particular way so as to make sure that the fantasy 
can eventually be traversed. On the one hand, this 
means that the ethical crime cannot be defined without 
specifying the particular position that a subject 
needs to take up within a fantasy in order to commit 
that crime. On the other hand, the difference between 
"entering" and "traversing" is also that while the 
traversal of the fantasy is clearly not something that 
can be voluntarily decided by the subject, the 
manipulation of the point of access to the fantasy is, 
on the other hand, something that can constitute a 
praxis for the subject. 
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But how can we define this point of access? For a 
"virtuous, " law abiding subject the criminal tendency 
of the death drive remains a repressed and never 
realized possibility 
- 
at the most, this subject can 
transgress the law to possess goods, but his fantasy 
will always be structured by the impossibility of 
transgresing the barrier of the good and the limit of 
the pleasure principle (the limit of pain). We have 
seen that the Sadean criminal, on the other hand, 
enters the fantasy as an instrument of the will to 
jouissance of the Other: he takes, in other words, 
upon himself the task of realizing the death wish that 
remains repressed in another subject's fantasy, and in 
this way manages to sustain it as a superegoic law, 
beyond the limit of the pleasure principle and of the 
common good. The ethical criminal enters the fantasy 
in a way that is similar to that of the Sadean 
criminal, that is, from the position of the object in 
the Other's fantasy, but, differently from the Sadean 
criminal, he positions himself as the cause of the 
Other's desire rather than as the instrument of the 
Other's will to jouissance. It is from this particular 
point of access to the fantasy, which separates desire 
from jouissance rather than confusing them, that the 
ethical crime can arrive to a deconstitution of the 
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Other and overcome the necessity of its hold over the 
subject. 
A renowned French analyst, Serge Andre, has offered a 
particularly enlightening account of the difference 
between the Sadean way and the ethical way to enter 
the practical script of fantasy in his seminal study 
of perversion L'imposture perverse. Andre's book 
demonstrates very clearly that it is not the 
overcoming of the fantasy but the access to the 
fantasy that distinguishes between the perverse Sadean 
crime and the ethical crime that, in Andre's reading, 
becomes explicitly associated with the conduct of the 
analyst in the analytic bond. As Andre explains, the 
Sadean master and the analyst are both marked by a 
similar way of entering the structure of fantasy from 
the position of the object that represents the 
fundamental tendency of the death drive for another 
subject, and, in this sense, they both take up a 
position of criminal disregard from all considerations 
of "compassion" or "justice" that eventually aims at 
extracting the divided subject from the pathological 
subject (20-21) 
. 
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In spite of this fundamental "analogy of structure, " 
however, the analyst manages to escape the compulsive 
and endless negation that enslaves the Sadean criminal 
by the fundamental gesture of separating his desire 
from the will to jouissance articulated in the Other's 
fantasy, a gesture that coincides with a "response" 
given to the Other and that allows the analyst to 
"witness that there is not a supreme Other depositary 
of the truth about jouissance" (Andre 18,22) 
. 
As 
Andre points out, therefore, while the Sadean criminal 
"identifies desire with his conscience of it" and 
"elevates to an absolute necessity the fact of 
satisfying it" - thereby turning desire into a will to 
jouissance or permanent negation - the analyst "avoids 
jouissance" and thus manages to sustain, in himself 
and in the Other, a desire that can remain mysterious 
and unsatisfied (56). 
This desire purified from jouissance, commonly 
referred to as the "desire of the analyst, " 
represents, like the "will to jouissance" of the 
Sadean criminal, a particular form of negation, whose 
structural and practical condition is laid down by a 
specific modality of access to the fantasy. Serge 
Andre encourages us to remember that the desire of the 
analyst recovers two main functions: the function of 
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causing interpretation - according to the Lacanian 
formula that "desire is its interpretation" 
- 
and the 
function of providing a protective barrier against 
jouissance (57-58). These two functions define the 
ethical thrust of the criminal negation of the desire 
of the analyst against the unethical negation of the 
will to jouissance: if, in fact, the will to 
jouissance only strengthens the hold of the Other on 
the subject and fuels the violence of the drive, the 
desire of the analyst frees the subject from the 
constraints of the Other through interpretation and 
protects him from the violence of the drive by 
separating desire from jouissance. More generally, we 
can also remark that the desire of the analyst in this 
way defines itself as the underlying logic for an 
ethical crime capable of providing a successful answer 
to the problem of the discontent of civilization, 
insofar as its particular type of negation would 
address not only the repressive constraints of the 
Other of civilization, but also its inherent 
structural violence (its will to jouissance). 
If we return now to the definition of psychoanalytic 
ethics that has been popularised in contemporary 
cultural theory, we must recognize that the analyst's 
intervention within the structure of fantasy also 
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implies, of course, a "symbolic suicide" (a 
deconstitution of the Other), a "'traversal of the 
fantasy" (a separation of jouissance from desire) and 
"fidelity to desire" (the articulation of the desire 
of the analyst) It is also essential, however, to 
recognise that there is an important difference 
between the approach that defines psychoanalytic 
ethics at the level of a "practical" intervention 
within fantasy and the approach which defines it only 
theoretically in terms of a subjective act of 
emancipation from the fantasy. This is the same 
difference we have appreciated in Lacan's distinction 
between the Sadean criminal fantasy and Sade's theory 
of crime. 
Conceived as practical ethical rules to be pursued by 
the subject for their own sake, the merely descriptive 
ideas of "suicide, " "traversal" and "fidelity" become 
completely useless, not only because we don't know how 
they should be applied or how the subject may 
determine in advance either the nature of the desire 
to whom he needs to be faithful or of the fantasy he 
needs to traverse, but also because their application 
as practical ethical rules would inevitably lead to a 
perversion of the goal they describe. As Nestor 
Brauenstein has observed, to take the Lacanian formula 
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of "not giving up on one's desire" as an absolute 
ethical rule would amount to nothing more than a 
"perverse reading that confuses unconscious desire 
with the intention to enjoy and that proposes 
enjoyment as a self-affirmation, " serving only to 
"justify negativism and a subjectivism that passes 
through the misrecognition and through the enslavement 
of the other" (311). 
This impasse can be avoided if we define the ethics of 
psychoanalysis and the ethical crime that lies at its 
heart as an intervention at the fundamental level of 
the fantasy that determines the logic of the subject's 
acts. A subject can, in other words, "commit symbolic 
suicide, " "traverse the fantasy" and "be faithful to 
his desire" only by accessing ethically a fantasy that 
is already there in the Other, the fantasy of another 
subject, and by separating a pure desire from the will 
to jouissance that he finds in the Other. The negation 
of the desire of the analyst that defines the ethical 
crime can, that is, only be sustained through a 
transferential social bond that allows the desire of 
one subject to be projected onto and purified by 
another subject. In this sense, the identification 
between the ethical criminal and the figure of the 
analyst becomes significant, although not in a 
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reductive way. The analyst cannot be, in fact, simply 
a figure instrumental to the ethical parable of the 
subject, so that, having "traversed the fantasy" the 
subject would be free to exist as pure and free 
object-drive beyond the fantasy. The position of the 
analyst is already proposed as an ethical task to the 
analysand from the very beginning of the treatment and 
the position of the subject at the end of analysis 
cannot be that of a pure object but, rather that of a 
subject capable of accessing ethically a fantasy in 
the Other from the position of the object. 
Chapter III 
Antigone and the Criminal Transference 
1. Criminal Ethics and the Social Bond 
As Lacan points out in "Kant avec Sade, " the 
redefinition of the field of ethics brought about by 
psychoanalysis starts from the self-imposing evidence 
of a certain "bonheur dans le mal, " a happiness in 
evil or pain which marks social life and which 
clinical experience foregrounds (765). From Freud to 
Lacan, however, to acknowledge that human beings often 
search for happiness beyond the threshold of what is 
good and pleasurable, and even to propose, as Lacan 
does, a criminal ethics against the good and the 
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pleasurable, never amounts to a wholesale refusal of 
the social bond. Psychoanalysis, in fact, sees the 
social bond not only as civilizing structure that 
restrains human beings 
- 
speaking beings or parletres 
in Lacan's jargon 
- 
from their ethical tendency 
towards le mal (evil and pain), but also as a 
civilizing structure that protects human beings from 
le mal, both as a pathological incidence (pain or 
suffering) and as a compulsive tendency (an evil 
destructive drive). The criminal ethics of 
psychoanalysis thus advocates a negation of the social 
bond that is neither a common crime (it does not 
simply give in to evil and pain as "normal"), nor a 
will to jouissance (it does not take evil and pain as 
absolute imperatives), but a purified desire that 
allows one to transcend the ethical horizon of 
civilization 
- 
the horizon of the common good and of 
the pleasure principle - and at the same time forges 
an alternative type of social bond capable of 
protecting the subject from evil compulsions and pain. 
We have seen how Lacan uses a multilayered reading of 
Sade in order to give us a definition of the ethical 
crime and of its practical conditions at the level of 
a particular position taken up by the subject within 
the fantasy of another subject. Although Lacan 
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criticises the Sadean position for giving place to a 
will to jouissance rather than to a purified desire, 
his reading of the Sadean fantasy makes it 
nevertheless very clear that, being determined by a 
particular point of access to a fantasy that exists in 
the Other for another subject, the ethical crime is 
not only transgressive but also constitutive of a 
particular modality of the social bond. In this 
chapter I will focus on this socially constitutive 
function of the ethical crime, emphasising how the 
emancipatory deconstitution of the Other of 
civilization made possible by purified desire 
coincides with 
- 
depends on, makes possible 
- 
the 
practical structuring of a social bond whose 
"civilizing" effects represent psychoanalysis' 
response to the dilemma of the discontent of 
civilization. 
Leaving Sade behind, I will focus instead on 
Sophocles' Antigone 
- 
the second criminal figure 
around which Lacan organises his definition of 
psychoanalytic ethics in Seminar VII - trying to bring 
to the fore how, in Lacan's reading, Antigone's 
position, and her particular point of access to the 
fantasy of the Other, come to illustrate precisely the 
constitution of an alternative modality of the social 
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link. More specifically, I will show how Lacan's 
reading of Sophocles' play functions as an 
illustration of the transferential dynamic which 
structures the analytic bond as an alternative 
civilizing bond around the purified and "criminal" 
desire of the analyst. 
The concept of transference is, of course, only one of 
the many possible angles from which Lacan's reading of 
Antigone can be approached. In Lacan's commentary, 
Antigone' s act is, in fact, not only a transferential 
act that transforms the structural logic of the social 
bond but also, by consequence, an act of freedom, a 
break in the continuity of the symbolic order, an act 
of neighbourly love and an act of fidelity to the 
impossible limit of one's jouissance. As we will see, 
other contemporary readers of Lacan have chosen to 
underline these aspects, privileging the "negative" 
potentiality of Antigone's act, so that even "love" 
and "fidelity" are generally referred to a bond that 
is external to the social link, while social change 
tends to be understood as a post-traumatic new 
structuring of the symbolic, rather than as a 
structuring of an altogether different type of social 
link around the dynamics of transference. 
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In the next section, before I move on to consider how 
Lacan's reading of Antigone illustrates the social and 
civilizing aspect of the ethical crime, I want to 
rehearse briefly some key articulations of the history 
of interpretation of Antigone, which will allow me to 
measure the distance between those 
- 
Lacanian or non- 
Lacanian 
- 
interpretations that see Antigone's crime 
as a pure gesture of negation and Lacan's own 
presentation of Antigone's crime as an intervention 
capable of initiating a transferential social bond. I 
will suggest that the modern history of the 
interpretations of Antigone is also, in a way, the 
history of a set of answers to the tragic "dilemma" of 
the discontent of civilization as formulated by Freud: 
the dilemma that opposes the singular to the universal 
and the reasons of the individual to the reasons of 
the community. In this respect, while readings of 
Antigone that privilege the negativity of her act will 
emerge as inevitably biased towards a criminal ethics 
that remains external to the possibilities of a 
different model of community, Lacan's reading of 
Antigone's act as a criminal transference points 
towards the practical possibility of a form of 
community where the subject's ethical orientation 
beyond the laws of community can be preserved and 
protected from the violence of its negativity. 
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2. Sophocles' Antigone and the Dilemma of Civilization 
In his history of the readings of Antigone, Antigones, 
George Steiner points out that the fortune of 
Sophocles' play in modern European culture starts 
after the French Revolution (7). Steiner names a 
series of reasons to explain why this may have been 
the case, the main one being the "irruption of the 
political into the private" and the "historicization 
of the personal" which marked the lives of millions 
throughout the economic and political revolutions of 
the late XVIII and early XIX Century, and which 
eventually became dominant features of the new post- 
revolutionary order (10-11) 
. 
By telling the story of 
the tragic clash between Antigone's devotion to her 
dead outlaw brother and the collective law of the city 
that forbids that she honour him, Sophocle's play was, 
as Steiner puts it, unique in making explicit the 
"dialectic of intimacy and exposure, of the "housed' 
and of the most public, " and managed to dramatise a 
distinctively modern concern with "the enforced 
politics of the private spirit, " with "the necessary 
violence that political-social change visits on the 
unspeaking inwardness of being" (11) 
. 
At a moment of 
historical discontinuity, Sophocles' Antigone thus 
started to draw attention to itself for being a 
classic text capable of reflecting a condition, a 
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conflict, which was perceived as typical of the 
subject of modern civilization: the ethical dilemma 
between the reasons of the individual and the reasons 
of the collectivity, the discontent of civilization 
made manifest by the clash between the individual and 
the collective. 
Among the early interpretations of Antigone produced 
in the first half of the XIX Century, the one that set 
the coordinates for all the subsequent philosophical 
engagements with Sophocles' text was, of course, the 
one presented by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
and in later texts such as the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion and the Philosophy of Right. In 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, Antigone constitutes the 
central reference for Hegel's discussion of the 
historical actualization of Spirit as ethical 
substance and its subsequent division in the two 
opposed ethical principles, the human law (the public 
law of the city) and divine law (the private law of 
the family). If Antigone, therefore, became a staple 
of modern European culture through its ability to 
reflect the underlying discontent of its new post- 
revolutionary civilization, we can say that Hegel was 
the first to approach this modern discontent through a 
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new theory of ethics and by means of a critical 
reading of Sophocle's text. 
In Hegel's Phenomenology, Antigone's devotion to her 
dead criminal brother is taken as a paradigm of 
conformity to the divine law, while Creon's defence of 
the interests of the collectivity against Antigone is 
taken as a paradigm of conformity to the human law. 
For Hegel, the divine law is the law that dictates the 
ethical relationship between the members of the family 
as a "natural ethical community, " understood as an 
"immediate" ethical form of the Spirit (Phenomenology 
268) 
. 
The human law, on the other hand, is the law 
that regulates relationships within the community, 
"the superior law whose validity is openly apparent, " 
embodied by the government as "the reality of Spirit 
that is reflected into itself, the simple self of the 
entire ethical substance" (Hegel, Phenomenology 272). 
Although it is only within the larger political 
community that the ethical substance can achieve self- 
consciousness, Hegel recognises that self- 
consciousness is possible also within the immediate 
and natural sphere of the family as such; it is, 
indeed, this possibility, for the family, of rising 
above its natural status, without nevertheless 
confusing its self-consciousness with the self 
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consciousness of the community, that enables the 
family to be determined as an "ethical being" with its 
own ethical (as opposed to natural) laws 
(Phenomenology 268) 
. 
As Hegel puts it, "the ethical 
principle is intrinsically universal, and this natural 
relationship [e. g. the family] is just as much a 
spiritual one, and it is only as a spiritual entity 
that it is ethical" (Phenomenology 268). 
The ethical action dictated by the divine law, 
therefore, can only be the one that relates the 
individual to the self-conscious universality of the 
whole family, and this is only possible if the 
individual himself is taken as an ethical end 
- 
not 
the living individual in its pathological needs but 
"the whole individual or the individual qua 
universal, " that is, the dead individual who "after a 
long succession of separate and disconnected 
experiences, concentrates himself into a single 
complete shape, and has raised himself out of the 
unrest of the accidents of life into the calm of 
simple universality" (Hegel, Phenomenology 269-70). 
The burial of the dead and the cult of the "pure 
being" of the dead individual thus come to represent 
the ultimate ethical duty for the member of the family 
and this is why for Hegel Antigone's act becomes a 
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paradigm of conformity to the divine law, "the perfect 
divine law, the positive ethical action towards the 
individual" (Phenomenology 270-71). 
Even if he recognises in Antigone the ethical dignity 
of the act that honours and raises to self- 
consciousness the individual in its accomplished, 
universalized form of pure being or death, Hegel's own 
position remains, however, faithful to the dialectical 
logic of his system, which means that he sides neither 
with Antigone nor with her enemy Creon, the guardian 
of the collective human law whose ethical legitimacy 
Hegel also recognises. Hegel emphasises, instead, the 
interdependence of the two ethical laws and the 
necessity to overcome both human and divine law in the 
progression of the Spirit beyond the sphere of ethics, 
beyond the ethical order itself. 
For Hegel, the self-conscious existence of the ethical 
order in the community's laws and regulations 
- 
the 
human law 
- 
crucially depends and rests upon the 
institution of the family and its divine law as its 
own "unconscious" substance, so that while the human 
law allows the family to "give to each [of its own] 
part[s] an enduring being" by checking their tendency 
to "be submerged in a merely natural existence, " the 
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family "shows itself to be the real power of the 
community and the force of its self-preservation" 
(Phenomenology 272-73). There seems to be, 
consequently, no tragic conflict or dilemma but only a 
peaceful harmony between human and divine law within 
the ethical substance as such. The conflict between 
human and divine law which finds its exemplary 
illustration in Sophocles' Antigone is only, in 
Hegel's view, the consequence of the inevitable 
polarisation of human ethical consciousness on one 
side or the other and of the polarised ethical action 
that must necessarily derive from such consciousness: 
for this reason, "absolute right" can only be 
accomplished, just like in Sophocle's play, by the 
tragic "downfall of both sides" which allows for a 
superior form of the ethical substance, destiny, to 
"step on the scene" as a "power that engulfs both 
sides" (Phenomenology 285). 
For the purposes of our enquiry into the nature of 
psychoanalytic ethics, the significance of Hegel's 
reading of Antigone lies in the fact that we can 
already find in it the essential coordinates of the 
Freudian analysis of the dilemma at the heart of the 
discontent of civilization. Hegel's description of the 
opposition between human and divine law, in fact, is 
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not merely an account of the conflict between the 
egoistic, pathological interests of the individual and 
the universal laws and customs of the collectivity, 
but an account of the conflict between civilization 
and the individual's ethical orientation towards the 
pure being of death, in which we can recognize an 
early formulation of the ethical agency of the death 
drive as defined by Lacan. More specifically, we can 
say that it is possible to find in Hegel's reading of 
Antigone the first articulation of a question which 
will be central to Freud's psychoanalytic reflection 
on the discontent of civilization: the question of the 
position of the drive in relation to the social bond. 
It is important to specify that this question is not 
the same as the one we have learnt to recognise, for 
example, in Sade's work following the logic of Lacan's 
and Klossowski's readings. Sade, we have seen, is 
concerned with the ethical nature of the death drive 
and asks whether the ethical crime is possible, 
whether there can be an exceptional ethical crime 
different from the crimes that are part and parcel of 
the discontent of civilization. Hegel, on the other 
hand, knows that the death drive is ethical and that 
the ethical crime is possible, he even defines it by 
pointing at Antigone's act, what he asks is whether 
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this crime 
- 
the purified death drive 
- 
has a place 
within civilization as well as against it. We may then 
say that Hegel's reading of Antigone can easily appear 
to be overdetermined (even if retroactively) by a 
distinctively Freudian problematic: the dilemma of the 
conflict between civilization and the death drive on 
the one hand and the question of how the drive may be 
integrated into the civilizing bond on the other. 
Even if they do not always present themselves as 
commentaries on Hegel, the most seminal contemporary 
readings of Antigone 
- 
including Lacan's, Derrida's, 
Irigaray's, Butler's, Copj ec' s, Zizek' s and Zupancic' s 
- 
can all nevertheless be seen as approaching 
Sophocles' play from the same distinctive angle where 
Hegel's and Freud's positions merge along the lines we 
have just sketched above. This means that these 
theorists not only formulate the tragic conflict of 
Antigone as the Hegelian conflict between human and 
divine law, but also generally tend to reformulate 
this distinctively Hegelian problematic in Freudian 
terms, so that even non- or anti-psychoanalytic 
readings of Antigone like those proposed, for example, 
by Jacques Derrida and by Luce Irigaray, typically 
chose to recast the dialectic of consciousness/self- 
consciousness that in Hegel opposes divine and human 
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law into the terms of a Freudian opposition between 
unconscious and conscious agencies. 
In engaging with Sophocles' text through Hegel and 
Freud, besides, these contemporary readings of 
Antigone also typically aim at formulating a critique 
of Freud's and Hegel's own set of answers to the 
ethical questions they raise, answers which, we cannot 
fail to notice, sound rather similar, particularly in 
relation to their common insistence on the necessity 
of controlling and overcoming the anarchy of the 
individual drive through the civilizing constraints of 
the communal law. It is, in fact, quite clear that, in 
spite of his dialectical neutrality (or perhaps 
precisely because of it), Hegel is nevertheless 
- 
just 
as Freud is 
- 
more than keen on emphasising the 
ethical superiority of the human law (civilization) in 
its function of control and containment of the 
centrifugal and anarchic tendencies of the divine law 
(the death drive). 
We may then posit that the contemporary critical 
debate on Antigone is marked by the following traits: 
1) it approaches Antigone from the point of view of 
Hegel's reading, as a play that stages the opposition 
between human and divine law; 2) it reformulates this 
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conflict in Freudian terms as the conflict between 
conscious and unconscious and between drive and 
civilization; 3) it attempts to define an ethical 
stance against the Hegelian-Freudian ethics of 
functional sublation (Aufhebung) and sublimation (in 
the Freudian sense) of the drive into the life of the 
community. Overall, we can say that most of the 
contemporary readings of Antigone are also marked by 
an overt endorsement of Antigone's criminal stance 
against the repressive and civilizing stance embodied 
not only by Creon's defence of the laws of the 
community, but also by the systematic logic of Hegel's 
philosophy itself. If Antigone's uncompromising 
obedience to the divine law is unanimously taken to be 
the paradigm of ethical action, the views on how her 
ethical stance may affect, be affected by or figure 
within the larger ethics of the community are, 
however, different.. We will now see how these 
different views depend on the different ways in which 
the opposition between divine law (drive) and human 
law (civilization) is theorised and on the different 
ways in which the question of their (in) compatibility 
is answered. 
If we consider, to start with, the readings of 
Antigone produced in the 1970s by theorists like 
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Derrida and Irigaray 
- 
readings that betray the more 
or less direct influence of Freud's and Lacan's work 
but do not present themselves as psychoanalytic 
- 
we 
can notice that the ethical stance adopted by Antigone 
in conformity with the divine law is emphasised in its 
criminal subversive and deconstructive character as 
well as in terms of the violence and repression it is 
subjected to by the human law which governs the 
community. Another common trait of these readings, and 
perhaps the most distinctive one, is an emphasis on 
the radical and unthinkable unconscious externality of 
the ethical crime in relation to the human law that 
represses it and which thus figures as the conscious 
law not only of society but also of rational thought 
itself. We may thus say that these readings answer the 
fundamental questions posed by Hegel's text by 
maintaining that divine law (drive) and human law 
(civilization) are radically external to each other 
and that the divine law can be integrated into the 
logic of the human law only at the cost of its violent 
disappearance and repression to the position of an 
unthinkable and unsettling supplement. 
Derrida's reading of Antigone in Glas, for example, 
insists on how the unconscious side of the divine law 
constitutes itself as an effect of the conscious 
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actuality of the human law, so that "no operation can 
actualize itself in the (day) light of consciousness 
without having structurally to restrain (shall we say 
repress, gird, suppress, push back into darkness, un- 
think, un-know) the other law, " which thus becomes the 
law of what cannot be thought, known or posited in the 
open light of consciousness (171). For Derrida, the 
"structural" opposition between human and divine law 
implies that every action is in itself criminal and 
guilty for having to align itself with one or the 
other of the two opposing laws. The ethical action, 
the ethical crime thus can only consist in the 
impossible attempt of making conscious what is 
unconscious, in bringing into light what by definition 
must remain hidden: "the crime" Derrida writes, "is 
more purely ethical when the opposition of one law to 
the other become conscious" (Glas 174). In this sense, 
Antigone is a paradigm of ethical action because she 
not only conforms to the divine law but also strives 
to bring this law into consciousness, to articulate it 
within the sphere of the human law without 
nevertheless allowing it to be assimilated by it: she 
is, as Derrida puts it, the guardian of a limit that 
is lost when it is guarded, and her conformity to the 
divine law can thus be defined precisely as an 
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irresistible but never accomplished drive; as a 
"trance that does not re(s)t(r)ain itself" (Glas 167). 
With this brief formula, Derrida gives us his answer 
to the question of the compatibility of human and 
divine law, of drive and civilization. The answer is, 
clearly, negative, as there is no possibility for the 
two laws to coexist: the divine law can only manifest 
itself within the civilized order as an "unrestrained" 
subversive drive; any attempt to assimilate it, on the 
other hand, will result in it not being "retained" and 
having to slip back into unconsciousness again, just 
like Antigone, who eventually is buried alive and must 
"return to the subterranean world that is her 
fundamental place" (Derrida, Glas 174). 
Derrida's understanding of Antigone's position in 
relation to the law of the collectivity is, in this 
respect, also very close to that articulated by Luce 
Irigaray in Speculum of the Other Woman. Although she 
gives additional emphasis to the feminine quality of 
the divine law, Irigaray similarly recognizes in 
Antigone's ethical drive the character of something 
that, for being radically other to the laws of 
consciousness and communal living, can neither be 
restrained or retained in any way. According to this 
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logic, Antigone's ethical crime can only be conceived, 
as Irigaray puts it, as a subversive act of "irony" or 
"corruption, " as the "resurgence of an 'essence' so 
different, so other, that even to expect it to 'work 
on the outside' reduces it to sameness, to an 
unconscious that has never been anything but the 
unconscious of someone conscious of human law alone" 
(223). 
In more recent years, the figure of Antigone has been 
reproposed as a paradigmatic model of ethical action 
in the work of Lacanian theorists like Slavoj Zizek, 
Russell Grigg, Alenka Zupancic and Joan Copjec. All 
these theorists claim to ground their readings of 
Sophocles' play 
- 
and their understanding of 
psychoanalytic ethics - on Lacan's own commentary of 
Antigone in Seminar VII. I will suggest, however, that 
their position should be considered in isolation from 
Lacan's since they are, in fact, emphasising only one 
particular aspect of Lacan's reading and developing it 
independently according to their own distinctive 
theoretical agenda. 
In Enjoy Your Symptom! and in many other of his books, 
for example, Zizek stresses above all the negative 
quality of Antigone's stance, and reads Antigone's 
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"No! " to Creon and to the law of the community as a 
radical "refusal of the social pact" 
-a subjective 
act of suspension of the symbolic order that creates 
the condition for a new subjectivation and for a 
transformation of the symbolic order of the community 
(76-77). We can thus say that for Zizek and for the 
other Lacanian theorists mentioned above, Antigone 
constitutes an example of the ethical crime as we have 
defined it in Chapter II, but divested from its 
practical condition at the level of the 
intersubjective montage of the fantasy, and thus 
ultimately turned into a pure subjective act of 
radical negation of the Other qua lacking and 
inconsistent. 
As Russell Grigg has pointed out in an article titled 
"Absolute Freedom and Major Structural Change, " this 
particular way of reading Antigone defines the 
opposition between the negative tendency of the drive 
and the symbolic community (civilization) around two 
main theoretical concerns: on the one hand, the drive 
is seen as what guarantees the possibility of freedom 
by enabling a radical suspension of the symbolic order 
of the community; on the other hand, the suspension of 
the symbolic can also enable change and a 
transformation of the community (114-15). If we return 
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to our guiding question - the question of the 
opposition between drive/divine law and 
civilization/human law as it emerges in Antigone 
through Hegel's reading 
- 
we can observe that although 
the Zizekian answer is different from the answer 
provided by Derrida and Irigaray, the idea of the 
radical externality of drive and social bond is 
nevertheless maintained by Zizek and by the other 
Lacanian theorists that follow his orientation. 
It is true that from Zizek's perspective the 
externality of drive and social bond is perhaps less 
radical than in Derrida or Irigaray, because the 
ethical act that follows the logic of the drive is 
also the act that can inaugurate a new social bond and 
not a mere moment of irony or corruption of the 
symbolic. As I have already pointed out at the 
beginning of this chapter, however, the new order of 
the symbolic inaugurated by the ethical crime as it is 
described by Zizek is not a different type of social 
link capable of integrating the pure ethical tendency 
of the drive (the divine law), but simply another 
arrangement, a new version of the same type of social 
link according to the same symbolic principles (the 
human law). It is thus apparent that, even in this 
type of reading, the drive figures as an exclusively 
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negative force, and that even if the drive is 
understood as a distinctive bond 
- 
between Antigone 
and Polynices, between the individual and what Hegel 
calls the pure being of death 
- 
this bond is thought 
of as external to civilization and the possibility of 
articulating a distinctive type of social link around 
it and within civilization is not taken into 
consideration. 
In this last respect, it is interesting to notice that 
some of the Lacanian readers of Antigone mentioned 
above 
- 
the most scrupulous ones, which does not 
include Zizek 
- 
have remarked that, in Sophocles' play 
as well as in Lacan's reading, Antigone is not simply 
defending a purely negative stance of absolute freedom 
from the symbolic order but she is also defending a 
particular position she has come to occupy within the 
symbolic network of her own family history. 
Ironically, instead of leading them to question the 
accuracy or partiality of their own accounts of 
psychoanalytic ethics, this awareness that their 
theoretical insight does not match the practical 
example provided by Lacan has also led them to argue 
that Antigone is, against Lacan himself, not the best 
example of Lacanian ethics. 
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In the article I quoted above, for example, Russell 
Grigg argues that Antigone's act is not an act of 
absolute freedom "in the required sense" (e. g. Zizek's 
sense) because Antigone's rejection of the symbolic 
law of the community "is entirely consistent with, and 
binds her to, her family destiny and paternal law, " 
reducing her parable to a mere subjective path of 
recognition and acceptance of her own symbolic destiny 
(116; 121). This almost paradoxical imposition of a 
rather different theoretical agenda onto Lacan's own 
reading is most apparent in Zupancic's Ethics of the 
Real, where the whole second half of the book, 
explicitly titled "Ethics and Tragedy in 
Psychoanalysis, " nevertheless purposefully avoids any 
sustained reference to Antigone and focuses instead on 
Lacan's discussion of Claudel's The Hostage in Seminar 
VIII, under the pretext that the heroine of Claudel's 
play exemplifies a much more radical and accomplished 
type of negation than Antigone (258-59). 
In relation to this particular issue, the most 
insightful Lacanian reader of Antigone seems to be, on 
the other hand, Joan Copjec, who in Imagine There's No 
Woman has managed to produce a reading of Lacan's 
commentary where the emphasis is not solely on the 
negativity of Antigone's act but also on the position 
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of Antigone within her familial network. Unlike Grigg, 
and, I think, correctly, Copjec does not see 
Antigone's conformity to the family law as the sign of 
her acceptance of her symbolic destiny, but, rather, 
as the sign of her ability to enter within a symbolic 
line of transmission that allows her to undermine and 
suspend symbolic necessity itself. As Copjec writes, 
Antigone shows that what the individual inherits from 
the family "cannot be located merely in a stateable 
law or dictate, [... ] but includes also that excess in 
the law that cannot be articulated within it" (Imagine 
45) This means that Antigone is not engaged in a 
simple negation or acceptance of her "fate" 
- 
of the 
symbolic law, of the human law 
- 
because what she 
inherits, what forms a social bond for her, is 
precisely the ability to criminally and ethically 
suspend the necessity of the symbolic Other: "she is, " 
Copjec emphasises, "destined to overturn her fate 
through her act" (Imagine 45). 
We can see how a very different understanding of the 
opposition of divine and human law, between drive and 
civilization takes shape through this type of reading. 
Suddenly the drive appears as transmissible and forms 
a social bond that is radically different from the 
bond of the human law but is nevertheless not 
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incompatible or external to it. Unfortunately, Copjec 
does not articulate the nature of this bond further. 
Her insight into the possibility of a social 
transmission of the ethical crime does not lead her to 
a reassessment of the Hegelian-Freudian question of 
the opposition between drive and civilization and her 
own theoretical agenda remains consistent with the 
Zizekian problematic of radical structural 
emancipation and transformation (freedom and change). 
The main critique that could be raised against the 
post-Hegelian readings of Antigone we have considered 
so far, therefore, is that, in spite of their firm 
rejection of Hegel's own way of accommodating the 
opposition between drive and civilization, they all 
nevertheless fail to provide an alternative ethical 
model capable of preserving and acknowledging the 
ethical dimension of the divine law/death drive within 
the boundaries of the human law/civilization. The 
readings of Antigone proposed by Derrida and Irigaray 
on the one hand, and by Zizek and his many 
contemporary Lacanian followers on the other, all move 
from a fundamental critique of the Hegelian and 
Freudian endorsement of a "superior" ethics of 
civilization against the ethics of the divine law and 
of the drive, choosing the latter as the referent for 
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their own brand of post-Hegelian or post-Freudian 
(Lacanian) ethics. 
This ethical inversion, however, does not prevent them 
from accepting Hegel's and Freud's fundamental tenet 
that, even when it provides the underlying ethical 
substance of the community and it can be sublimated 
into the higher purposes of civilization, the drive 
must nevertheless remain in a position of radical 
externality to the civilizing social bond of the 
community. If drive and the divine law are recognised 
as ethical dispositions against the violence of 
civilization, they are also presented as nothing more 
than negative dispositions that can only subvert and 
deconstruct or, at the most, introduce a radical break 
in the symbolic organization of the community which is 
then "free" to rearrange itself according to the same 
civilized ethics, that is, according to the human law 
and the pleasure principle. In this sense, the 
readings of Antigone proposed by all these theorists 
hardly represent a step forward from Hegel and Freud 
and may even be seen as confirming Hegel's and Freud's 
social subordination of the divine law and the death 
drive by continuing to exclude the possibility of a 
civilizing social link forged around an ethics of the 
drive. 
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But is another account of the opposition between drive 
and civilization even possible? Can we think of an 
ethical outcome to the dilemma between drive and 
civilization that would neither subordinate one to the 
other (as in Hegel and Freud), nor reinscribe this 
subordination by reserving a merely negative role for 
the drive (as in Derrida, Irigaray and Zizek), but 
adopt, instead, the very externality of the drive as 
an aggregative principle? While it will be my 
contention that Lacan's reading of Antigone heads 
precisely in this direction, it is worthwhile 
mentioning that an attempt to come to terms with this 
third position can also be identified in Judith 
Butler's own reading of Antigone in her book 
Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death. 
Butler's reading thus emerges as quite apart from the 
other readings discussed above, although this distance 
does not imply, as I will try to show, a greater or 
less complicated proximity to the position that we 
will finally recognize in Lacan's reading of Antigone. 
In Antigone's Claim, Butler reformulates the 
opposition between drive and civilization in 
Sophocle's play as the opposition between kinship and 
the state, thereby emphasising how the drive, qua 
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divine law and law of the family, also implies in 
itself a certain level of sexualised social 
aggregation 
- 
kinship 
- 
that demands to be 
interrogated not only from the perspective of its 
opposition to the dominant social link but also from 
that of its recognition as social link. After 
suggesting that, as we have just seen, in the history 
of the readings of Antigone "the separation of kinship 
from the social haunts even the most anti-Hegelian 
positions within the structuralist legacy, " Butler 
insists that 
The distinction between them does not quite 
hold, for in each instance we are still 
referring to social norms, but in different 
modes of appearance. The ideal form [i. e. the 
symbolic social law] is still a contingent 
norm, but one whose contingency has been 
rendered necessary, a form of reification [... ] 
. 
(3; 20-21) 
For Butler, therefore, the drive 
- 
the ethical push 
that orients Antigone's action against the law of the 
state 
- 
must be understood not as the negotiation or 
transgression of a symbolic limit but as a "'social 
norm, " as a drive that is already articulated as a 
contingent sexual social bond and that enters into 
conflict not with the social as such but with another 
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social norm "reified" into a universal condition of 
social acceptability and cultural intelligibility. In 
spite of her emphatic critique of psychoanalysis, 
Butler's position is, in this respect, much closer to 
Lacan's than she would like to admit, although a 
crucial difference also opens up between Butler and 
Lacan at this point. 
In full conformity with her "queer" agenda, Butler 
argues that the ethical kernel of Antigone's act lies 
in her "claim" for the public recognition of the 
incestuous and unconventional sexual bonds that mark 
her family history, in her defence of kinship "not in 
its ideal form but in its deformation and 
displacement" (24). Butler takes great care to explain 
to her readers that Lacan and his followers do not 
acknowledge the contingency of the allegedly universal 
social norms they theorise and defines the Lacanian 
symbolic as "what sets limits to any and all utopian 
efforts to reconfigure and relive kinship relations at 
some distance from the Oedipal scene" (20). We know 
very well, however, that this is not true since for 
Lacan the symbolic is far from being a mere set of 
rigid universal rules dictating sexual positions. 
Lacan understands the symbolic as nothing more than an 
inconsistent and open-ended set of signifiers and is 
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ready, not unlike Butler, to recognise not only the 
contingent aspect of Oedipal social norms but also the 
possibility and ethical dignity of a non-Oedipal 
social norm marked by a non-Oedipal jouissance. The 
crucial difference between Butler and Lacan is, 
rather, that Butler understands non-Oedipal social 
norms essentially in terms of sexual orientation or 
object-choice, while for Lacan the only non-Oedipal 
social norm is the norm that defines the analytic link 
as a bond that allows the subject to pass from the 
phallic jouissance of the sexual object to the 
jouissance of the Other 
- 
the jouissance of speech 
- 
through the path of desire. 
From this perspective, it is clear that Butler's 
"claim" for the social recognition of displaced 
structures of kinship risks losing its ethical edge 
and becoming, at best, simply a political claim for 
the recognition of a right to (phallic) jouissance, 
or, at worst, just another instance of the perverse 
superegoic will to jouissance we have examined in 
Chapter II. In relation to the problem of the conflict 
between drive and civilization, we may say then that 
Butler is right in arguing that the drive as ethical 
force needs to be seen as a social norm and not as a 
tendency external to the social. Her error is that she 
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implies that the drive can be socialised against the 
dominant ethics of civilization simply by being 
articulated to an unconventional sexual object, while 
Lacan reveals that the drive can be socialised against 
the dominant ethics of civilization only if it is 
articulated in a social bond that can alter the 
modality of its relation to the sexual object as such. 
We have seen how a certain series of seminal readings 
of Sophocles' Antigone starts from common post- 
Hegelian and post-Freudian preoccupations to develop 
them in different directions according to a range of 
different theoretical agendas, including otherness 
(Derrida and Irigaray), freedom and change (Zizek and 
the other Lacanians), and sexuality (Butler). These 
different agendas lead these readings to concentrate 
on different aspects of the drive vs. civilization 
dilemma emphasising either the orientation of the 
drive outside the boundaries of civilization or the 
possibility of articulating the drive in alternative 
social structures. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter, we will focus 
on Lacan's own reading of Antigone, where the main 
agenda is, instead, the definition of an ethical 
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conduct for the subject faced by the dilemma of 
civilization. Lacan's agenda can be seen as including, 
but also exceeding, the limited concerns with 
otherness, freedom, change and sexuality which 
condition the partial outlook of the readings we have 
analysed so far. Lacan, as we will see, accepts that 
the drive is directed outside the limits of 
civilization (Derrida's, Irigaray's and Zizek's 
position) but also insists that the drive can only 
achieve its ethical thrust outside the symbolic within 
a particular modality of the social link. On the other 
hand, if he acknowledges that the drive can be 
articulated in an alternative type of social structure 
(Butler's position), Lacan will also insist that this 
is not simply a social structure stripped of its 
civilizing universality by virtue of an unconventional 
sexual object-choice, but a structure, the structure, 
that enables the subject to sustain its freedom and 
autonomy by isolating desire from the jouissance of 
the object. 
3. Antigone's Criminal Transference 
Lacan's reading of Sophocles' Antigone occupies the 
whole of Section IV of Seminar VII. Coming just after 
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Lacan's discussion of Sade, it establishes a neat 
contrast between the figure of Sade and the figure of 
Antigone as two different paradigms of the ethical 
crime. If, as we have seen, Sade is still in many ways 
a criminal figure "on the limit" of the ethical 
threshold of jouissance, Sophocles' Antigone 
represents for Lacan the fully ethical criminal figure 
that manages to cross that limit: Antigone, says 
Lacan, is "a character situated from the start within 
a liminal zone between life and death" (VII 317), 
within that empty ethical space that ex-sists beyond 
the symbolic structure of civilization, after the 
sacrifice of the imaginary common good, and at the 
real gravitational end of the death drive. For Lacan, 
Antigone's criminal negation of civilizing laws 
succeeds where Sade had failed: Antigone can really 
suspend the symbolic order, her actions obey neither 
symbolic rules nor a fantasy of jouissance guaranteed 
by the Other. As Lacan puts it in his own reprise of 
Hegel's terms, Antigone's law is not the human law as 
"written" law but the divine law as "unwritten, " as 
"what is in fact of the order of the law but is not 
developed in any signifying chain, in nothing at all" 
(SVII 324). 
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Reprising the argument with which I closed Chapter II 
and against most of the Lacanian readings of Antigone 
I have discussed above, I would like to suggest that 
Lacan's reading of Antigone is more about how Antigone 
manages to accomplish her ethical crime than about 
what her ethical crime actually involves. It is, of 
course, correct to say, as has been said, that for 
Lacan Antigone's trajectory involves a "symbolic 
suicide, " a "traversal of the fantasy" and a "fidelity 
to desire. " Lacan, however, is also telling us how 
these logical moments are made possible, and I would 
like to argue that neglecting this side of Lacan's 
commentary 
- 
the most specifically ethical side 
insofar as ethics is essentially concerned with 
conduct 
- 
has major consequences not only for our 
understanding of psychoanalytic ethics, but also for 
our understanding of how Lacan approaches the 
opposition between the ethical/criminal drive and 
civilization. The privileging of the "what" over the 
"how" neglects a crucial part of Lacan's analysis of 
Sophocle's play and tends to present Antigone's 
emancipation as a mere individual act of arbitrary 
nihilism whose only social consequence can be that of 
allowing a temporary suspension and subsequent 
reconstitution of the symbolic. A focus on the "how, " 
on the other hand, is not only closer to Lacan's 
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actual argument, but will also allow us to appreciate 
that ethical conduct depends on the forging of a 
particular type of social link and that the 
"unwritten" divine law of the drive is constitutive of 
a particular social bond as well as external to the 
social. 
We can start by noting that, in Lacan's reading of 
Antigone, the divine law that drives Antigone to 
persevere in her attempt to bury her brother Polynices 
against Creon's public law is clearly not a mere 
abstract drive towards death and annihilation. In 
terms that are possibly also more coherent with the 
original Hegelian analysis of the play, Lacan presents 
the divine law 
- 
and, by implication, the ethical 
drive 
- 
as a matter of how one relates to a particular 
body that comes to represent the nothingness of death. 
In this sense, for Lacan, the key to grasp the ethical 
import of Antigone's gesture lies in the specific way 
in which she relates to the body of her brother 
Polynices for what it comes to represent -a lack or 
void in the Other - on the grounds of what it actually 
is 
- 
the dead body of a criminal. Because he is not 
only an enemy of the common good but also a corpse, a 
piece of nothing, Polynices comes to embody what Lacan 
refers to as the neighbour, the hostile other that 
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stands in excess of the symbolic chain in and outside 
ourselves, the void in which we locate the lost 
treasure of our jouissance. 
Polynices, however, occupies the place of the 
neighbour within Antigone's fantasy in a very special 
way. Unlike the Sadean torturer, he does not act as 
the instrument of Antigone's will to jouissance, 
taking its place within a fantasy of jouissance which 
is already constituted in the Other. Rather, Polynices 
acts as the semblant of a remainder of symbolization 
that escapes symbolization and as such undermines 
Antigone's fantasy from within, undoing the 
symbolization of jouissance produced by fantasy and 
thus allowing Antigone to suspend and deconstitute the 
Other. As Lacan points out closely following 
Sophocles' text, Polynices represents for Antigone 
something "unique" that "cannot be replaced" 
- 
that 
is, symbolized: Antigone defends Polynices because "he 
is what he is, " she "insists on the unique value of 
his being beyond all content, beyond all that 
Polynices may have done of good or evil, beyond 
anything that may be inflicted on him" (SVII 324-25). 
In Lacan's reading, 
This purity, this separation of being from all 
the characteristics of the historical drama it 
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has gone through, this is exactly what the 
limit is, the ex-nihilo around which Antigone 
holds herself. It is nothing else but the cut 
that the very presence of language installs in 
human life. (SVII 325) 
By finding and holding her relation to this limit 
Antigone can separate her desire from the jouissance 
of the fantasy and thus accomplish her ethical crime, 
deconstituting the Other and conquering her own self- 
legislating autonomy. 
Directed to an elusive cut in the Other, Antigone's 
desire loses its object and becomes a "pure desire, " 
"the pure and simple desire of death as such, " the 
enigmatic, objectless and all-destroying desire of the 
lacking inconsistent Other that originally confronts 
all speaking beings in their relation to the maternal 
Other (Lacan, SVII 329) 
. 
"What happens to Antigone's 
desire? " 
- 
asks Lacan 
- 
"Must it not be the desire of 
the Other and branch itself on the desire of the 
mother? " (SVII 328). The "autonomy" of Antigone's 
position ("autonomous, " from "autos" (self) and 
"nomos" (law), means "self-legislating: " Lacan takes 
the term directly from the Greek word used by 
Sophocles, "auTövo, uos") rests precisely on her ability 
to redirect her desire from the jouissance promised by 
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the fantasy, a fantasy that the Other is (only) 
supposed to guarantee with its supposed laws, demands 
and knowledge, to the infinite measure of this cut in 
the Other: "Antigone presents herself as avrövopog, 
pure and simple relation of the human being with what 
he finds himself to be the bearer of, that is, the 
signifying cut, which confers on him the 
indestructible power to be, in front of and against 
everything, what he is" (SVII 328). 
If the ethical crime depends on a relation to the 
signifying cut, however, it is equally important for 
Lacan to insist that this relation can happen only 
through Antigone's relation to Polynices acting as a 
semblant of this cut. Antigone's ability to maintain a 
certain ethical stance in relation to what exceeds the 
symbolic Other, in other words, depends on the forging 
of a particular bond with the body of another speaking 
being and on the particular way in which this body can 
enter or find its place as a semblant of this excess 
within Antigone's fantasy. There is no other practical 
way. It should thus be clear that for Lacan the 
Hegelian divine law and the drive in its 
ethical/criminal articulation cannot be understood 
simply as purely negative forces or abstract 
orientation towards nothingness. In this sense, Lacan 
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would certainly agree with Judith Butler in 
maintaining that for Antigone the divine law is a 
matter of kinship, a matter of maintaining a certain 
libidinal bond with another body rather than with 
abstract (symbolic) death, except that, of course, for 
Lacan this would be a bond with a body that represents 
(symbolic) death, rather than with an unconventional 
type of sexual object. 
We could say, therefore, that in his reading of 
Antigone Lacan defines psychoanalytic ethics not just 
as a negation of the Other, but as a negation of the 
Other whose practical condition is a social bond. This 
social bond, in turn, reveals that the drive in its 
ethical/criminal course is not just opposed to 
civilization but also a civilizing force in its own 
right to the extent that it is constitutive of a 
precise social bond. Lacan's definition of Antigone's 
act confirms this by emphasising how this act depends 
on a relation between two speaking beings. Antigone, 
Lacan says, "chooses to be purely and simply the 
guardian of the criminal being; " her position "is 
situated in relation to the criminal good" (SVII 280; 
329). This means that Antigone accomplishes her 
ethical crime by loving a criminal, she becomes a 
criminal by loving a criminal, her crime is the full 
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realization of that "love of the neighbour" that Lacan 
had found missing in Freud's ethical formulation. 
We have seen how this love depends on a transferential 
relation between Antigone and Polynices, who comes to 
represent that signifying cut that resists and 
undermines the symbolic law of the Other from within. 
The logic of this relation is specifically 
transferential because Antigone transfers her relation 
to the cut that defines her own unique being 
- 
and the 
possibility of her criminal autonomy 
- 
on her relation 
to the unique and non-replaceable body of her brother 
qua semblant of this cut. As well as being 
transferential in one direction (from Antigone to 
Polynices), however, this ethical and criminal 
relation structured by the drive is also characterised 
by a dynamic of transmission which works in the 
opposite direction (from Polynices to Antigone), in 
the sense that Antigone appears to "inherit" her 
relation to the signifying cut and her pure criminal 
desire from Polynices. As Lacan puts it, Antigone 
"perpetuates, eternalizes, immortalizes the family 
Ate, " the criminal "undoing" of the law that she 
recognises in the history of her family (SVII 329). 
This is why we can say that Antigone becomes a 
criminal by loving a criminal. 
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We can see then how this double dynamic of 
transference and transmission that characterises the 
practical side of the ethical tendency of the drive 
allows for the articulation of a social bond that does 
not stop and goes well beyond the dual link between 
the subject and the neighbour. The process of 
transference and transmission, in fact, ensures that 
the relation to the signifying cut and the purified 
desire of the criminal can be "immortalized" and 
handed down from one to another and then to another 
subject to create an open social network based 
precisely on its participants' ability to undo social 
norms and articulate their own autonomy. We have seen 
how Joan Copjec gestured implicitly towards this form 
of social aggregation by pointing out that Lacan's 
Antigone inherits an excess of the symbolic law 
through which she is paradoxically bound to a line of 
inheritance and to a destiny that consists in being 
able to overthrow one's destiny. I would like now to 
suggest that this movement is also made apparent, in 
its particular implications for the constitution of an 
alternative type of social bond, by Lacan's own focus 
on the function of Antigone's image within the economy 
of the tragic spectacle. 
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Lacan approaches Sophocles' play by adapting 
Aristotle's definition of tragedy to his own theory of 
the death drive. The purification (or sublimation) of 
desire from the good that defines the unhindered 
activity of the death drive is equated by Lacan to the 
"catharsis" of fear and pity that defines the tragic 
spectacle according to Aristotle. As Lacan puts it, 
"catharsis means purification of desire, " a 
purification that "cannot be accomplished, as is clear 
simply from reading Aristotle's phrase, if one has not 
at least situated the crossing of its limits, which 
are called fear and pity" (SVII 372). Fear and pity 
are, of course, the limits of the common good insofar 
as it is through fear and pity that our relation to 
the imaginary register of the good takes place 
- 
fearful hostility and pitiful altruism being the 
emotions we use to protect ourselves from the 
horrifying nothingness of the neighbour (Lacan, SVII 
219-20). 
For Lacan, in Sophocles' play it is the criminal image 
of Antigone that performs the cathartic purification 
of desire, so that it is possible to say that, at 
least within the economy of the tragic spectacle, 
Antigone occupies, for the audience, a position 
analogous to that occupied by the criminal body of 
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Polynices for Antigone: the position of the neighbour, 
of the criminal good in relation to which an ethical 
stance can be defined. Antigone's desire confers on 
her terrible and pitiful image the cathartic power of 
"purifying from fear and pity through fear and pity: " 
Antigone's image becomes a paradoxical image capable 
of purifying from imaginary passions, an image endowed 
with a "dissolving power [... ] towards all the other 
images that suddenly seem to fall against it and 
vanish" (Lacan, SVII 290). The purification of desire 
from the common good that lies at the heart of the 
trajectory of the tragic hero, therefore, is repeated 
in Lacan's reading within the economy of the tragic 
spectacle which in this way manages to forge an 
ethical social bond around the figure of the criminal. 
In the particular type of relation to the criminal 
good that marks the tragic spectacle, the spectator is 
made aware, as Lacan puts it, of the "cost" of pure 
desire and "demystified on the value of the prudence 
that is opposed to it, on the relative value of the 
beneficial reasons, attachments and pathological 
interests [... ] that may withhold him from that way" 
(SVII 372). The ethical experience is thus not just 
the extreme trajectory of those who decide, like 
Antigone, to pay with their lives (and with the lives 
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of others) the price for the realization of their 
desire, but also, and especially, the trajectory of 
those who, like the spectators of Antigone, decide to 
pay with the value of their own good, with the value 
of their own personal "beneficial reasons, 
attachments, and pathological interests, " the price 
for the revelation of the truth of their desire in 
somebody else's semblance. 
Lacan's illustration of the way in which Antigone's 
relation to the criminal good is redoubled by the 
relation between Antigone's figure and the tragic 
audience permits us to bring into focus the essence of 
the ethical crime. Although it is defined by a gesture 
that exceeds and questions the social link, the 
ethical crime does not, strictly speaking, take place 
outside the social arena of civilization. Before the 
ethical crime can suspend and project the subject 
towards the very limit of the social order and its 
symbolic structure, it must take place as an 
intersubjective transferential relation where one of 
the two parties acts as a semblant of the criminal 
good: there is no other way for Antigone's desire to 
be transformed and purified if not through her very 
special type of relation to the body of another 
speaking being. 
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The ethical dimension of the criminal act can thus be 
realised only within a type of social exchange capable 
of accommodating what by definition exceeds the limits 
of the social exchange of goods: love, the tragic 
spectacle as an example of artistic sublimation, and 
also the analytic relationship itself, which is 
discussed by Lacan in the last part of Seminar VII as 
an instance of the subject's relation to the criminal 
good in the person of the analyst. For Lacan, the 
tragic spectacle provides the "model" for the 
psychoanalytic bond between analyst and analysand, and 
the cultivation of the criminal good becomes the focus 
of the social practice of psychoanalysis qua ethical 
practice (SVII 372). 
Like the tragic spectacle, the analytic relationship 
is based on a social exchange of the criminal being, 
at the end of which the subject must learn to sustain 
his/her own pure desire and "reach and know the field 
and the depth of the experience of absolute loss" 
(Lacan, SVII 351). The subject's acknowledgement of 
the cost of his/her desire in relation to the common 
values that orient his/her life is actually even more 
profound in the analytic setting than in the tragic 
spectacle because, as Lacan points out, it is only in 
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the singularity of the analytic transference that the 
subject can "open the ballot box of his own law" and 
thus also of his/her own particular good rather than 
of the generalised common good staged in the tragic 
spectacle (SVII 347) 
. 
Rather than as a dissolution or 
negation of the social bond, the analytic bond is 
presented by Lacan as a particular type of social 
exchange whereby the discontents of civilization 
- 
that is, the social conflicts and neuroses centered 
around the symbolic displacements of the common good 
- 
may be treated. 
As we have seen, Freud had chosen the common good over 
the criminal good and left the problem of the 
discontent of civilization open by putting the ethics 
of psychoanalysis under the compass of a civilizing 
ethics. Lacan's choice of the criminal good does not 
simply reverse Freud's position: Lacan does not throw 
out the baby with the bathwater by seeking a solution 
to the discontent of civilization in a negation of 
civilization. Rather, Lacan strives to address the 
discontents of civilization by identifying a criminal 
ethics capable of finding its place in a different 
type of social bond 
- 
the analytic bond itself 
- 
through which the subject may learn to articulate his 
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desire against the repressive constraints and the 
structural violence of civilization. 
4. The Ethics and Politics of Transference 
We could sum up the progress of our argument so far by 
saying that Lacan's commentary on Sophocle's Antigone 
illustrates the necessary practical condition that 
needs to be fulfilled if the criminal and destructive 
tendency of the drive wants to become ethical and 
allow (1) an orientation towards the good of 
jouissance beyond the common good of civilization, as 
well as (2) the possibility of the subject's autonomy 
and freedom from the constraints and inherent violence 
of civilization. This condition coincides with a 
particular ethical practice, which we have defined as 
an intervention at the level of fantasy and as the 
articulation of a transferential bond, and which would 
allow the subject's relation to the "limit" of 
jouissance as well as his autonomy and ability to 
purify his desire from the jouissance of the fantasy. 
By turning to Lacan's commentary on Antigone in order 
to emphasise the centrality of this practical 
condition of psychoanalytic ethics, we have also had 
the chance to insist on how, in this respect, Lacan 
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defends a unique position within the Hegelian-Freudian 
legacy as he maintains that the ethical criminal drive 
is not external to civilization but constitutive of a 
certain civilizing bond. I would like to conclude this 
chapter, and the first part of my thesis, by 
suggesting that the handling of the (criminal) 
transference thus emerges in Lacan as the fundamental 
principle not only of psychoanalytic ethics but also 
of psychoanalytic politics. 
In The Language of Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche and 
Jean-Baptiste Pontalis give a minimal definition of 
transference as "a process of actualisation of 
unconscious wishes" that "uses specific objects and 
operates in the framework of a specific relationship 
established with these objects" (455). They point out 
that the structure of transference coincides with that 
of repression, since transference is essentially only 
a particular case of the displacement of unconscious 
wishes from one object to the other that defines the 
mechanism of defence and symptom formation (456-57). 
The peculiarity of transference as a mode of 
displacement is clearly that the subject's relation to 
a specific unconscious object (e. g. his fantasy) is 
transferred not to a manifest conscious idea (as in 
dreams) or to a bodily part or bodily action (as in 
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symptoms) but to the body of another person that in 
this way becomes the object of a transferential social 
relation. 
In his papers on transference, "Observations on 
Transference-Love" and "The Dynamics of Transference, " 
Freud insists on this particular side of transference 
by presenting it as a repetition of the subject's 
unconscious fantasy that provides the formula of the 
subject's relation to its libidinal objects. As Freud 
puts it, the subject's ability to acquire a "specific 
method [... ] in the preconditions to falling in love 
which he lays down, in the instincts he satisfies and 
the aims he sets himself in the course of it" produces 
a sort of "stereotype plate (or several such), which 
is constantly repeated - constantly reprinted afresh - 
in the course of the person's life" ("Dynamics" 99- 
100). In this particular sense, transference is what 
maintains the subject's subordination to the fantasy 
as a practical unconscious law, simply by repeating 
and displacing/transferring the structure of this law 
onto every relation that the subject needs to 
negotiate. 
Freud is then able to say that transference is also a 
form of "resistance" to the work of analysis and to 
219 
the dynamics of the analytic relation, in which such 
unconscious social stereotypes need to be brought into 
consciousness so that the analysand may be enabled to 
escape the sway of his unconscious determinants 
("Dynamics" 105). Now, if this is the standard 
Freudian definition of transference, we have seen that 
the transferential dynamic illustrated by Lacan's 
reading of Antigone takes place on a very different 
level. We can, indeed, say that, in a way, Antigone is 
"actualising her unconscious wish" by transferring it 
onto Polynices, but it would not be correct to say 
that this transference is simply a repetition of 
Antigone's unconscious fantasy. In order to transfer 
her fantasy object onto Polynices, Antigone would need 
to rely on a signifier capable of producing that 
object as a signification invested with the necessity 
of a law. 
As we have seen, however, what Antigone transfers onto 
her relation to Polynices is not her relation to a 
particular object or signification guaranteed by the 
supposed authority of a signifier 
- 
Antigone cannot 
say what Polynices is 
- 
but her independent relation 
to a body representing her own lack of being and the 
impossibility of her jouissance. Polynices is the 
semblant of a limit in the symbolic register of 
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signification, and this means that in her relation to 
him Antigone cannot be backed by any pre-existing 
"method, " "stereotype" or law and must take 
responsibility for her own desire as an autonomous 
subject. Antigone's transference is thus both 
"criminal" and "ethical, " guaranteeing an autonomous 
orientation towards jöuissance for the subject. 
The possibility of moving from transference as 
repetition to transference as ethical and criminal 
bond, and, generally, the central role played by 
transference in the ethical experience of the subject, 
depend on the dialectic of desire and demand that, 
according to Lacan, structures the relation of the 
subject to the Other and underlies every social 
relation negotiated by the subject. In one of the key 
texts of his Ecrits, "La direction de la cure et les 
principes de son pouvoir, " Lacan explains how this 
dialectic orients the dynamics of the transferential 
relation and how it is only through the strategic 
direction of this dynamics that an ethical structuring 
of the transference can be achieved. 
Lacan insists that, since the transference invests a 
second person not only as an object but also as a 
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speaking being, the transference should also be 
understood as the transferring of a demand originally 
addressed to the Other as point of origin of all the 
demands addressed to the subject, not a demand for 
something specific but a pure, "radical" demand: 
He [the analysand] demands... 
, 
from the very 
fact that he speaks: his demand is 
intransitive, it does not involve any object. 
[... ] His demand [... ] is not even his, since 
after all it is me [the analyst] that has 
offered him to speak. [... ] To demand, the 
subject has never done anything but that, he 
has lived to demand, and we have to follow 
this pattern. ("Direction" 617) 
It is by directing or handling this radical demand of 
the speaking being that the dynamics of the 
transference can be moved on from the repetition of an 
unconscious fantasy (of satisfaction of the subject's 
demand) towards a desiring engagement with that cut or 
limit in the Other that exceeds all fantasies of 
satisfaction. As Lacan puts it referring to the 
analyst's response to the analysand's demands in the 
transference: "the analyst has the task of sustaining 
the subject's demand, not, as has been said, to 
frustrate the subject, but so that the signifiers that 
capture his frustration [e. g. the signifiers through 
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which the subject can refer to his lack and thus 
sustain himself as a desiring subject] may reappear" 
in the subject's speech ("Direction" 618). 
One partner of the transference, in other words, needs 
to refuse to play the role of the demanding, law 
giving Other that his partner's demands invite him to 
play, but at the same time "sustain" his partner's 
demand, so that his own lack of being and incomplete 
knowledge may eventually enable his partner to define 
and choose autonomously the signifiers of his own 
desire. The role of demand within the transference 
thus allows us to emphasise two points. First, the 
fact that the subject needs to negotiate the Other's 
demands before being able to move from (the) 
jouissance (of the fantasy) to his autonomous desire, 
and, most importantly, the fact that such negotiation 
can only take place through a relation to another 
speaking body to which the Other's demands are 
transferred, allow us to insist once more that there 
can be no grandiose ethics of "negation, " "suicide" or 
"fidelity" without a perhaps more modest, but 
certainly more viable, ethics of transference which 
can be practised only at the level of the concrete 
handling of the analytic social bond. Second 
- 
and 
this leads us to the last part of our argument 
- 
we 
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can see that this ethics of transference also implies 
a particular politics, which we will identify as 
psychoanalytic politics insofar it characterises, to 
return to Lacan's words, the "direction of the 
treatment" and the "principles of its power, " or, to 
put it differently, the way in which power relations 
are handled within the criminal and ethical 
transferential social bond of analysis. 
In "La direction de la cure, " Lacan observes quite 
explicitly that in the transferential relation the 
analyst needs to orient his "strategy and tactics, 
that is, his politics, [... ] on his lack of being rather 
than on his being" (589). In orienting his politics on 
his "being" and on a certain understanding of reality 
(how things are, how things should be), the analyst 
would simply accept the powerful position of the 
demanding Other that the analysand transfers on him, 
thinking that he is acting independently while in fact 
he is merely acting as a dummy of the Other of the 
transference. Lacan formulates this very beautifully 
when he writes that "the inability to sustain a praxis 
in an authentic way results, as is common in the 
history of men, in the exercise of power" ("Direction" 
586). 
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Psychoanalytic politics thus implies a degree of 
rejection or demystification of the power that the 
dynamics of transference displaces within the social 
bond. It is also true, however, that psychoanalytic 
politics does not imply a simple abdication of power 
since the demand of the Other also needs to be 
"sustained" so that the signifiers that allow it to be 
separated from desire can be found. We may say that 
psychoanalytic politics must walk a thin line between 
renouncing and sustaining power in order to enable all 
the subjects involved in the transference to finally 
reclaim their autonomy from the Other. 
Freud's early papers on transference offer a very 
effective formulation of this thin line that 
psychoanalytic politics needs to walk in negotiating 
the way in which the supposed power and knowledge of 
the Other is displaced under the guise of a demand for 
love during the transference: 
It is, therefore, just as disastrous if the 
patient's craving for love is gratified as if 
it is suppressed. The course the analyst must 
pursue is neither of these; it is one for 
which there is no model in real life. He must 
take care not to steer away from the 
transference-love, or to repulse it or to make 
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it distasteful to the patient; but he must 
just as resolutely withhold any response to 
it. He must keep firm hold of the 
transference-love, but treat it as something 
unreal [... ] 
. 
("Observations" 383) 
By "keeping firm hold" of a power that is nevertheless 
also "'treated as something unreal, " psychoanalytic 
politics prepares the ground for the moment when power 
flows back from the Other to the subject and the 
subject can stop addressing his demand to the Other 
and start to articulate his signifiers and his desire 
autonomously. 
Contrary to what one may think, moreover, this moment 
of emancipation of the subject, which is the logical 
outcome of the particular handling of power that marks 
psychoanalytic politics, does not imply a dissolution 
of the transference and the release of its 
participants to a state of individualistic and 
atomised autonomy. Some commentators of Lacan, and 
most notably John Rajchman, have suggested that 
Lacan's ethics of desire opens up the question of a 
social bond among "singular subjects, " among subjects 
that are not gathered together by a common ideal or 
morality, but by a form of love that "assumes the 
`transferential' form of the place of the subject in 
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language" (Rajchman 52-53). With reference to our 
discussion of Antigone, I think we can make this point 
clearer by saying that the ethical-criminal social 
bond can also sustain itself through a dynamics of 
transmission that would bind together a set of 
autonomous subjects not through their common 
submission to a law or ideal guaranteed by the Other, 
but through their common relation to a lack or limit 
in a powerless Other. On a different level, therefore, 
psychoanalytic politics is also concerned with the 
transmission of the ethical-criminal social bond 
within a certain type of collective formation. 
As Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed out in his "Turin 
Theory of the Subject of the School, " the structure of 
this collective transferential social bond based on 
criminal transmission is articulated by Lacan in his 
1964 "Acte de fondation" of the Freudian School of 
Paris, where Lacan emphasises the "loneliness" of his 
"relation to the analytic cause" as the constitutive 
principle of the collective formation of the school 
(229). In Lacan's formulation, the "loneliness" of the 
leader is the loneliness of the autonomous subject who 
does not address his demands to the Other because he 
has recognised that the power of the Other is only 
ever supposed and that responsibility lies with the 
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subject. The leader who orients his politics on his 
loneliness (or, as we have said above, on his lack of 
being) is thus a leader that sustains the transference 
that invests him with the insignia of the Other not in 
order to control his subjects but in order to transmit 
his loneliness and his autonomy to them. 
It is this transmission that can tie a group together, 
not as an ideal but as a cause 
-a cause as chose, 
causa or thing, Das Ding, the limit in the Other, but 
also a cause as something one fights for, an 
orientation, an ethical good which has the same 
structure for all speaking beings but is signified 
differently by each "lonely" subject. As Miller points 
out: "a community is possible between subjects who 
know the nature of semblants, and for whom the ideal, 
the same for all, is nothing more than a cause 
experimented by each one, at the level of his 
subjective loneliness, as a subjective choice, of 
one's own alienating choice, even forced, and implying 
loss" ("Turin" 4). 
In terms of its internal dynamics of power, such a 
community would be an "anti-totalitarian set par 
excellence, " a "series in which a law of formation is 
missing, " a "series of exceptions, of lonelinesses 
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incomparable to each other, except that all are 
lonelinesses structured as lonelinesses" (Miller, 
"Turin" 6). In terms of its type of government, such 
community would not be a collectivity of isolated 
individuals relating to a common ideal or 
identification (as in the collective formations 
analysed by Freud in Group Psychology), but, rather, a 
collective subject emerging from the signifiers 
produced by the open-ended work of interpretation of 
its members (Miller, "Turin" 7). 
Finally, in terms of its relation to the power of the 
State (the power of the Other), such community would 
be comparable to an underground criminal society, not, 
as Miller explains, in a "conspiratorial" sense, but 
in the sense that it is its very inconsistency that 
makes it "invisible" to the eyes of the Other: "the 
School is in itself its own purloined letter, 
unfindable by the police, this police that, according 
to Hegel, forms the very essence of the State" 
("Turin" 8). 
Lacan's insistence on the centrality of the 
transferential bond for psychoanalytic ethics should 
thus not lead us to the usual conclusion that 
psychoanalysis, even as an ethical practice, only 
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concerns the individual and is alien to, and 
conservatively separated from, the social and 
political sphere. On the contrary, it is precisely its 
inherent link with the handling of the social dynamics 
of the transferential bond which makes of 
psychoanalytic ethics also an always already social 
and political practice and thus marks its significance 
for contemporary debates on radical politics. As 
Yannis Stavrakakis has stated in his book Lacan and 
the Political, the appeal of psychoanalytic ethics for 
contemporary politics is that it can offer a "new 
ethical framework" capable of overcoming the limits of 
"traditional fantasmatic politics" (120-21). 
While the work of Slavoj Zizek and others has 
unfortunately, as we have seen, paradoxically only 
reinforced the idea of the externality of 
psychoanalytic ethics to the social and political 
sphere by exaggerating its transgressive and 
revolutionary political effects, other theorists have 
managed to grasp the political potential of the 
transferential bond. In a representative essay 
published in the collection Emancipation(s), for 
example, Ernesto Laclau has shown how a Lacanian 
critique of universalistic ethics, and the reduction 
of the "space of the common good" to an empty symbolic 
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transferential function 
-a "master signifier" 
- 
covering a constitutive antagonism inherent to the 
social, can "open the way to a relative 
universalisation of values which can be the basis for 
a popular hegemony" and a radicalisation of the 
democratic project (60-5). 
Alain Badiou, on the other hand, has grounded the idea 
of the ethical "fidelity" of the subject to an 
"undecidable" and traumatic event on the possibility 
of distinguishing between political orientations based 
on truth and political orientations based on interest: 
while the vast majority of empirical political 
manifestations - including the "action of the State" - 
have nothing to do with truth, "a political 
orientation touches upon truth provided it is founded 
on the egalitarian principle of a capacity to discern 
the just or the good" ("Philosophy" 70-71). 
Interestingly, Badiou's definition of a politics based 
on truth, that is, on the defence of the possibility 
of the subject's ethical relation to a truth-event, 
may find an example precisely in the type of 
transferential collectivity described by Miller in his 
theory of the subject of the psychoanalytic school. 
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I would like to suggest, however, that neither Laclau, 
nor Badiou, nor any other contemporary political 
theorist has identified the handling of the 
transferential relation and the transmission of desire 
as the fundamental and structuring feature of their 
understanding of radical politics. Some Anglo-American 
readers of Lacan, notably Sherry Turkle (in 
Psychoanalytic Politics: Jacques Lacan and Freud's 
French Revolution) and Jacqueline Rose (in a long 
critical preface to her translation of Moustapha 
Safouan's Jacques Lacan and the Question of 
Psychoanalytic Training), have devoted some attention 
to the question of politics within psychoanalytic 
institutions, reconstructing Lacan's attempt to create 
an institution based on a form of political 
sovereignty "capable of renouncing its own essential 
or reigning principle, " and suggesting that the 
significance of such an attempt "has to exceed the 
person of Lacan and indeed, finally, the institution 
of psychoanalysis itself" (Rose 39,43). 
If this is the case, we might argue that, while 
contemporary political theory has learnt to uses 
psychoanalysis 
- 
to return to Stavrakakis' formula - 
as a "new ethical framework" to study and theorise 
politics, there is also another, perhaps more 
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fruitful, way in which the relation between 
psychoanalysis and politics might be reconfigured 
today. Lacan's understanding of politics, as we have 
seen, refers literally to the direction of the 
analytic treatment as a practical strategy of power to 
enable an ethical position that has profound political 
consequences in the constitution of a social bond 
based on the transmission of the desire of the 
analyst. Psychoanalysis, in this sense, does not need 
to be applied or used as a "framework" to study and 
theorise politics: it is politics already and it 
should then not only be practiced as politics but also 
studied and theorised as politics. 
Part Two 
The Sinthome 
Blank Page 
Chapter IV 
The Discontents of Contemporary Life 
1. A Diachronic Approach 
Up to this point we have considered Lacan's reading of 
Freud's hypothesis on the discontent of civilization. 
On this reading rests Lacan's classic formulation of 
the ethics of psychoanalysis, an ethics centred on the 
death drive and on the criminal act as means of 
sublimating desire from the common good of 
civilization. We have also remarked that Lacan's 
reading of Freud is based on a structuralist paradigm, 
so that we are now in the position to observe that 
Lacan's critique of civilization seems to operate 
according to a timeless logic 
- 
the logic of 
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signification - independent from historical 
contingency or cultural difference. This is, however, 
only partially true because Lacan's approach to the 
discontent of civilization never limits itself to the 
mere synchronic study of structures. Even in those 
moments of his teaching when he is most concerned with 
the incidence of signifying structures, Lacan also 
constantly sustains a rigorously diachronic approach, 
emphasising the impact of historical change on the 
structure of civilization and the close relation 
between the symptomatology of discontent and 
structural change. 
Seminar VII, L'ethique de la psychanalyse, is a very 
good example because, although it belongs to Lacan's 
most overtly structuralist period (1953-1964), its 
reading of Freud's Civilization and its Discontents 
also manifests a diachronic awareness of how the 
structural logic behind both civilization and 
civilization's discontent had changed since the time 
of Freud's critique. In fact, while Freud insisted on 
the repressive agency of civilization and on 
"neurotic" discontent, Lacan's emphasis is more, as we 
have seen, on the violence emerging from within 
civilization itself in the social struggle over 
sublimated goods, once civilization's repressive 
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agency against the death drive becomes less effective. 
For Lacan, this "crisis" of repression is not simply a 
cyclical, episodic incident that may justify periodic 
explosions of social "barbarism" (wars, etc. ): it is 
also a distinctive long-term historical tendency of 
modern civilization (SVII 276-77). Lacan's 
structuralist reading of Freud thus draws our 
attention to a type of social structure (the 
ambivalent link between subject-object or subject- 
neighbour) and to forms of discontent (the struggle 
over goods) that are characteristic of the modern 
world, and in this way also manages to highlight the 
crisis of the traditional, repressive and pacifying 
function of civilization as a historical dynamic, 
rather than as a periodic structural phase. 
Lacan's synchronic analysis of civilization, 
therefore, should also be seen as a diachronic 
analysis of civilization because it emphasises the 
structure of the subject's (impossible) relation to 
jouissance 
- 
rather than the structure of repression - 
as the fundamental structure of contemporary 
civilization. In addition to this, we can also note 
that, over the years, Lacan's basic position remains 
essentially unchanged on this subject. The idea of a 
historical crisis in the symbolic function that 
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prohibits jouissance and contains the death drive 
- 
the paternal function 
- 
is an underlying constant of 
his work. 
Early, and often quoted, examples of Lacan's insight 
in this sense are his 1938 article "Les complexes 
familiaux dans la formation de l'individu" and the 
1948 ecrit "L'aggressivite en psychanalyse, " where the 
endemic violence and aggression of a modern, 
"narcissistic" and "utilitarian" civilization are 
explicitly linked to the increasing absence of the 
structural "pacifying function" of the "libidinal 
normativity and cultural normativity bound up from the 
dawn of history with the imago of the father" 
("Aggressivite" 117; 121-24). This early diagnosis is 
consistent not only with Lacan's account of the social 
struggle over goods as we have encountered it in 
Seminar VII (e. g. in Lacan's middle period), but also, 
as I will show, with the later Lacan's analysis of a 
society in the grips of the surplus jouissance 
embodied in the surplus value of consumer goods. In 
fact, even if these different accounts also clearly 
imply a different understanding of the "object" of 
jouissance at the heart of the death drive as, 
respectively, Imaginary double (early Lacan), Symbolic 
lack (middle Lacan) and Real nothingness (later 
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Lacan), it is always the decline of the "libidinal 
normativity" of the paternal function that allows for 
the rise to prominence of the object and of the death 
drive on the social horizon of contemporary life. 
In spite of the substantial continuity and conceptual 
coherence of Lacan's preoccupation with the idea of 
structural change, however, it is in his later work 
that his diachronic approach becomes more apparent. 
The explicit diachronicity of Lacan's later work lies 
in the fact that here Lacan is less concerned with 
illustrating the logic of a structural reading of 
Freud than with attempting to formulate a direct 
response to the new type of civilization that had, by 
the end of the 1960s, defeated and replaced the old 
and traditional social horizon. As Veronique Voruz and 
Bogdan Wolf have explained in their "Introduction" to 
a recent collection of essays on the later Lacan, 
"Lacan's persistent reworking of psychoanalysis [... ] 
has as much or more to do with the practical need to 
address impasses encountered in the consulting room as 
it does with theoretical difficulties" (vii). 
From the late 1960s onwards the structure of modern 
civilization had ceased to be an emerging one and, 
having become dominant, started to impose itself on 
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psychoanalytic practice, prompting a direct and 
practical engagement of psychoanalysis with the 
specificity of contemporary civilization. In the later 
Lacan, therefore, we find not only an analysis of 
contemporary life that develops his earlier critique 
of civilization through an explicit study of the 
differences between traditional and modern social 
structures (Lacan's theory of discourse), but also a 
new treatment of psychoanalytic ethics that, while it 
does not negate the ethical principles extracted, as 
we have seen, from a structural reading of Freud, also 
examines the conditions and modalities of their 
practice in a contemporary setting. 
2. Contemporary Life 
In order to outline the logic of the later Lacan's 
account of modern civilization I will refer to Seminar 
XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse (taught between 1969 
and 1970), as well as to a later text, "Du discours 
psychanalytique" (dated 1972), where the analysis put 
forward in Seminar XVII is developed more fully. As 
Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed out, Seminar XVII 
represents in many ways a "new edition" of the reading 
of Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents given by 
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Lacan ten years before in Seminar VII, L'ethique de la 
psychanalyse, a new edition where particular attention 
is paid to the specificity of the "current moment of 
contemporary civilization" ("On Shame" 12). 
The privileged Lacanian term to refer to this 
historically specific "moment" of civilization is 
"contemporary life. " This tag figures prominently in 
the title of the third part of Seminar XVII, "The 
Other Side of Contemporary Life, " which, as Lacan 
himself makes clear towards the end of the seminar, is 
a direct reference to the title of a novel by Balzac, 
The Other Side of Contemporary History (SXVII 219). 
The expression "contemporary life" is still currently 
used, almost forty years after Lacan's seminar, by 
Lacanian clinical theorists, and holds a descriptive 
meaning that is close, but not identical, to that of 
more popular academic labels such as "late 
capitalism, " "postmodernism, " and even 
"globalization. " 
Like other, apparently neutral Lacanian terms, 
"contemporary life" is in fact an exceptionally 
complex and meaningful category, overdetermined by its 
implicit reference to Balzac's text and to Lacan's 
reading of it. Balzac's novel tells the story of a 
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secret elite that govern "beneath history" in the 
years after the French Revolution and the regicide 
that marked its climax. Through Lacan's few passing 
remarks and aided by Jacques-Alain Miller's commentary 
("Religion" 23), we gather that, for Lacan, the 
significance of Balzac's novel lies in its historical 
insight into the social structure of French post- 
revolutionary society: "if you have not read it, " 
Lacan says, "you may have read anything you want on 
[... ] the French Revolution, [... ] you may even have read 
Marx, but you will not understand anything about it, 
there will always be something that escapes you" 
(SXVII 219). This "something" that would normally 
escape the scholars of post-revolutionary modernity 
but is revealed in Balzac's novel is the well-known 
Lacanian structural logic whereby transgressive 
"freedom" ultimately functions as the reverse hidden 
side of prohibition. This is the same logic that, as 
we have seen, allows Lacan to distinguish between 
ethical crime and structural transgression, and that 
in this context also allows him to pin down the 
"inverted" structure of a new society where post- 
revolutionary freedom finds its "other side" in the 
constraints of a hidden power. 
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In Lacanian theory, consequently, "contemporary life" 
comes to identify a social structure characterised by 
the decline, disappearance or absence of traditional 
figures of authority like the king in Balzac's 
example: in this type of structure the organising 
principle is not an overt prohibition that dictates a 
certain order, but, rather, the structural 
complementarity of Law and transgression that makes 
the prohibition survive as a "secret ruling elite" 
when the figures that embody it disappear in order to 
give way to a false semblance of freedom. If we wanted 
to recast this analysis in the terms of Freud's 
original argument on civilization, we could say that 
"contemporary life" is a civilization that has ceased 
to actively try to restrain and frustrate man's 
"powerful drives, " but where the hindering of the 
drives is nonetheless still "secretly" at work in the 
liberated drives as such because drives, as Lacan 
constantly reminds us, are the by-product of 
frustration and would not exist without an originary 
prohibition. 
As the example of Balzac's novel also suggests, for 
Lacan, the historical rise of this social structure 
begins with the great political and economic 
revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Lacan 
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comes to terms with this historical shift already in 
Seminar VII, where his extended discussion of Kant and 
Sade is presented precisely within the framework of a 
structural alteration of the Law in what Lacan calls 
the "great revolutionary crisis of morals" of the end 
of the 18th century (SVII 85). Sade's reformulation of 
the moral imperative as "pure and simple object" - 
that is, as unhindered satisfaction of the drives - 
and Kant's reformulation of the moral imperative as a 
universal maxim abstracted from all "pathological" 
objects (SVII 85), represent and reflect precisely the 
two sides of the structure of contemporary life, its 
explicit liberation of the drives and hidden, "non- 
pathological" structural constraints. Even if the 
emergence of this structure can be dated back to the 
eighteenth century, however, for Lacan it is not until 
the end of 1960s, and the full affirmation of a late 
capitalist consumer society centred on the enjoyment 
of the drives, that the structure of contemporary life 
becomes dominant and thus ripe for direct analysis. 
"Contemporary life, " in sum, refers not to a precise 
historical time, but to a historical social structure 
that emerges at the end of the 18th century and, 
becoming dominant during the last decades of the 20th 
century, is still with us today. 
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But how does Lacan justify this structural shift? How 
are we to understand the historical transformation 
that led to the affirmation of the structure of 
contemporary life as the underlying structure of 
modern civilization? In Seminar XVII, Lacan answers 
these questions by saying that the crucial, albeit 
somewhat elusive, historical event behind the 
transformation of the traditional social structure was 
the conversion of surplus jouissance into surplus 
value: 
Something has changed in the discourse of the 
Master from a certain moment in history. We 
will not trouble ourselves trying to find out 
if it was because of Luther, or of Calvin, or 
of some traffic of ships around Genoa, or in 
the Mediterranean, or somewhere else, because 
the important point is to know that, starting 
from a certain day, surplus jouissance is 
counted, measured and totalised. It is there 
that what we call the accumulation of capital 
starts. (207) 
This is an important statement and it requires some 
explanation. By "discourse of the Master" Lacan means 
the traditional structure of civilization based on the 
control and repression of the drives as we found it in 
Freud. Lacan writes it in the following way: 
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Si 
--, 
S2 
$ f a 
This formula can be read (clockwise, starting from $} 
as the basic structure of signification: a signifier 
(Si) represents (t) a subject ($) to (-*) another 
signifier (S2), thereby producing (j) a signification 
of the lost being/jouissance ("a" or surplus 
jouissance) that cannot be reconciled (4) with the 
constitutive void of the barred subject introduced 
retroactively by signification. The two levels of the 
formula also correspond to the two "sides" of the 
traditional social structure that becomes reversed in 
the structure of contemporary life. The upper side is 
the open and official side: in traditional societies, 
a collectivity bound together, organised and pushed to 
work by a Master, a ruler, an ideal, a universal Law. 
The lower side is the repressed and hidden side: in 
traditional societies, the individual subject pursuing 
the impossible satisfaction of the drives via 
"significations" or sublimated objects of jouissance 
that strive to fill his constitutive lack. 
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As long as these objects, this surplus jouissance, do 
not get counted and valued, this traditional structure 
remains stable. Even if the subject may pursue drive 
satisfaction in the object, their relation remains of 
secondary social importance because the object as such 
has no power over the subject: "on the second line, " 
Lacan points out, "not only is there no communication, 
but there is an obstruction" (symbol f) (SXVII 203). 
This obstruction, continues Lacan, is "production" 
itself, "that which results from work, " as opposed to 
the object qua pure surplus jouissance embedded in it; 
as such, "production does not have any relation with 
the truth [of the subject], " it is "something that 
protects it [the truth of the subject], which we will 
call impotence" (SXVII 203). 
To the impotence of the object is opposed the overt 
social power of the Master signifier (e. g. the King, 
the Father, God, an ideal, etc. ), a power that derives 
precisely from the fact that, conversely, the 
signifier counts, it can be counted as one and for 
this reason it can give to and take from the subject 
by representing him. We should now be able to see what 
Lacan means when he says that it is the conversion of 
surplus jouissance into surplus value that determines 
the shift from the traditional to the modern structure 
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of civilization. When surplus jouissance starts to get 
counted as surplus value, in fact, not only does the 
object overcome its lack of power over the subject and 
starts to function as a Master, but the drive also 
fulfils its social "liberation" and the absolute power 
of the Master signifier becomes displaced and 
redoubled in the drive, giving place to the illusory 
freedom of contemporary life. As Lacan puts it, 
"surplus value is added to the capital - no problem, 
it's homogeneous, we are dealing with values, " and 
once this is done, "from the fact that the clouds of 
impotence have been dissipated, the Master signifier 
appears even more invulnerable [... ]. Where is it? What 
should we call it? How can we find it? (SXVII 207). 
If Seminar XVII gives us an explanation of the logic 
behind the transformation of traditional social 
structures, Lacan comes closer to articulating a full 
definition of the structure of contemporary 
civilization in a later text, "Du discours 
psychanalytique. " In this lecture, presented at the 
University of Milan in May 1972 (and sometimes 
referred to as the "Milan Discourse"), Lacan 
elaborates for the first time the formula of the new 
social structure resulting from the alteration of the 
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discourse of the Master, presenting it as the 
"discourse of capitalism: " 
$ S2 
W 
S, a 
What marks the difference between this new type of 
social structure and the old one is, in Lacan's 
reading of the formula, "simply a very little 
inversion between Si and the barred S ($), that is the 
subject" (8). This inversion, which we can observe if 
we compare the formula above with that of the 
discourse of the Master on page 246, is exactly the 
effect of the capitalist logic of countability that, 
as we have seen, historically invests surplus 
jouissance: now counting as One (the Capital) surplus 
jouissance (a) starts to impose itself as a Master 
(right-to-left diagonal arrow) on the subject ($); the 
"liberated" subject ($), meanwhile, rises to the upper 
side of the social structure and traditional Masters 
(Si) fall socially (1) but also persist as products 
(again, 1) of the subject alongside all sorts of other 
rules and regulations which allow (left-to-right 
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diagonal arrow) the whole system (S2) to work and 
produce (j) surplus jouissance (a) again. 
Significantly, whereas the discourse of the Master 
could be read clockwise as an interrupted circle, 
reflecting a social structure based on prohibition and 
repression, the discourse of capitalism/contemporary 
life functions as a continuous loop (the arrows form a 
NN 
°° " loop figure), with no interruptions, or, in 
Lacan's own words, as a "madly clever" mechanism that 
"runs as if on wheels" and "could not work better" 
("Du discours" 8) 
. 
This endless circularity is 
essential not only, as we will see shortly, for 
Lacan's diagnosis of the particular discontent of 
civilization associated with it, but also for pinning 
down the essence of what we refer to as contemporary 
life. The closed loop of Lacan's formula illustrates 
perfectly the logic of a social structure where the 
purpose of prohibition (e. g. of all the different 
regulations and Si that order our modern world) is to 
enable transgression (e. g. the subject's relation to 
surplus jouissance via consumption of products). This 
is the fundamental logic of contemporary life. 
Underneath the apparent freedom of the subject, we 
find two Masters, the two sides of the Law locked to 
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each other: the Law as object (enjoy! ) forcing itself 
on the subject, and the Law as prohibition, the 
symbolic Law (no! ), forcing itself on the subject in 
order to produce the Law as object. 
3. The Discontents of Contemporary Life 
We have seen that in Seminar VII, L'ethique de la 
psychanalyse, Lacan's analysis of the discontent of 
civilization moved away from the Freudian idea of a 
"neurotic" discontent deriving from the social 
repression of the drives and concentrated, instead, on 
the violence and destruction of the liberated drives 
as an inherent aspect of civilization. In this way, by 
describing a social order dominated by the ambivalence 
of the subject's relation to two particular forms of 
the object of jouissance 
- 
the common good and the 
neighbour 
- 
Lacan was already grounding his argument 
on a reading of the modern social link between subject 
and object, rather than on the traditional link 
between subject and Master, and he was thus also 
anticipating his later definition of contemporary 
life. 
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The forms of social discontent discussed by Lacan in 
L'ethique de la psychanalyse 
- 
the aggression against 
the neighbour who enjoys the jouissance of the good 
and the destructive violence of the struggle over 
goods 
- 
can therefore also be introduced now as forms 
of the discontent of the contemporary social order we 
have tried to define so far. Social conflict and 
violence for the possession of goods, however, are not 
the only consequences of the promotion of the object 
on the scene of contemporary life. We may even suggest 
that, although they certainly illustrate one social 
consequence of the structural rise of the object and 
fall of the Master, they do not necessarily reflect 
per se the full structural logic that defines the 
functioning of contemporary discourse. 
It is another type of violence that allows us to 
capture the logic of contemporary discontent: not the 
violence that aims at possessing the neighbour's goods 
but the violence that aims at destroying an excess of 
goods. Lacan refers to this type of violence already 
in L'ethique de la psychanalyse, when he discusses the 
anthropological wisdom of the potlatch ceremonies 
where an excess of goods is destroyed, as he puts it, 
in a fully "conscious and controlled" way, suggesting 
that much of our "modern" explosions of destructive 
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violence may be put down to our inability to deal with 
our excesses of jouissance in a similar fashion (SVII 
274) 
. 
The discontent of contemporary life, therefore, 
is not merely the effect of a sudden liberation of the 
drive and promotion of the struggle over jouissance in 
the social arena. It is also, and more profoundly, the 
effect of an excess of jouissance sustained by the 
structuration of the drive in contemporary discourse. 
After Seminar VII, the later Lacan (and contemporary 
Lacanian theory) will focus more and more on this idea 
of excessive jouissance as the fundamental aspect of 
contemporary discontent, exploring its connections not 
only with violence, but also with anxiety, inhibition 
and the functioning of the system of production. 
In "Du discours psychanalytique, " Lacan eventually 
comes to explain how this pathologic and pathogenic 
excess of jouissance arrives to disturb the apparently 
flawless circular logic of the discourse of capitalism 
(and thus of the structure of contemporary life) 
itself: 
After all, it is the cleverest discourse we 
have made. It is no less headed for a blow- 
out. This is because it is untenable. It is 
untenable because capitalist discourse is 
here, you can see it, simply a little 
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inversion between the Si and the $, that is the 
subject [... ] 
. 
This is enough to make it run as 
if on wheels, it couldn't work better, but it 
runs too fast, it consumes, it consumes so 
well that it consumes itself [ca se consomme, 
ga se consomme si bien que pa se consume]. (8) 
On a first level, we can take Lacan's "it consumes/it 
consumes itself" as a kind of prophecy of the 
inevitable implosion of a consumer capitalism that 
feeds on itself, and is therefore "headed for a blow- 
out. " 
On another level, however, if we keep in mind that 
Lacan (and psychoanalysis in general) maintains a 
fundamental homology between social and psychic 
structures, Lacan's statement can also work as a 
definition of the discontent of our social order as a 
form of "being consumed" by excessive "consuming. " We 
must not forget that, for Lacan, the subject is in 
itself an integral part of the structure as consumer. 
The "it consumes" of the structure depends thus on the 
pull of the object on the subject, so the "it consumes 
itself" and the eventual "blow-out" of the structure 
can only coincide with a discontent of the subject: on 
the one hand, with a "wearing out" of the subject's 
functional desiring engagement to the object; on the 
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other hand, as I will illustrate shortly, with the 
"blow-out" of the subject itself who becomes inert, 
passive and incapable of desire. 
In general, therefore, the collapsing of the 
distinction between "consuming" and "being consumed" 
at the logical level of the structure becomes apparent 
as social discontent in the experience of the subject. 
The homology between psychic and social structure, 
however, does not, in itself, explain the implosion 
that leads, according to Lacan's analysis, to the 
blow-out of both. If we want to understand why the 
smooth functioning of contemporary discourse is bound 
to come to a painful and distressing halt not only 
for, but also in the subject, we need to look 
elsewhere, to the peculiarity of the link between 
subject and object on the scene of contemporary life. 
As Lacan frequently points out in his later teaching, 
one of the consequences of our increasingly abstract 
scientific and technological system of production (S2 
in Lacan's formula of the discourse of capitalism) is 
the progressive erosion and destruction of human 
reality (including nature and the human body) by the 
technological objects of jouissance and consumer goods 
produced by science. For Lacan, the characteristic of 
the pure signifying formulas of modern science is not 
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"the introduction of a better and wider knowledge of 
the world" but the fact that "they have allowed the 
emergence, in the world, of things that did not exist 
in any way at the level of our perception" (SXVII 
184). The emergence of such invisible things 
- 
chemical compounds, electromagnetic waves, DNA 
molecules, neurotransmitters, etc. 
- 
as the new Real 
of science allows for the production of new objects, 
new technological gadgets, new drugs, new bodies and 
new virtual realities that are, as Lacan puts it, 
"plugged into" this invisible Real (SXVII 188). 
Technological products are thus always invested by a 
fantasmatic quality that turns them into a source of 
both desire and anxiety for the subject who can 
consume them as surplus jouissance but also sees his 
own world and his own humanity as being consumed and 
eventually wiped away by them (Lacan, SXVII 189). The 
structure of contemporary life, therefore, produces 
consumer goods that are also "consuming goods, " goods 
that can be consumed and make the system function 
because they are plugged into a Real that also 
swallows and consumes human reality. The two cannot be 
kept apart: the better the product, the higher its 
ability to erode humanity; the ultimate drug, the 
ultimate surgery, the ultimate technological gadget 
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promising total satisfaction are thus nothing but a 
fantasy of the extinction of humanity. 
Is this the eventual blow-out of contemporary 
discourse predicted by Lacan? Is this ultimate fantasy 
of total satisfaction as total annihilation destined 
to be realised? Lacan does not think so and encourages 
us to grasp the difference between the fantasy and the 
Real effects of the fantasy on the subject. In a text 
of 1974, Le triomphe de la religion, Lacan ironises on 
technological anxiety defining total self-destruction 
as the ultimate "triumph" of humanity, and clearly 
states that he does not find scientific research 
exceedingly dangerous due to the "resilience of 
animality" (75). If the full advent of humanity can 
only coincide, as Lacan seems to suggest here, with 
humanity's final confrontation with the absurdity of 
its fantasy of satisfaction, and thus with its own 
nothingness as the essence of humanity (the path of 
psychoanalytic ethics), then what is threatened and 
consumed by science is not humanity but "animality, " 
the resilient stupidity of an unenlightened, 
satisfaction-driven sub-humanity which we cannot hope 
will be wiped out by science. 
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Lacan's ironic reversal of terms should not be taken 
here as an indication that the erosion of human 
reality by technological products must be dismissed as 
a fantasy. On the contrary, the problem remains 
precisely because we are dealing with a fantasy and 
not with reality: fantasy is dangerous because it 
creates anxiety and not because it can be realised. 
"We are not there yet, but, " continues Lacan, "the 
idea provokes in any case some anxiety" ("Triomphe" 
75) 
. 
Lacan's stance is thus less pessimistic than it 
may seem at first sight. For sure, science and the 
products of technology are "consuming" a great deal of 
what we understand as our human heritage. The Spaltung 
that divides the subject from itself and allows not 
only for the pleasure-seeking animality of man but 
also for his ability to transcend it, however, remains 
basically safe, unthreatened by a science which not 
only does nothing to undermine the survival of base 
animality, but also does not facilitate the traversing 
of the apocalyptic fantasy which, in any case, would 
lead to a revelation of the nothingness of the human, 
rather than to its annihilation. 
The end of the human is, therefore, a fantasy, a 
fantasy of the discontent of contemporary 
civilization. It reflects the structural contradiction 
259 
between "consuming" and "being consumed" in the 
discourse of contemporary life but it cannot, as such, 
be identified with the necessary "blow-out" of the 
structure referred to by Lacan. For Lacan, the "blow- 
out, " the wearing out of contemporary discourse, must 
be primarily an effect of the anxiety induced by this 
fantasy, rather than of the direct undermining of 
established human reality by the system of production. 
Technological consumer goods can consume reality as 
much as we want, but eventually it is only the anxiety 
awakened by this process that can wear out the subject 
and lead to a blow-out of the system. 
This exhaustion of the subject is not linked merely to 
technological anxiety, but is the effect of the more 
general anxiety that accompanies the subjective 
confrontation with the massive and growing presence of 
the object and of surplus jouissance on the scene of 
contemporary life. As Lacan points out in his seminar 
on anxiety, Seminar X, L'angoisse, from a strictly 
clinical point of view, anxiety is essentially an 
affect that works as a "signal" of a "lack of lack, " 
the red light indicator of a total jouissance that 
would wipe away the lack on which the split desiring 
subject constitutes himself, a signal, that is, of the 
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possible, anticipated extinction of the subject by 
jouissance (SX 66-67). 
Now, on the ground of what we have elaborated so far, 
we can also add that the danger signalled by anxiety 
is clearly not a real one for the "normal" neurotic 
subject, whose anxiety-ridden confrontation with the 
object would lead, along the ethical lines of the 
analytic path, to an enlightened purification of 
desire from the fantasy of jouissance and not to an 
extinction of subjectivity. Similarly, the anxiety 
that surrounds the possible end of humanity through a 
perfect technology of satisfaction is not a signal of 
the likelihood of this end, but, as we have seen, 
rather a cultural ethical path for the revelation of 
the essential nothingness of humanity. There is, 
however, a danger that is implicit in the experience 
of anxiety, and it comes from the 
- 
likely, this time 
- 
chance that the subject may react to what promises 
to be an overload of jouissance by a withdrawal of the 
libido and a generalized inhibition of desire. And it 
is precisely in this sense that we should understand 
the "blow-out" of the discourse of capitalism 
predicted by Lacan: as a defensive inhibition of 
desire that, warding off an excess of jouissance, 
leaves the subject "'consumed, " depressed and incapable 
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of sustaining its structural role of consumer in 
relation to the object. 
As Eric Laurent has pointed out in his inaugural paper 
for the 2008 World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP) 
congress, it is the logic of this oscillation between 
anxiety and inhibition that captures the sense of 
Lacan's remarks on the current state of civilization: 
"Lacan, " observes Laurent, "oscillated between the 
anguish-inducing aspect of a civilization that lacked 
lack, and the effect of fatigue, of ennui, of 
generalized depression that it produced" ("Stakes"). 
Lacan's diagnosis of the discontent of contemporary 
civilization, therefore, not only stresses the 
importance of giving the right weight to the 
apocalyptic fantasies evoked by the excess of surplus 
jouissance that marks our society, but also points 
towards a very specific psychic formation to name the 
discontent caused by this excess: inhibition. 
The psychic process of inhibition, first discussed by 
Freud in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (published 
in 1936), has been given much attention by 
contemporary analysts and psychoanalytic theorists, 
who have, in the wake of Lacan's teaching, tried to 
articulate its relation to the structure of 
262 
contemporary life (see, for example, Renata Salecl's 
On Anxiety, Darian Leader The New Black: Mourning, 
Melancholia and Depression, Julia Kristeva's Black 
Sun: Depression and Melancholia and New Maladies of 
the Soul). In the work of these theorists, the 
mechanism of inhibition is mostly used to explain the 
logic behind the growing clinical incidence of 
depression in our society, but also transcends the 
clinical specificity of depression and comes to 
identify a general crisis of desire that emerges more 
and more as the prevalent discontent of contemporary 
civilization. 
It may seem, at first, an overstatement or a 
contradiction to present depression and the inhibition 
of desire as the keywords of contemporary discontent. 
After all, depression is only one of the many types of 
psychic suffering that afflict contemporary subjects. 
We should not forget, however, that, as always in 
Lacan, what we are confronting is not an empirical 
symptomatology but a structure that may find a variety 
of empirical manifestations. Although it would perhaps 
be wrong to understate the social incidence of 
depression 
- 
which according to the World Health 
Organization website, by 2020 is expected to become 
the second global cause of death after heart disease - 
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depression is only one of the social epiphenomena of 
inhibition. The crisis of desire that marks inhibition 
is also not only not contradicted but even manifested 
by the triumphant hedonism of our civilization, by the 
anonymity and impersonality of the mass produced 
objects of jouissance that are in themselves a 
negation of the unique singularity of each subject's 
desire. 
As one of the analysts of the New Lacanian School, Rik 
Loose has shown in his work on addiction, the 
conspicuous consumption of surplus jouissance in 
contemporary society becomes a way for the subject to 
find refuge from the anxiety and responsibility of the 
confrontation with his/her own object-cause of desire 
in the anonymity of deceptively "safe" worldly objects 
which will also, eventually, confront him with the 
anxiety of a lack of lack (153-54) 
. 
Moreover, giving 
up the confrontation with one's own object-cause of 
desire also means, necessarily, giving up on 
knowledge. Another Lacanian analyst, Guy Trobas, has 
pointed out that inhibition testifies to a "patent 
failure of the elaboration of jouissance in the 
unconscious, " which means that, in its effort to find 
a protection from an excess of jouissance, the subject 
does not limit itself to a mere neurotic processing of 
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jouissance through signification, but disengages from 
both jouissance and its signification, and thus finds 
itself "at odds with knowledge, " "in a conflict with 
knowledge which can reach a point of true `epistemic 
anorexial" (92-93). 
This refusal to sustain a desire for knowledge is 
another manifestation of inhibition that has reached 
prominence in contemporary life, "a position in which 
the subject passively consents to test a know-how 
without wanting to verify the knowledge that supports 
it, or wanting to be enlightened on his state of 
suffering, and even less to make himself the agent of 
any elaboration of knowledge" (Trobas 93). Of course, 
knowledge does reign sovereign in our culture, but 
this is, as we have already pointed out, a technical 
and academic knowledge that disregards the subject 
rather than articulating its constitutive split and 
desiring disposition. As a structural function, 
inhibition thus underlies the contemporary discontent 
of civilization well beyond depression and also beyond 
a simplistically defined "crisis of desire" and comes 
to inform the very passivity of contemporary subjects, 
their docile conformity to the institutions, 
regulations and procedures that "consume" them. Even 
more generally, inhibition defines the very crisis of 
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the subject as such, the crisis of the singularity and 
dignity of the desiring subject as the distinctive 
social disease of contemporary civilization. 
If Freud's original account of the discontents of 
civilization turned around the standard neurotic 
structure of repression, Lacan's remarks on the 
discontents of contemporary life, eventually also turn 
out to be centred around a clinical structure: not 
repression but inhibition. In this respect, however, 
it is essential to remember that inhibition is not 
simply another psychic structure, a modern 
"alternative" to repression, but is, rather, a 
structure that coexists and supplements that of 
repression when the mechanism of repression becomes 
geared towards producing, rather than towards warding 
off, jouissance. 
Inhibition, in a sense, presupposes repression, not 
repression as a defence structure but repression as a 
productive structure. For Freud, repression involves 
the barring from consciousness of a signifier, or 
"ideational representative, " of jouissance, which then 
attracts by association a whole unconscious formation 
of signifiers related to it ("Repression" 570). 
Repression is thus primarily a defensive structure, 
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but it can also be seen as working in the opposite 
sense because the fantasy produced by the associative 
work of the signifiers can also be brought to 
consciousness and emerge in symptomatic forms. When 
this happens one signifier linked to the repressed 
formation associates itself with a bodily function or 
object, and thus generates not only a surplus of 
jouissance and a compulsive repetition of the act 
and/or desire for the object, but also the anxiety of 
a potential "too much" of jouissance. 
As Freud puts it, the instinctual representative 
"takes on extreme forms of expression, which when they 
are translated and presented to the neurotic are not 
only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by 
giving him the picture of an extraordinary and 
dangerous strength of instinct" ("Repression" 570). 
There is, therefore, a distinctively productive side- 
effect to the mechanism of repression, and it is 
precisely to this side-effect that inhibition responds 
as an attempt to minimise the anxiety aroused by the 
neurotic production of symptoms and fantasies. Freud 
states this very clearly in Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety when he defines inhibition as a "restriction" 
imposed by the ego on its functions "so as not to 
arouse the anxiety symptom" (39). 
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This structural connection between inhibition and 
repression allows us to say that the discontent of 
contemporary life, centred on inhibition, is still, 
nevertheless, a neurotic discontent. It is true that 
Lacan insists on the incidence of a certain liberation 
or social rise of surplus jouissance in contemporary 
life, and yet his later teaching also shows how 
contemporary life depends on neurotic repression as a 
mechanism of production and consumption, if not as a 
system of defence. There can be no work, no 
elaboration of knowledge, no production of desirable 
objects or desire for objects to consume if the 
signifying chain and jouissance are not linked 
together through the process of repression. 
The problem of contemporary life is that the social 
rise of surplus jouissance has reduced the defensive 
function of repression and replaced it with 
inhibition, while continuing to exploit repression as 
a structure of production and consumption. We can, 
interestingly, find a trace of this 
- 
very modern 
- 
possibility of repression functioning as a mere logic 
of production, rather than of protection, in Freud's 
own example of the case of "inhibition to work" in 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: work, the Freudian 
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defensive and repressive activity par excellence, the 
sublimating process on which the whole of civilization 
is based, may become, explains Freud, using terms that 
echo closely those used later by Lacan, in itself a 
source of anxiety and a cause of inhibition for the 
subject who then "feels a decrease in his pleasure in 
it or becomes less able to do it well; or he has 
certain reactions to it, like fatigue, giddiness or 
sickness, if he is obliged to go on with it" (15): the 
productive system "consumes" and "consumes itself" at 
the same time. 
We might note that this structural link with 
repression also allows inhibition to account for the 
discontents of contemporary life more convincingly 
than other psychic structures proposed by cultural 
theorists influenced by psychoanalysis. Particularly 
in the context of the debate around postmodernity, 
contemporary civilization has sometimes been described 
using psychoanalytic categories like psychosis, 
schizophrenia, paranoia or even perversion, suggesting 
a complete breakdown of traditional "neurotic" social 
structures and the advent of a new, loose and 
decentred social network. 
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In spite of this trend, Lacanian theorists have always 
been firmly opposed not only to the idea, and 
possibility even, of a psychotic or non-neurotic 
civilization (Miller, "Fantasy" 6), but also to the 
generalizing application of psychic categories to a 
particular moment or aspect of civilization (Salecl, 
(Per)versions 159). This resistance is due not so much 
to the obvious gap between clinical and cultural 
realities (if that was the case, how could we talk of 
a neurotic civilization in the first place? ), as it is 
due to the incoherence of using constitutive and 
foundational psychic categories as historical 
categories. Psychic categories like neurosis, 
psychosis and perversion cannot be historicised 
because they are defined in relation to an event 
- 
repression 
- 
which is not historical. Repression takes 
place before the beginning of history and 
civilization; it represents the ahistorical condition 
for the possibility of a neurotic formation, and, 
consequently, also the condition of possibility for 
civilization and history as such. So, of course, 
civilization is neurotic and neurosis is the 
ahistorical and universal logic of history and 
civilization as neurotic formations, while perversion 
and psychosis are the equally ahistorical and 
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universal logics of the subjective rejection of 
civilization and history. 
None of these categories, however, may be used to 
identify one moment or aspect of civilization over 
another. To talk about a psychotic or neurotic moment 
of civilization, besides, also carries the risk of 
falling into the trap of a certain reductionism or 
determinism which would overemphasise the power of the 
structure and overlook the freedom of the subject in 
front of the ahistorical and structurally constitutive 
choice of repression. From a Lacanian point of view, 
the psychic or social structure obviously has a 
constraining effect on the subject; the structure 
itself, however, confronts the subject not only as a 
destiny but also in the first place as a fundamental 
choice that the subject makes, a free choice between 
neurosis, psychosis and perversion. By presenting 
psychic categories as the result of a structuring 
event (repression), rather than as historical labels, 
the Lacanian position thus also preserves the freedom 
of the subject by insisting on the constitutive 
necessity of a choice. 
As opposed to neurosis, psychosis and perversion, 
inhibition is more suited to capture the logic of 
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contemporary life because its incidence is subject not 
to the pre-historical "choice" of repression, but to 
the historical/discursive alteration of the structure 
of repression itself. For Lacan, historical change 
does not respond to the logic of choice or chance that 
regulates the alternative between different psychic 
categories; it responds to the combinatory logic that 
regulates the permutations of the discourse of the 
Master as the fundamental, repressive and neurotic 
structure of civilization. Inhibition can work as a 
historical category because its emergence as a social 
phenomenon formulates a response to the discontent 
generated by these permutations, and in this way also 
signals and manifests a historical variation. As Guy 
Trobas has put it, contemporary social inhibition does 
not respond to a historical crisis of the structuring 
function of repression because this function cannot be 
touched by history: "primal repression constitutes 
something intangible, something which, once carried 
out, once produced, remains, in neurosis as in 
perversion, beyond the reach of contingency: a 
structure is in place, which cannot be modified by 
historical contingencies" (86-87). 
What inhibition does is to accommodate a historical 
and discursive "variation" in a mechanism of 
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repression that is "always partial, mobile, and 
oscillates between success and failure according to 
the margin left by its symptomatic product to 
displeasure and in particular to anguish" (Trobas 87). 
It becomes clear, therefore, that inhibition marks 
contemporary life not as a fundamental psychic or 
social structure, but as a particular way of dealing 
with the symptomatic product of the fundamental 
neurotic structure of civilization. From this 
observation we can draw two further conclusions. The 
first is that we should not regard contemporary life 
in terms of a radical structural alteration. We should 
learn, instead, to recognise that behind the 
generalised lack of lack and crisis of desire that 
identifies our time there is an inhibited and 
submerged neurosis and not a psychotic breakdown. The 
second conclusion is that if inhibition is only one 
way to deal with an excess of neurotic anxiety, other 
ways may be found, ways through which the subject may 
not only be relieved of its anguish, but reawakened as 
a desiring subject from the slumber of its 
inhibitions. 
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4. Academic Readings and Ethical Practice 
Lacanian theorists working from within the academic 
circuit have, in recent years, repeatedly turned to 
Lacan's analysis of contemporary life in order to 
formulate their own accounts of contemporary culture 
and society. In their work, they are essentially 
consistent with the Lacanian position I have outlined 
above, although they also tend to emphasise certain 
aspects over others, and often extract particular 
conceptual keys from Lacan's discourse in order to 
give a particular slant to their argument and develop 
it in a particular direction. 
Todd McGowan's The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques 
Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment, for 
example, grounds its account of contemporary society 
around Lacan's idea of an historical transformation in 
the status of jouissance. Lacan's remarks on the 
modern discursive decline of the paternal function and 
rise of surplus jouissance lead McGowan to define 
contemporary society in terms of an historical shift 
from a society of prohibition to a society of 
enjoyment, and, more specifically, in terms of a shift 
from a society centred on the prohibition of the 
Symbolic Law to one centred on the Superegoic 
imperative to transgress and enjoy (8,34). The 
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classic Lacanian thesis of the dialectical co- 
dependency between prohibition and enjoyment, Law and 
transgression, Ego-Ideal and Superego, is then used by 
McGowan to conclude that of course, "though the social 
order today demands enjoyment rather than the 
sacrifice of enjoyment, this in no way allows subjects 
within the social order to enjoy themselves, " since 
"the existence of the superegoic command `Enjoy! ' 
merely produces a sense of obligation to enjoy 
oneself; it does not produce enjoyment" (37). 
For McGowan, the problem of contemporary society is 
that contemporary subjects are caught within the logic 
of an imperative that creates an impossible ideal of 
satisfaction, leading them to "move so quickly 
- 
from 
commodity to commodity, from internet site to internet 
site, from channel to channel, " resulting in an 
"absence of enjoyment, widespread apathy, 
aggressiveness and cynicism" (38-39). McGowan does not 
mention, even less go into the details of, the 
fundamental link between surplus jouissance, anxiety 
and inhibition, but it is nevertheless possible to 
read in his conclusions an implicit reference to 
Lacan's guiding remarks about the consuming/self- 
consuming movement of contemporary discourse. 
275 
While McGowan focuses his account of contemporary 
society around the concept of jouissance, Slavoj Zizek 
has organised his own reading of Lacan's thesis on 
contemporary life around the concept of fantasy. Like 
McGowan, Zizek also grounds his analysis of postmodern 
culture on Lacan's theory of the contemporary 
discursive rise of surplus jouissance over symbolic 
authorities. Zizek's definition of contemporary 
culture, however, emphasises not so much a shift from 
prohibition to transgression, as the proliferation and 
growing social incidence of fantasies, in which the 
ambivalent (love/hate; desire/anxiety) subjective 
relation to surplus jouissance is articulated in 
imaginary forms. 
In the introduction to one of his best known books, 
The Plague of Fantasies, Zizek gives an almost literal 
reading of Lacan's circular, self-feeding formula of 
the discourse of contemporary life when he argues that 
"among the antagonisms that characterize our epoch 
(world-market globalization versus the assertion of 
ethnic particularisms, etc. ), perhaps the key place 
belongs to the antagonism between the abstraction 
which increasingly determines our lives (in the guise 
of digitalization, speculative market relations, etc. ) 
and the deluge of pseudo-concrete images [e. g. 
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fantasies]" (1). On the one hand, Zizek here is 
following Lacan in presenting not only the fantasmatic 
object of jouissance, but also the abstract 
scientific-technological system charged with its 
production 
- 
which he also defines as the "fetishised" 
"immaterial virtual order that effectively runs the 
show" (Plague 103) 
- 
as the two interlocked masters of 
contemporary society. 
On the other hand, Zizek's distinctive focus on the 
fantasmatic, that is to say imaginary, articulations 
of jouissance also leads him to expose in an original 
way the implication of surplus jouissance within 
contemporary social systems of belief, and in 
particular within ideology. In what is perhaps his 
most original and important contribution to the 
Lacanian analysis of culture, Zizek repeatedly 
underlines how fantasies of jouissance function as a 
screen against the impossibility of jouissance, 
thereby not only transgressing or contradicting 
ideological meanings and beliefs, but also indirectly 
upholding them as an indispensable "hidden obscene 
supplement" that operates as a "filler holding the 
place of some structural impossibility, while 
simultaneously disavowing this impossibility" (Plague 
72,76). 
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In The Metastases of Enjoyment, Zizek explains how in 
contemporary society the balance between these two 
levels 
- 
ideological "reality" and fantasies of 
jouissance 
- 
is altered and the "imaginary overgrowth" 
of fantasies results in a "de-realization" of reality 
itself: today "reality is no longer structured by 
symbolic fictions [e. g. ideology]; fantasies that 
regulate the imaginary overgrowth get a direct hold on 
it" (76) 
. 
The result of this altered balance is, for 
Zizek, an increasing recourse to social violence, in 
the form of hatred against "enjoying neighbours, " 
racial or otherwise, as an "attempt to evict a [e. g. 
surplus jouissance] from reality by force, and thus 
regain access to reality" (Metastases 77-78). 
Although Zizek emphasises violence rather than 
inhibition as social discontent, we can observe that 
his analysis of contemporary society nevertheless 
comes close to that of the later Lacan because 
violence here is not presented merely as a 
manifestation of a ""social struggle" with the 
neighbour over the possession of jouissance-goods (as 
in the early Lacan of Seminar VII), but becomes, like 
inhibition, a subjective strategy to deal with the 
excess of jouissance that marks contemporary 
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discourse, an attempt to re-establish a reality eroded 
by the "plague of fantasies. " 
As far as social and cultural analysis goes, the work 
of McGowan and Zizek is certainly a valuable 
illustration or complement to Lacan's teaching; 
particularly in Zizek's case, Lacanian positions are 
articulated into an analysis of contemporary society 
that becomes even more complex, variegated and 
revealing than the few examples mentioned above might 
suggest. There is, however, a problem with this type 
of academic reading of Lacan, and it lies in their 
inability to transcend effectively the field of social 
and cultural critique and come up with a convincing 
model for a political practice based on psychoanalytic 
ethics. 
Of course, an attempt to formulate viable strategies 
and solutions to social discontent is never absent 
from this type of work, and, as is well known, Zizek 
has gone to great lengths in trying to convert 
psychoanalytic ethics into political strategy. As 
already noted by Zizek's critics, however, the ideas 
of political practice resulting from this type of 
theoretical "translation" generally not only come 
across as absurdly vague and extreme, but also end up 
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obscuring the radicality of psychoanalytic clinical 
practice itself by introducing a rigid distinction 
between individual and social change (Parker 74) 
. 
My 
suggestion is that this inability to elaborate a 
coherent model of political practice based on 
psychoanalytic ethics should be explained through 
McGowan's and Zizek's position in relation to academic 
discourse. 
Academic discourse, or, as Lacan also calls it, 
university discourse, is characterised first and 
foremost by the value it puts on knowledge: in it 
knowledge is the Master, knowledge "comes first" and 
"counts" above everything else, just as surplus- 
jouissance "counts" above everything else in the 
discourse of contemporary life. This capitalization of 
knowledge implies a total disregard for the subject, 
which is merely cast off as a useless remainder each 
time knowledge attempts to master a particular object. 
As Lacan has put it, "'science has no subject, " because 
what drives academic knowledge is not a subjective 
desire to know but a categorical "imperative to know" 
(SXVII 120-21) 
- 
an imperative to know an object or, 
in the human sciences, an imperative to compare and 
assesses critically different theories in order to 
find the one that is most valuable for, again, gaining 
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knowledge over a 
because it seeks 
limits of knowle 
subject with the 
discourse of the 
ethical discourse. 
particular object. In this sense, 
to eliminate or push forward the 
dge, rather than to confront the 
jouissance of these limits, the 
university is also clearly not an 
For the same reason, besides, academic discourse also 
tends to introduce a rigid separation between socio- 
political and subjective practice, regarding the 
contingent particularity of subjective practice - the 
only possible form of ethical practice - as a 
deviation from the universally valid and applicable 
type of social and political knowledge it strives 
after. Zizek's and McGowan's difficulties with 
converting psychoanalytic ethics into political 
practice, and the improbable notions of political 
practice that result from their separation of the 
clinical-subjective from the socio-political domain, 
may be explained precisely in terms of their different 
entanglement with academic discourse and with the 
disregard for subjectivity that defines it. 
McGowan's allegiance to academic discourse is apparent 
from his explicit effort to explain, systematize and 
ultimately demonstrate critically the validity of 
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Lacanian thought as a form of social knowledge, 
particularly in contrast or at the expense of Marxism. 
"Marxism, " argues McGowan: 
allows us to understand the role of economic 
and social contradictions in driving the 
movement of history, but it often provides an 
inadequate explanation of the actual politics 
of historical transformation 
- 
why change does 
or does not occur at a given time. It is on 
this question that psychoanalysis proves 
indispensable. Psychoanalysis allows us to 
rethink socio-political history around the 
question of enjoyment. (5) 
McGowan may well be right here, and psychoanalysis may 
indeed allow us to think history differently and 
better than Marxism. This is, however, quite beside 
the point. What matters is that McGowan's statement 
clearly reveals that what drives his work is not an 
ethical, subject-oriented understanding of knowledge 
but an impersonal, scientific (and very un- 
psychoanalytic) categorical imperative to know and 
discern between different models of social and 
political knowledge. We should also note, besides, 
that McGowan's concern with a wider notion of 
political transformation rather than with subjective 
transformation at a "clinical" level 
- 
and here we 
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could read "transformation" as another word for 
"practice" 
- 
reflects the same kind of discursive 
promotion of universal knowledge over subject-specific 
practice. And perhaps this is the reason why his 
attempts to formulate a wider political practice 
grounded on psychoanalytic ethics sounds so 
disappointingly inappropriate and misplaced, as if a 
subject-oriented practice is being forced to become a 
wider, universalised political practice without 
subjectivity, within a discourse that rejects 
subjectivity. 
At the end of the book, for example, McGowan suggests 
that "today, after enjoyment has become a social duty, 
the embrace of partial enjoyment - rather than the 
pursuit of an illusory total enjoyment - emerges as a 
unique political possibility" (194). How can we 
possibly imagine and put into practice a generalised 
political strategy based on "partial enjoyment"? 
Should people just gather together and make a 
collective effort to "embrace partial enjoyment, " 
regardless of their own subjective disposition towards 
enjoyment? As we will see, the detotalization or 
deconstitution of jouissance, its separation, that is, 
from the structure of fantasy, is indeed a central 
element of the new psychoanalytic ethics formulated by 
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Lacan in response to the discontents of contemporary 
life. Once it is displaced from a subject-oriented 
clinical practice and from a discourse that centres 
itself around the ethical furthering of subjectivity, 
however, this type of recommendation cannot but sound 
improbable and useless as a generalised political 
strategy, however radical the social implications of 
its clinical application may be. 
As we saw at the end of Chapter III, in strict 
Lacanian terms, there is no separation between 
clinical and political practice: psychoanalytic ethics 
finds its social application in clinical practice, 
which is at once subjective and political and has 
effects that are both subjective and political. The 
attempt to translate psychoanalytic ethics into a 
purely social or political practice, separated from 
its already political treatment of subjectivity, is 
the effect of a discourse that rejects subjectivity 
structurally, and thus ends up subtracting from the 
ethics of psychoanalysis its most fundamental 
component: the subject. 
Let's now turn to Zizek and consider how this 
discursive logic determines his position. While 
McGowan's work can be seen as falling more easily and 
284 
comfortably within the logic of academic discourse, 
Zizek's case is more complex. On one level, Zizek's 
work appears as a formidably diligent response to the 
academic "imperative to know" which seems to sustain 
it in its continuous critical dialogue with different 
areas of academic knowledge (political theory, film 
studies, cultural studies, gender studies, etc. ) and 
to motivate its fastidious illustration and 
enthusiastic endorsement of Lacanian thought. On 
another level, the chaotic, unrestrained and 
apparently incoherent flow of Zizek`s writing has also 
been linked to the disorienting and baffling quality 
of psychoanalytic discourse as typified by Lacan's own 
writing. It has been pointed out, for example, that 
Zizek's writing "teases at the limits of our 
understanding at the level of the chapter or the book 
in a way practised by Lacan from the level of the 
sentence upwards" (Kay 7). 
There is, however, a significant difference between 
Lacan and Zizek in this sense. Lacan's discourse is 
the ultimate example of analytic discourse because its 
baffling quality serves to instigate a desire for 
knowledge and thus to awaken the subject to its 
ethical path. Lacan's work is essentially didactic, it 
offers a series of enigmatic and self-contained 
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conceptual tools that function as provocations for the 
subject to engage in interpretation and put his 
knowledge to work. Zizek, on the other hand, does not 
encourage the work of interpretation: he just puts 
forward an incessant and chaotic maze of 
interpretations. For this reason, Zizek's discourse is 
closer to that of the hysterical analysand than to 
that of the analyst, and it would not be 
inappropriate, I think, to say that his is the writing 
of an academic subject who has put his knowledge to 
work in response to Lacan's teaching. 
His writing is incoherent because it meanders through 
academic knowledge following a desire for knowledge 
rather than a categorical imperative to know. It 
proceeds chaotically, by free associations, like the 
unconscious that speaks in the analysand's discourse 
during an analytic session. Its essential effect or 
product is inconsistent and decentred knowledge, or, 
as Lacan puts it, the emptying out and barring of the 
Other as the locus of knowledge. Zizek's discursive 
position thus establishes an ambiguous relation 
between itself and academic discourse. On the one 
hand, Zizek challenges academic discourse by 
foregrounding desire and subjectivity and by carrying 
out a hysterical deflation of knowledge. On the other 
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hand, Zizek remains tied up to the logic of academic 
discourse because his horizon is still that of a 
critical dialogue with academic knowledge, a dialogue 
that gives voice to a desiring subjectivity but 
ultimately addresses itself primarily to knowledge, 
and not to the subject. 
Zizek's discursive position certainly gives an ethical 
edge to his work by introducing subjectivity and 
desire into the field of knowledge. Zizek's flattening 
of the Other, and his hysterical derive of 
interpretations, can be rightly taken as an ethical 
stance against the disregard for subjectivity that 
marks the academic approach to knowledge. His 
"negative" entanglement with academic discourse, 
however, is eventually also the cause of his 
incapacity to elaborate the guidelines of a clear and 
consistent political practice. However Zizek may try 
to translate psychoanalytic ethics into political 
practice, it is the very structure of his discourse 
that pulls him back, because it addresses knowledge, 
not subjectivity, and aims at turning "full" knowledge 
into "empty" knowledge, not at orienting the subject 
ethically towards the limits of his own knowledge 
about jouissance. Besides, because Zizek's fundamental 
address is the field of "universal" academic and 
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generally applicable knowledge, his work is 
susceptible to the same kind of polarization of the 
socio-political against the subjective that we have 
noted in McGowan, and eventually leads to the same 
type of exclusion of psychoanalytic practice qua 
subject-oriented practice. This can be observed easily 
if we consider a few examples of Zizek's political 
"adaptations" of psychoanalytic ethics. 
Zizek's texts borrow or adapt a whole set of concepts 
from psychoanalytic ethics, all of which signal the 
subjective process of transcending the constraints of 
symbolic structures by means of an overcoming of the 
contemporary fantasmatic hold of surplus jouissance. 
These concepts include: "traversing the fantasy, " 
whereby the subject is "obliged to assume a distance 
towards the myths [e. g. fantasies] that guarantee the 
very consistency of our symbolic universe" (Metastases 
82); the "act, " whereby the subject's gesture of 
"assuming the big Other's non-existence" manages to 
"redefine the rules and contours of the existing 
socio-symbolic order" (Iraq 80-81); or the "organ 
without body, " whereby "the acephalous subject assumes 
the position of an object that subjectivizes itself" 
and thus freely enjoys its own "partial" nothingness, 
rather than the imaginary fullness of the body (Organs 
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176) 
. 
Now, what is remarkable is that, whenever Zizek 
attempts to adapt these concepts to the socio- 
political arena, this is usually done by providing a 
wealth of historical illustrations and examples, 
rather than by discussing the type of political 
practice that may put this type of transformative 
dynamics to effect. 
In his book on Iraq, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, for 
example, Zizek gives three very different examples of 
a political "act" in the space of only a few 
sentences: the 1974 referendum on divorce in Italy, 
Mitterrand's first electoral victory in France, and 
Khrushchev's 1956 speech denouncing Stalin's crimes, 
explaining that the only distinctive trait of the 
political "act" that connects these three moments is 
"a kind of reckless excess which cannot be accounted 
for in terms of strategic reasoning" (87-88). By 
identifying political practice with what transcends it 
(e. g. a "strategic excess"), Zizek here demonstrates 
against himself the contradictory nature of any 
attempt to universalise and de-subjectivize 
psychoanalytic ethics. He also ends up reducing 
political practice to a spontaneous and miraculous 
emergence of subjectivity, which ultimately makes all 
praxis appear as unnecessary, be it the traditional 
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political practice that operates "strategically, " or 
the subject-oriented practice of psychoanalysis that 
aims at producing such "strategic excesses. " 
Examples like this also manifest the structural 
constraints of Zizek's discursive position by showing 
how Zizek's prime concern is much less the 
articulation of a political practice from 
psychoanalytic ethics than the use of psychoanalytic 
ethics to provide new against-the-grain 
interpretations of historical and political knowledge 
- 
as if the (hysterical) endeavour of suggesting 
different interpretations of received historical 
knowledge were more important to Zizek than the 
articulation of a clear and detailed political 
practice. Moreover, even when Zizek does attempt to 
suggest the concrete forms and modalities of a 
political practice grounded on psychoanalytic ethics, 
this normally involves reference to practices that are 
not political in a socially strategic or universal 
sense, but, rather, aesthetic, and therefore, not 
surprisingly, closer to clinical practice and to the 
particularity and contingency of subjective 
experience. This is, for example, definitely the case 
with Zizek's elaboration of the political strategy of 
ideological "overidentification, " which consists in 
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taking a given ideological stance (no matter how 
conservative or progressive) at face value and without 
any sort of critical distance, so as to "shock" the 
subject that witnesses overidentification into 
questioning that ideological stance and, eventually, 
into "taking up his [ideological] position and decide 
on his desire, " in a way that, according to Zizek, 
recalls the conclusion of the analytic treatment 
(Metastases 72). 
In conclusion, we might say that the work of theorists 
like McGowan and Zizek illustrates a fundamental 
aspect of psychoanalytic ethics, namely that it is not 
a practice that can be easly universalised or applied 
to a wider socio-political field. While psychoanalysis 
can help us to understand the structural changes 
behind contemporary life and the predicaments of the 
subject in the particular configuration of knowledge, 
power and jouissance that marks our society, 
psychoanalytic discourse and psychoanalytic ethics 
cannot be simply applied to the social and implemented 
on a collective level by suggesting that people should 
engage in practices that follow the same logic of, but 
are different from, psychoanalytic practice itself. We 
must insist that the reason for this impossibility is 
definitely not, as some might suggest, that 
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psychoanalytic ethics is merely concerned with the 
individual or with subjectivity and thus ultimately 
incompatible with the wider sphere of social and 
political practice. On the contrary, psychoanalytic 
ethics is a constitutively social and political 
practice, concerned with handling power relations and 
with forging relationships between subjects, but 
precisely because it is also concerned with 
subjectivity it cannot be universalised or generalised 
or applied or translated in any way. It must start 
from the uniqueness and contingency of each subject's 
ethical relation to his jouissance, even if it also 
aims at forging a social and political bond. This is 
something that is immediately clear to anyone who has 
ever tried to apply psychoanalytic "knowledge" to 
himself in an analytic setting and was immediately 
confronted with a resolute resistance on the side of 
the analyst, justified by the fact that the 
application of universal knowledge to what is unique 
and singular can only result in a loss or suppression 
of subjectivity. 
It is one of the most well-known principles of 
psychoanalytic practice that there are no fixed rules 
and no ready-made procedures to apply and that the 
practice of psychoanalysis must be re-invented anew 
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for each subject, finding its bearings in a 
formalisation that maintains, without reducing it, the 
singular domain of subjectivity (Leclaire 16). The 
same principle should also be applied, I think, to 
psychoanalytic politics, which, being based on 
psychoanalytic ethics, and, consequently, on an agenda 
that places the subject's autonomy and freedom at its 
strategic core, can only engage with power at the 
level of the transference and of the analytic bond in 
order to be able to address the wider discontents of 
civilization and expand the analytic bond into wider 
social networks based on the transmission of desire 
and on the autonomy of each one of its members. 
Chapter V 
Addiction and the Limits of Contemporary 
Ethics 
1. The Ethics of Contemporary Life 
We have up to now concerned ourselves with the 
structure of contemporary civilization and with the 
discontents that are inherent to it. We have also seen 
that the ethics of psychoanalysis is oriented towards 
the subject and aims at providing an answer to the 
discontents of civilization by offering the subject an 
ethical measure for his/her actions different from the 
ethos of civilization. The ethics of psychoanalysis 
qua ethics of the subject is, consequently, 
fundamentally at odds with the ethics of civilization. 
But what is the ethics of contemporary life? Has the 
installation of the discourse of contemporary life 
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also brought along a new social ethos against which 
psychoanalytic ethics needs to define itself? 
The idea that contemporary civilization is dominated 
by a superegoic imperative to enjoy is commonly used 
by Lacanian theorists and analysts alike, suggesting 
that the ethics of contemporary life should be defined 
as an ethics of jouissance. We have seen, for example, 
how Todd McGowan explains contemporary society in 
terms of a shift from an ethics of prohibition to an 
ethics of enjoyment, and Jacques-Alain Miller has also 
recently talked about our civilization as a "merchant 
civilization" in which "the superego strictly speaking 
dominates, the superego whose imperative can be 
formulated as jouis! " ("Psychoanalysis"). This 
analysis is, of course, true, but it is also, at the 
same time, misleading because in the discourse of 
contemporary life the imperative to enjoy is 
incorporated within a system of production that can 
only be sustained through a regulatory mechanism of 
prohibition and repression. 
Jouissance, therefore, is allowed and even commanded, 
but only on condition that it should remain within the 
limits of what makes the structure function and work, 
that is, within the limits of production and 
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signification. As Lacan has reminded us, the discourse 
of contemporary life is before anything else a 
"perfect mechanism" that "works as if on wheels" ("Du 
discours" 8). If this "mechanism" tells us to enjoy it 
is only because of the "effort" that, as Eric Laurent 
has put it, "needs to be made in order to attain that 
point of jouissance for which everybody has to work 
even harder, which just reinforces the system" 
("Symptom" 233). In sum, the contemporary Other 
- 
the 
discursive structure of contemporary life 
- 
may 
command its subjects to enjoy, but the fundamental 
ethos of our social structure is work, not jouissance. 
We can trace a first definition of this type of work- 
oriented social ethics back to Seminar VII, L'ethique 
de la psychanalyse, when Lacan discusses the shift 
from Aristotelian ethics to utilitarianism as a 
radical historical transition characteristic of the 
modern era. For Lacan, the rise of utilitarianism at 
the beginning of the XIX century represents a 
"conversion" or "reversal" from the ideal to the real 
in the nature of the common good, and is "entirely 
conditioned historically by a radical decline of the 
function of the Master, which clearly grounds all 
Aristotelian thought" (SVII 21). In Lacan's reading, 
utilitarian ethics finds its bearings in an 
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interrogation of the value of what Jeremy Bentham 
calls "fictions, " that is, of symbolic social 
institutions seen from the point of view of their 
ability to create the common good as a real and useful 
object of human need rather than as an ideal (SVII 
22). The utilitarian conversion of the common good 
from the ideal to the real thus implies an ethical 
emphasis on the "useful" functioning of the symbolic 
structure that can create the common good as an object 
of use, pleasure and exchange (Lacan, SVII 269). 
We can see how this shift in the history of ethics 
matches the Lacanian account of the historical 
transition from traditional social structures based on 
the discourse of the Master to the discourse of 
contemporary life via the transformation of surplus 
jouissance into "countable" surplus value. The 
utilitarian conversion of the common good from the 
ideal to the real is, in fact, nothing but the result, 
in the field of ethics, of the historical-discursive 
promotion of the object on the horizon of contemporary 
life. The ethics of contemporary life is, therefore, a 
utilitarian ethics, oriented towards the service of 
the common good qua real, material good through the 
fundamental principle of the good functioning of the 
socio-symbolic structure qua productive machine. 
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The utilitarian ethics that rules over the discourse 
of contemporary life can be observed in the current 
unshakable social belief that economic growth and the 
good functioning of the economy comes before anything 
else. Our society is also manifesting more and more 
clearly that the utilitarian principle of efficient 
economic growth tends to operate today in complete 
independence from and disregard of any other ethical 
norm, be it a traditional and humanistic understanding 
of the good of Man or a psychoanalytic ethics of 
subjectivity and desire. As Antonio di Ciaccia, 
analyst of the Lacanian School in Italy, has pointed 
out in an article entitled "Ethics in the Era of 
Globalization, " 
the ethic of the free market absolutely does 
not have the good of Man as its final aim. Its 
final aim is that the machine go where it is 
going, following its own circuit inescapably 
and irresistibly. Free marketers uphold that 
the final aim of the machine is necessarily 
positive because it is the best system of 
resource creation yet invented. So the good of 
the market becomes the good of Man because it 
does not proceed directly from Man's 
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intention, since Man could very well want 
evil. (20) 
Utilitarian ethics thus emerges as an increasingly 
autonomous imperative in contemporary life and 
eventually enters into frontal conflict not only with 
humanistic understandings of the common good as an 
ideal of humanity based on the discourse of the 
Master, but also with a psychoanalytic understanding 
of the good. While, in fact, utilitarian ethics 
understands the common good as a real material 
"resource" to value and accumulate, psychoanalysis 
also understands the good as real, but approaches the 
real of the good as surplus jouissance, that is, as a 
piece of worthless waste, as a void, and can thus 
sustain an ethics of desire and subjectivity 
independent from the ethics of the "grinding machine" 
of economic progress (Di Ciaccia 20-21). 
Lacan's discussion of utilitarianism in Seminar VII 
also confirms our point that Lacan's early critique of 
civilization is consistent with his later definition 
of contemporary life. We are familiar with the way in 
which, in Seminar VII, Lacan was already referring to 
a modern social structure where the bond between 
subject and neighbour - that is between subject and 
object - had started to assert itself over the 
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traditional bond between subject and Master. 
Similarly, we can see Lacan's first reading of 
utilitarianism as pointing towards the contemporary 
capitalist ethics of structural efficiency he comments 
upon in the last phase of his teaching. 
When in Seminar VII Lacan refers to a civilization 
that "implements to its extreme consequences the 
universal imperative of the service of goods" he is 
already talking about the ethics of contemporary life 
(SVII 250-51). This is important because it means that 
the psychoanalytic ethics of "criminal" sublimation of 
desire from the common good, introduced by Lacan in 
Seminar VII precisely as an antidote to the discontent 
of a civilization based on the service of goods, is 
still relevant for us today. For sure, the paradigm of 
psychoanalytic ethics undergoes a radical change in 
the space between Seminar VII and the teaching of the 
later Lacan, and we will interrogate more closely the 
logic of this change in the next chapter. In his later 
work, in fact, Lacan links the contemporary structural 
and subjective effects of the utilitarian service of 
the goods to a new practice of psychoanalytic ethics 
which takes into account and adapts to both the 
permanence of jouissance within social and signifying 
structures and the subject's growing incapacity to 
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process jouissance through signification. This later 
version of psychoanalytic ethics is, however, still 
grounded on the same ideals of subjective freedom and 
autonomy from the imperatives of symbolic law on the 
one hand and of jouissance on the other, while it also 
continues to define itself against the same type of 
utilitarian social ethics that Lacan had started to 
explore in his earlier work. In order to bring these 
continuities into light and to identify how exactly 
the contemporary ethics of psychoanalysis defines 
itself against the ethics of contemporary 
utilitarianism, I will follow the direction of the 
argument that led me, in the first part of this 
thesis, to interrogate the Sadean crime as an ethical 
gesture at the limit of the ethics of the good, and I 
will consider, instead, the more specific question of 
the limits of contemporary utilitarianism. 
2. The Limits of Contemporary Ethics 
In Seminar VII Lacan makes his formulation of 
psychoanalytic ethics pass through an interrogation of 
the common good as a limit separating the subject from 
jouissance and the death drive. On this limit he 
places two figures, Kant and Sade, whose complementary 
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ethical stance he presents as oriented simultaneously 
beyond and within the ethical horizon of the common 
good. In Lacan's reading, the Kantian moral law 
projects the subject beyond the limit of the common 
good by detaching the universal maxim of ethical 
action from all "pathological" interest (SVII 364). 
The Sadean injunction to treat the other only as a 
"pathological" instrument of pleasure, on the other 
hand, overcomes the limit of the common good by 
opening the doors to the cruelty of murder and 
destruction (Lacan, SVII 234) In both cases, the 
subject also remains, however, within the limits of 
the good: not only, in fact, is the Sadean destruction 
of the good sustained by a fantasy of jouissance, but 
the same fantasy of jouissance also haunts the pure 
"non-pathological" rationality of the Kantian moral 
action through the (masochistic) suffering that the 
moral law requires from the subject (Lacan, SVII 97, 
232). 
If the common good represents a limit to jouissance 
and to the death drive, therefore, we can say that the 
complementary ethical positions of Kant and Sade 
represent the two limits of the ethics of the good, 
the two opposite and complementary directions from 
which the limit of the common good can be approached 
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but not crossed. In the remaining parts of this 
chapter I will consider the limits of the ethics of 
contemporary life from the point of view of two social 
practices 
- 
addiction and religion 
- 
that replicate 
the two ethical positions formulated by Kant and Sade: 
on the one hand, a rejection of the satisfaction of 
the object in the name of a transcendental and 
universal principle; on the other, a no holds barred 
pursuit of satisfaction beyond the limits of pleasure 
itself. Without wanting to suggest, or even less argue 
for, any simplistic identification of Kantian and 
religious ethics, or of Sadean ethics and the 
psychology of addiction, I will attempt to establish 
how addiction and religion as social practices 
challenge the utilitarian ethics of contemporary 
discourse by adopting the two positions of jouissance 
that Lacan finds formalised in Kant's and Sade's work, 
rather than a Kantian or Sadean ethics as such. 
Significantly, it is Lacan himself who points out how 
the positions articulated by Kant and Sade emerge 
historically as a response to two key aspects of the 
new discursive structure of contemporary life: the 
"revolutionary crisis of morals" of the late XVIII 
century and the "disorienting effect" of the 
scientific, and specifically Newtonian, formalization 
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of the laws of physics (SVII 82,93) 
. 
In this sense, 
we can see Kant and Sade's projection of ethics beyond 
the limits of the good as an attempt to assert the 
autonomy of the subject from the determinism of a new 
symbolic structure (formalised by the laws of physics) 
whose automatic functioning appears more and more as 
eroding the freedom and autonomy of the subject. As 
Jorge Alemän has noted in the presentation of Lakant, 
a collective seminar on Lacan and Kant by the tcole de 
la Cause Freudienne, the Kantian subject "who gives to 
himself his own law" and the Sadean subject who tries 
to outdo natural limits in his pursuit of pleasure are 
both subjects who assert, for the first time, their 
autonomy in relation to a signifying structure, 
scientific, "natural" or otherwise, that had started 
to emerge and function independently from human 
reality 
- 
and this is one of the reasons why the 
formulations of Kant and Sade have been so important 
for psychoanalytic thinking so far (18). 
In sum, Kant and Sade provide us with the first 
formulations of two ethical positions from which the 
"ethics of the machine, " which is at once the ethics 
of modern science and the utilitarian ethics of 
contemporary life, can be resisted. In this respect, 
however, it is important to mark the distance between 
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the significance of Kant and Sade's work and the 
limits of the ethical positions they propose. As 
Jacques-Alain Miller's contribution to the Lakant 
seminar makes clear, in fact, the autonomy of the 
subject does not lie in the possibility of a subject 
defined purely by his duties (as in Kant) or of a 
subject defined purely by his rights (as in Sade), 
since such subjects are, as we have seen, both 
eventually controlled by a fantasy of jouissance 
("Incroyable" 39-40). The autonomy of the 
Kantian/Sadean subject lies instead in the splitting 
of the subject that the self-imposition of duties (or 
rights) provokes and which is the only structural 
element that can preserve the autonomy of the subject 
from the causality of the structure (Miller 
"Incroyable" 28-29). In Chapter II we have seen how 
this splitting of the subject is palpable in Sade's 
thought, rather than in Sade's subjective position, 
but now we must insist that it is also not an 
attribute of the Kantian subject of absolute duty and 
of the Sadean subject of absolute right per se, who 
are always, in spite of their "ethical" resistance 
against the constraints of the symbolic structure, 
also responding to the imperatives that guarantee the 
functioning of the symbolic structure. 
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In contemporary life, we can encounter the Kantian and 
Sadean positions of jouissance within two 
characteristic and widespread social practices which 
thus emerge, if we follow the logic of our analysis, 
as markers of the limits of contemporary utilitarian 
ethics: religion and addiction. This point has been 
illustrated nicely by Eric Laurent, who has shown how 
a "Kantian" renunciation of jouissance and, on the 
other hand a "Sadean" pursuit of jouissance beyond the 
pleasure principle, constitute the two structural 
limits of the contemporary relation to the common good 
upheld by our capitalistic-utilitarian ethics of 
"hedonism: " 
The current state of civilization is from time 
to time described as an individualism of the 
masses or as a conformist hedonism of the 
masses. [... ] A psychoanalyst cannot endorse 
this term of contemporary hedonism, because 
hedonism is a dream: it supposes a possible 
degree of relationship between the subject and 
his jouissance. The limits to this 
relationship can be marked from two 
directions. The first is that of love, which 
prefers nothing to satisfaction. [... ] The 
second direction of the limit of the so-called 
hedonism is the jouissance beyond the pleasure 
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principle that shows the horizon of the death 
drive. ("Stakes") 
In Laurent's analysis, these two limit positions, that 
of "the restoration of a love for the dead father" and 
that of the "death drive, " are produced as "effects" 
of the "actualization of surplus jouissance" that 
marks the discourse of capitalism in two main types of 
social practice: "religious fundamentalism" on the one 
hand, and "narco-capitalism" on the other ("Stakes"). 
Mutatis mutandis, therefore, the Kantian and the 
Sadean responses to the ethics of the common good are 
replicated, against the horizon of contemporary 
hedonism and utilitarianism, by religious 
fundamentalism and addiction. Just like the Kantian 
and Sadean subjects discussed by Lacan, the subject of 
religion and the subject of addiction stand on the 
limit of the common good: they point beyond it from 
the double angle of a "pure" moral duty and of a 
"pure" right to jouissance beyond the pleasure 
principle, but they also remain within it as "effects" 
of an ethics of the good which ultimately determines 
them through the promise of a more complete 
satisfaction (to be obtained either through dutiful 
renunciation or through the repeated administration of 
the drug itself). 
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Establishing a structural similarity between the 
positions of jouissance of Kant/Sade and those of 
religion/addiction is important not only because it 
allows us to identify the limits of contemporary 
ethics with two precise social practices, but also 
because it allows us to read these practices as 
ethical practices and interrogate the differences 
between them and the peculiarities of Kant's and 
Sade's ethics. In this sense, a first line of 
interrogation may try to assess whether contemporary 
fundamentalism and addiction can succeed, like Kant 
and Sade before them, in transcending the limits of 
their own positions of jouissance by revealing, in a 
gesture which would take on a completely different 
ethical resonance, the radical division of the subject 
who independently imposes his own rights and duties on 
himself. 
For sure, as social practices religion and addiction 
fall much more fully than the philosophy of Kant or 
the writing of Sade within the limit of an ethics of 
the good. The experience of contemporary subjects, 
however, also shows that when the subject, in the wake 
of Sade and Kant's examples, wilfully engages in an 
exclusive and extreme pursuit of his duties or rights 
beyond the pleasure principle and into the realm of 
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religious and political fundamentalism or fully- 
fledged addiction, we start to cover a different 
ethical ground, an ethical ground that points beyond 
the limits of the utilitarian ethics of contemporary 
life. In this sense, however easily and quickly the 
ethics of religion and addiction may be co-opted 
within utilitarian ethics, the subjective stance 
involved in taking these two positions to the extreme 
must also be seen as implying an ethical complaint of 
the subject against the utilitarian ethics of the 
Other, insofar as it reveals, behind its renewed 
fantasy of jouissance, the splitting of the free 
subject who sets the stakes higher, actively demanding 
more rights or more duties. We can thus see how the 
contemporary practices of religion and addiction can 
replicate not only the positions of jouissance 
formalised by Kant and Sade, but also, in a way, the 
ethical vindication of the autonomy of the subject 
that is implicit in the Kantian and Sadean self- 
legislating subject. A series of very important 
restrictions, however, must be introduced in this 
respect, so that it is also essential to mark the 
distance between the ethics that emerge from Kant and 
Sade's work and the fundamental indifference towards 
subjectivity that, as we will see, characterises 
fundamentalism and addiction. 
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3. The Ethics of Religion 
In the first place, we can observe that, in opposition 
to what is defined by Kant's and Sade's position, the 
position of religion and the position addiction pursue 
a radical suppression of the splitting of subjectivity 
which, from a Lacanian perspective, is the only ground 
on which a non-utilitarian ethics of subjective 
freedom and desire can be built. While Kant's 
philosophy and Sade's writing emphasised the painful 
division of the subject who single-mindedly pursues 
his duties or rights to the extreme limit, religion 
and addiction replicate the subjective positions 
formalised by Kant and Sade but also fundamentally 
negate and aim at concealing the suffering of the 
divided subject. In religion, in fact, the law that 
enjoins the religious subject to ignore all material 
or "pathological" satisfaction is not the law of his 
own reason, as in Kant, but the law of the dead 
father, commanded by a love for the dead father. For 
Lacan, the ethics of religion is even opposed to the 
rationalism of Kantian ethics. 
In a text of 1974, "La troisieme, " Lacan states this 
explicitly by presenting the contemporary Church 
("1'Eglise") as a watchman there to "contain" 
("tamponner") "a raving rationalisation like Kant's. " 
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Even if both Kant and contemporary religion approach 
the same limit of contemporary ethics by renouncing 
the service of goods and the satisfaction of surplus 
jouissance, their way of dealing with the rationalism 
which also characterises contemporary ethics (as a 
utilitarian functional/scientific ethics of the 
signifier as well as a hedonistic ethics) is crucially 
different. Kant grounds on the rationality of the 
Newtonian laws of science the very possibility of a 
rational subject who freely promulgates his own moral 
law, while religion rejects all rationalism, 
scientific or ethical, altogether. The contemporary 
subject of religion manages in this way to avoid not 
only (1) the anxiety involved in the confrontation 
with the contemporary excess of surplus jouissance 
(e. g. consumer goods), but also (2) the anxiety 
involved in the freedom that the subject must assume 
in the act of giving his own law to himself, and (3) 
the splitting of subjectivity which becomes "healed" 
and "anaesthetized" by a structure of fantasy which is 
infinitely stronger than that detected by Lacan in the 
Kantian hypothesis of the immortality of the soul or 
in the moral masochism implicit in the Kantian 
position (SVII 366). 
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In sum, the ethics of contemporary religion steers the 
modern Kantian position of jouissance back towards a 
traditional ethics of the Master and of the good 
understood as ideal rather than real. This does not 
mean that contemporary religious ethics is a mere 
return to a traditional ethics of the Master: its 
modernity and its deepest affinity with Kant manifests 
itself in the "fundamentalism" of its attitude towards 
duty and of its total abstraction from surplus 
jouissance which places it on the limit of 
contemporary ethics. The contemporary ethics of 
religion thus both loses and gains something in 
comparison with Kantian ethics. It loses something 
because it gives consistency to the Other, using "God" 
as a "tampon" to plug the Kantian opening towards the 
autonomy of the divided subject. It gains something 
- 
over Kant and over every other type of ethics 
- 
because of its ability to heal and appease all sort of 
division and anxiety: the division of the subject, the 
anxiety of surplus jouissance, and the anxiety of 
freedom. 
This is, perhaps, the secret of the growing success of 
religious ethics in contemporary life and the meaning 
of Lacan's well known "prophecy" on the eventual 
"triumph of religion. " According to Lacan, religion 
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will eventually triumph thanks to its ability to 
confer meaning on the ever growing incidence of the 
real in contemporary life: 
The real [... ] is going to spread and religion 
will have many more reasons to reassure 
people. Since always, religion turns around 
giving meaning to those things that in the 
past were understood as "natural. " And it is 
not because things are now, thanks to the 
real, getting less natural, that religion is 
going to stop producing meaning [secreter le 
sens]. Religion is going to give a meaning to 
the most strange enterprises, about which even 
scientists are rightly starting to feel 
anxious. Religion is going to find some fierce 
and terrible meanings for all this. (Triomphe 
79-80) 
The ethics of religion will then triumph over the 
scientific and utilitarian "ethics of the real" that 
governs contemporary life because it can give meaning 
where the real only gives anxiety. 
However close its "fundamentalist" challenge to the 
common good may get to that posed by the Kantian 
categorical imperative, however "fierce and terrible" 
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the meanings imposed by religion may become, religious 
ethics will nevertheless always essentially "give 
meaning" and thus avoid all division, all split and 
all responsibility for the subject. We can see how 
Lacan's "prophecy" on the triumph of religion points 
in the same direction as his comments on the eventual 
"exhaustion" of the discourse of capitalism: just like 
inhibition, the ethics of religion presents the 
subject with a strategy to deal with the anxiety- 
provoking excess of surplus jouissance in contemporary 
life. This is not, however, a strategy that blocks off 
the production of jouissance by inhibiting the 
symbolic mechanism of repression, nor simply a 
repression of the "natural" real: it is a strategy 
that aims at repressing the symptom, at repressing the 
real as a product of repression itself: "by continuing 
to soak [noyer] it in meaning, into religious 
meaning, " Lacan points out, "we will arrive to repress 
this symptom" (Triomphe 82) 
. 
This means, of course, 
that what is at stake with contemporary religious 
ethics is much more than a simple renunciation of 
"material" worldly contentments: the stake is, as 
Lacan also reminds us elsewhere (in his discussion of 
Pascal's wager in Seminar XVI), the symptom that this 
renunciation produces, and, with it, the division of 
the autonomous subject which the symptom allows (SXVI 
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118-20). In this sense, we can appreciate once more 
the distance between traditional religious ethics and 
the contemporary, post-Kantian ethics of religion that 
does not sustain a dominant social discourse based on 
the repression of a "natural" real, but moves from the 
limits of a contemporary discourse oriented towards 
the production of a technological real in order to 
abstract the moral imperative from this technological 
real as a "pathological" product or symptomatic object 
of the subject's jouissance. 
If we move forward in time from the context of Lacan's 
historical analysis in the early 1970s, we can observe 
that the current rise of religious fundamentalism 
seems to confirm and, indeed, fulfil Lacan's 
hypothesis on the growing strength and appeal of 
religious ethics for contemporary subjects. As for a 
final "triumph" of religion, however, the current 
state of civilization has also thrown light on some 
aspects of contemporary religious discourse that had 
escaped Lacan's insight. Eric Laurent notes that the 
contemporary practice of a neo-religious ethics by 
different types of fundamentalist groups also 
maintains an unexpected hidden alliance with the 
ethics of addiction that defines the other 
complementary limit of the common good (the other way 
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to go "beyond the pleasure principle") in contemporary 
life: 
These two sides [religion and addiction] might 
be brought together when we learn that the 
Taliban support themselves by the cultivation 
of poppies and the export of opium, just like 
the Columbian guerrillas with cocaine 
trafficking. A very interesting study shows 
that, as the fall of ideals transforms the 
guerrillas into a discourse more open on the 
ideological plane 
- 
and this, as much as 
regards the reasons for their struggle as who 
they are 
-, 
these same guerrillas transform 
themselves radically into organizations 
remarkably adapted to the fabrication, 
distribution and financing of drugs. We thus 
find a melange of extremes that leaves us to 
think that the most difficult thing in this 
civilization of supposed hedonism is the 
treatment of its relationship to addiction. 
(`"Stakes") 
The examples presented by Laurent are extreme but 
illustrate very well an essential trait of 
contemporary fundamentalism. Through its connections 
with the system of production of drugs, technology 
and, more generally, of surplus jouissance, religious 
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fundamentalism defines its relation to the real not 
only in terms of an ethics based on "giving meaning" 
and "giving up satisfaction, " but also in terms of 
production. 
The idea that religion may succeed in "drowning" the 
real in meaning remains, therefore, distant from our 
current social reality, where religion is actively 
taking part in the production of the real as surplus 
jouissance. This, of course, pushes to the fore the 
question of addiction, as a pathological excess of 
jouissance induced by contemporary discourse, as well 
as an ethical stance in relation to jouissance 
-a 
Sadean refusal to "give up on satisfaction" 
- 
from 
which the other limit of the ethics of contemporary 
life can be challenged. 
4. The Ethics of Addiction 
After religious fundamentalism, addiction defines 
today the second limit of contemporary utilitarian 
ethics, the limits formalised by the Sadean position 
of the subject who recognises nothing but his right to 
jouissance. This position 
- 
we must insist on this 
point once more - is distinct not only from its 
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theoretical elaboration in Sade's work but also from 
Sade's own ethical position as a subject, and 
represents here only an underlying structural relation 
linking the Sadean subject and the subject of 
addiction. 
My concern is with the differences between the ways in 
which this fundamental relation to jouissance is 
developed from an ethical standpoint by Sade and, on 
the other hand, by the subject of addiction. Of 
course, addiction as a social pathology escapes 
ethical consideration. In this specific sense, 
addiction defines an inherent disturbance of the 
utilitarian system, one that occurs when the subject 
conforms too much to the utilitarian imperative to 
consume and enjoy and ends up being led astray, beyond 
the ethics of the common good and "beyond the pleasure 
principle. " The guardians of utilitarian ethics 
- 
organised by the state in the name of the good 
management of human and financial resources 
- 
are 
always ready to intervene and invest to "rehabilitate" 
and recuperate these subjects who have crossed the 
limit of jouissance and made themselves "useless. " 
While there is nothing ethical about the stance of 
these subjects duped into addiction by the false 
promises of satisfaction made by contemporary 
318 
civilization, the treatment of addiction provided by 
contemporary civilization also remains within the 
boundaries of its own utilitarianism and prioritizes 
social adaptation over the freedom and the singularity 
of the subject. 
There is, however, one aspect of the subjective 
experience of addiction which cannot be reduced to or 
incorporated within the ethics of contemporary 
utilitarianism. This aspect is the very cause of 
addiction, the lack of satisfaction that motivates the 
subjective ability to fall into an addiction in the 
first place. It is to this aspect that we owe the 
possibility of thinking about addiction as an ethical 
stance at the limit of utilitarianism. The fact that 
addiction can only be theorised as an action taken in 
relation to a lack of satisfaction that is structural 
and, consequently, cultural, installed by the Other of 
civilization, explains why addiction has constantly 
been associated with cultures marked by a non- 
conformist ethics of revolt and rebellion. 
Interestingly, this association dates back to the 
beginning of what Lacan describes as the discursive 
restructuration of contemporary life (the late XVIII 
- 
early XIX century) and stretches from the Romantic 
movement (Coleridge's and De Quincey's addictions to 
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opium are good examples), through fin-de-siecle 
aestheticism (Baudelaire's "paradis artificiels"), to 
re-emerge triumphantly within the Counterculture of 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
Lacan's own definition of addiction points precisely 
in this direction: for Lacan, "the only possible 
definition of drugs" is "what permits one to break the 
marriage to the little willy, " that is, what allows 
the subject to find a way of enjoying that is 
different from the phallic jouissance made possible by 
the subject's relation to the Other through castration 
(Loose 221). This means that addiction always contains 
an "ethical" complaint or protest against the 
enjoyment that the Other can(not) give or promise. As 
Rik Loose puts it: 
Despite the attempt of neurotic (and perverse) 
addicts to break away from phallic jouissance 
in an act that takes place independently of 
the Other, it is undoubtedly the case that 
this act is, at the same time, an appeal to 
the Other as it was the encounter between the 
subject and the Other that produced the 
dissatisfaction of having to put up with 
limited pleasure and desire. In other words, 
the act of neurotic and perverse addicts is an 
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appeal to the Other in the form of a 
complaint. (221) 
The ethical side of addiction, therefore, is not the 
revelation of a more authentic "good" - the good of 
toxic jouissance 
- 
whose pursuit would represent a 
higher ethical path than the pursuit of the enjoyment 
offered, commanded or regulated by the Other of 
culture. 
This may indeed be the position defended by the addict 
himself, but the truth is that the drug is always 
fundamentally letting down the addict (who needs to 
repeat its administration over and over again) and 
also ultimately undermining his freedom by reducing 
him to complete dependence. The ethical aspect of 
addiction rather lies in the "complaint" that the 
subject of addiction addresses to the Other and that 
bares the fundamental division of the subject, the 
division on which the possibility of freedom and 
autonomy from the other is based. It is on this point 
that we can find a similarity and a historical 
continuity between the ethical position of the Sadean 
subject and the position of the subject of addiction. 
We can, in fact, see the subject of addiction as 
replicating not only the Sadean quest for a jouissance 
beyond the limits of any type of "natural" or social 
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order arranged by the Other, but also the Sadean 
experience of a subject who discovers himself as 
constitutively divided 
- 
and free 
- 
through the very 
failure of his quest which ties him to the Other in a 
perpetual position of defiance or protest. 
There is also, however, one fundamental difference 
between the subject of addiction and the Sadean 
subject. The Sadean subject, on the one hand, relates 
to jouissance by means of the "unconscious" structure 
of fantasy, that is, by means of signification, which 
means that he is continuously reinscribed as a split 
subject both within and without the limits of the 
Other. The drug as a product of the real of science 
and capitalism, on the other hand, allows the subject 
of addiction to separate his jouissance from the Other 
in a much more radical way than fantasy, and 
eventually tends to cover and hide the split of the 
subject rather than to reinscribe and reveal it. 
Without referring to Sade, Rick Loose has explained 
this difference in terms of a distinction between the 
"unconscious fantasy" of the neurotic subject who 
"deals with the real via the detour of the signifiers 
of the Other" and the "conscious fantasy" of the 
addict who uses the drug to create an "immediate" way 
of dealing with the real, a "symptom in the real" 
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which depends on, but at the same time also bypasses, 
the unconscious fantasy structure of the subject 
(254). 
The ethics of a jouissance "against the Other" that 
gives shape to the experiences of the Sadean subject 
and of the subject of addiction is pursued, in this 
sense, much more successfully by the subject of 
addiction, at the cost, however, of that subjective 
split which was guaranteed by the very impasse 
implicit in the Sadean fantasy. In relation to the 
Sadean subject, therefore, the subject of addiction 
loses much of his ethical edge and may be seen as the 
result of a historical push to close down, from the 
perspective of the same position of jouissance, the 
opening towards an overly demanding ethics of desire 
that had emerged in Sade's experience. If Sade's right 
to jouissance had the structural function of producing 
the painful splitting of the subject and to affirm, 
eventually, the subject itself in its relation to 
jouissance, the right to jouissance defended by the 
addict has the opposite effect of erasing lack and 
subjectivity by pursuing a jouissance that not only 
transgresses the limits posed by the Other but also 
bypasses the jouissance of transgression and the 
symbolic-structure of the Other altogether. 
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This difference between the Sadean subject and the 
subject of addiction can also account for the 
different ways in which their liminal ethical stances 
end up being assimilated within the mainstream ethics 
they strive to challenge. We have already discussed 
how Sade's attempt to cross the barrier of the good 
fails because his transgression is based on the script 
of a fantasy that is taken from and attributed to the 
Other. In the case of the addict, on the other hand, 
it is precisely the attempt to seek jouissance by 
avoiding the detour of signification and fantasy that 
collapses the limit between the ethics of addiction 
and the utilitarian ethics of contemporary life. In 
fact, even if addiction, contrary to utilitarianism, 
moves beyond the boundaries of the good and the 
useful, its attempt to eliminate the lack at the heart 
of subjectivity and of the social structure by 
bypassing the mediation of the Other also mirrors 
closely the utilitarian logic articulated in the 
discourse of contemporary life. 
Lacan's analysis of the discourse of contemporary life 
shows very well how the utilitarian "machine" of 
contemporary life aims at the production of surplus 
jouissance destined to fill the lack of the subject 
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and how, in this way, social discourse has managed to 
turn itself into a seamless loop that can function 
without the two stumbling blocks of signification 
- 
that is, without the "impossibility" of representation 
and the "impotence" of the object to satisfy the 
subject as the two structural principles of 
signification (SXVII 203). Another way to put this is 
that contemporary utilitarian discourse strives to 
overcome the libidinal frustration inherent to 
civilization and the always partial and contested 
jouissance that passes through the Other by producing 
objects that satisfy and complete the subject. 
We may say that the relation between the subject and 
the object in contemporary discourse, therefore, is 
already an addictive one, in the sense that the 
surplus jouissance embodied by the object qua 
prosthetic technological gadget, medication, drug or 
commodity is already there to fill the lack of the 
subject directly, not as the "impotent" remainder of 
an "impossible" process of signification that invests 
the relation of the subject to the Other, but as a 
master that can control the subject in a dynamic of 
direct dependence and addiction. In this way, the 
ethics of addiction not only challenges one side of 
contemporary utilitarianism - the side that would 
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maintain a limit to jouissance in order to preserve 
the pleasure principle and the principle of the common 
good as prerequisites of the good functioning of 
production 
- 
but is also consistent with that side of 
utilitarian ethics that aims at restructuring social 
discourse so as to avoid and eliminate the 
constitutive lack that disturbs the smooth functioning 
of the symbolic structure. 
This second side of contemporary utilitarian ethics 
may be characterised as "prosthetic ethics" insofar as 
it believes in the power of objects to satisfy and 
complete subjects. The object is, in this case, still 
the sovereign good that orients the subject but it 
emerges as crucially different from the ideal object 
of classic Aristotelian ethics and from the fantasy 
object of Sade's bonheur dans le mal: it is the object 
as prosthesis, the prosthetic good. Freud was among 
the first to acknowledge this aspect of modern ethics 
when he described the civilized man as a "god with 
artificial limbs" and linked the production of 
prosthesis to the human search for happiness in 
Civilization and Its Discontents (36) 
. 
The prosthetic 
tendency at the heart of contemporary culture ethics 
has also received much attention in contemporary 
critical and cultural theory. Marquard Smith and 
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Joanne Morra, for example, have talked about a 
"prosthetic impulse" to describe the interaction of 
the human body and technology in modern culture (4). 
They point out how in contemporary critical debates, 
and following a series of seminal interventions by 
theorists like Baudrillard (The Transparency of Evil), 
Haraway ("The Cyborg Manifesto") and Hayles (How We 
Became Posthuman), the prosthetic impulse of modern 
culture has been approached from the point of view of 
the dialectic between the human and the posthuman, 
with an emphasis that oscillates, on the one hand, 
between the evolutionary outcomes of this impulse (the 
prosthetic leading to the overcoming of the human) and 
its constitutive character (the prosthetic as part of 
the human), and, on the other hand, between the 
dystopic and catastrophic outcomes of the prosthetic 
impulse (the invasion and infiltration of the body by 
technology) and its utopian, political, transformative 
and liberating promise (the prosthetic impulse as a 
way to overcome the limitations of the human) (6-7). 
From a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective, we may say 
that the prosthetic impulse corresponds exactly to the 
tendency to fill the subject's lack with surplus 
jouissance without the mediation of the Other as we 
have described it above and as it is illustrated in 
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Lacan's formulation of the discourse of contemporary 
life. In this sense, we may say that the prosthetic 
impulse emerges in Lacanian discourse neither as an 
evolutionary/constitutive impulse in relation to the 
human, nor as a dystopian/utopian promise. It seems, 
in fact, correct to suggest that in Lacanian terms the 
prosthetic impulse is neither constitutive nor 
evolutionary to the extent that it reflects a socio- 
historical investment of a mode of jouissance that 
both precedes (as we will see shortly) and bypasses 
the signifying relation to the Other that defines the 
human, and neither utopian nor dystopian, to the 
extent that it manifests the structure of a particular 
modern solution to the problem of jouissance but also 
the structure of addiction as a contemporary pathology 
or discontent of civilization. 
This link between addiction and the prosthetic impulse 
of contemporary utilitarian ethics has been underlined 
by contemporary analysts who have presented addiction 
not only as a timeless clinical category but also as a 
pathology related to modern culture's promotion of the 
prosthetic enhancement of the human. The best example 
of this kind of two-fold approach, respectful of both 
the clinical and of the socio-historical dimensions of 
addiction, is perhaps the work of Fernando Geberovich, 
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one of the most well-known analysts to have 
specialised and worked in the field of addiction in 
France. Geberovich starts from the standard Lacanian 
definition of addiction as an attempt to find a 
jouissance outside the limits and the conditions 
imposed for it by the Other and outside the 
"substitutive satisfaction" that can be achieved 
through the metaphorical displacements of 
signification (castration, repression, symptoms, 
sexuality, etc. ) (261-62). He also develops, however, 
the Lacanian definition in an original way, 
emphasising that, just like signification, addiction 
functions not only as a modality of access to 
jouissance but also, and primarily, as a defence 
against jouissance and as a particular way of dealing 
with psychic pain (254). 
In this way, Geberovich argues, the structure of 
addiction can be traced back to the originary and 
symbiotic relation between mother and child 
- 
when the 
pain of excessive internal or external stimuli is 
regulated by the acts (endlessly repeated by the 
addict) of searching and holding on to a "prosthetic" 
substance that has not, strictly speaking, yet become 
a person or an object separated from the child - and 
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extended up to, but not beyond, the logical moment of 
separation that, by creating a lack and a loss, 
prepares the ground for the metaphorical 
interpretation of this lack and the beginning of 
signification (244,249-250). According to Geberovich, 
therefore, as a mode of jouissance, addiction and, 
generally, the use of prosthetic objects, represents a 
regression in relation to signification/symbolization, 
which marks a phase that is logically, if not 
necessarily chronologically, secondary. The jouissance 
of the addict is thus not the satisfaction that comes 
from the relation to an object (or, more generally, 
from speech and from symptomatic formations) but the 
relief of pain, the regulation of jouissance as bodily 
intensity, or the nostalgia (depression, melancholia) 
for the maternal body as an object that has never 
existed as such (Geberovich 240). 
For the same reason, addiction is also to be related 
not simply, as we have noted above, to a "complaint" 
against the Other but also to the return or 
manifestation of a pain or jouissance that cannot be 
metaphorised and displaced through signification, 
either because the pain is too intense (as when 
addiction is triggered by a trauma) or because the 
symbolic function does not work well (Geberovich 250). 
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By differentiating in this way between a prosthetic 
(maternal) and a symbolic (paternal or "phallic") mode 
of jouissance, Geberovich can lay the ground for a 
definition of addiction as a pathology marked by what 
he refers to as "autolysis" (self-dissolution): rather 
than symbolizing the lack associated with bodily pain 
or jouissance the subject fills it with a prosthesis 
that eventually opens a hole in the place of the 
object and in the place of the ego (254). 
The emptying out of the object and of the ego, in 
turn, triggers a whole series of problems that are 
commonly associated with addiction: depression 
(mourning for an object that does not exist), 
destruction of the erogenous body and crisis of 
desire, inability to process knowledge and produce 
meaning through signification, inability to love and 
relate to others, manipulation of others (co- 
dependence), inability to invest in the future, 
dissociation from one's identity, violent oscillations 
between sense of omnipotence and depression and 
between total freedom (from the Other and towards the 
other) and total dependence (on the prosthesis) 
(Geberovich 258-269). 
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Of course, Geberovich is not the only analyst to have 
presented addiction as a return to the maternal 
register of psychic experience. We can find, for 
example, a similar, and perhaps more familiar to 
English-speaking readers, account of addiction in 
Kristeva's Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia and 
New Maladies of the Soul. Geberovich's analysis is, 
however, more relevant to the type of argument we are 
trying to articulate here for the emphasis he puts on 
the prosthetic character of addiction and for the way 
in which it presents the "prosthetic impulse" as an 
effect a specific socio-historical change in the 
contemporary organisation of the symbolic function 
(Like Smith and Morra, Geberovic also uses the term 
"impulse" to suggest a difference between the 
"pulsating" temporality of the relation to the 
prosthesis 
- 
searching, holding on to, letting go 
- 
and the more linear symbolic temporality of the drive 
or pulsion that relates the subject to the lost object 
(264)). 
Following Lacan, Geberovich argues that the crisis or 
impasse of the symbolic/paternal function (e. g. 
signification) as one of the main determinants of 
addiction is not merely a clinical occurrence but 
reflects a more general cultural delegitimation of 
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signifying structures in favour of other forms of 
biological and social organisation. In particular, 
Geberovich links addiction and the prosthetic impulse 
to a shift from signification to information, from a 
system of social and psychic regulation marked by the 
"metaphorical delegation of power" to a system marked 
by the "total mastery over life, " where metaphor, "far 
from pointing to a necessary structural lack, " becomes 
instead "a mechanical fault in the transmission of 
messages, a technological void that scientists, 
politicians and advertisers strive to fill by 
inventing the adequate prosthesis" (270). 
In this context, the whole landscape of 
psychopathology is necessarily altered, so that the 
subject moves from repressed normality and neurotic 
pathologies to prosthetic normality and addictive 
pathologies: 
In a culture that substitutes lack with void, 
and satisfaction with fullness [comblage), the 
structure of normality is that of the 
prosthesis and the structure of pathology is 
that of addiction. The passage from the 
formation of symptoms to that of addictions 
throws light on a symbolic mutation that is, 
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eventually, that of the passage from the 
metaphor to cybernetics. (271) 
We may see Geberovich's idea of a passage from 
metaphor to cybernetics as just an updated way of 
formulating the shift already written by Lacan in the 
formula of the discourse of contemporary life: the 
shift from a social discourse where power rests on a 
relation of impossibility (signification) and 
impotence (the drive) to another utilitarian 
configuration of the social link where the object 
starts to become useful and allows the system to run 
smoothly so that relations of impossibility and 
impotence are avoided. 
The prosthetic impulse is thus the core libidinal 
relation of utilitarian ethics and addiction is not 
opposed to it, but emerges as its a-symptomatic (non- 
signifying) and autolytic pathology, as the side 
effect of the prosthetic use of the object. As Nestor 
Braunstein has put it, addiction is an "a-(d)diction, " 
a way of relating to the jouissance of an object which 
is not produced by signification and speech 
("diction") as immediately lost and impossible to 
name, but which can be "found on the market" as a 
product (240). For this very reason, the prosthetic 
impulse, at least if we see it from the standpoint of 
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the use rather than from that of the production of the 
prosthesis, is neither constitutive nor evolutionary 
with respect to the human, neither human nor 
posthuman, since in contemporary life the prosthesis 
avoids the signifying relation that defines the human 
and models itself on a libidinal disposition that 
logically precedes the articulation of signification 
and the constitution of subjectivity. 
In conclusion to this section, I would like then to 
propose the following reading of addiction as a limit 
of contemporary utilitarian ethics. On the one hand, 
addiction implies an ethical position (a position of 
jouissance) that exceeds the limit of contemporary 
ethics by pushing jouissance beyond the limits of the 
common good and of the useful and by acting out 
(rather than giving voice to) a complaint or a protest 
against the conditions of jouissance imposed by the 
Other. If the contemporary Other imposes or commands 
jouissance, we have also seen that this imperative is 
subordinated to the imperative that, at least 
socially, the signifying system of production be kept 
working in order to make surplus jouissance available 
to the subject. In this sense, the discourse of 
contemporary life does not function solely as an 
information system that strives to fill in lack as a 
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"mechanical fault" of transmission but also as a 
signifying system that needs to impose rules, 
regulations, and a certain sacrifice of jouissance in 
order to be able to produce the prosthetic filler. 
The ethics of addiction implies a complaint and an 
attempt to bypass these conditions imposed on 
jouissance by the Other of contemporary life, while 
the self-destructive and autolytic tendency of 
addiction expresses well its orientation beyond the 
limits of utilitarianism, beyond the limits of the 
pleasure principle that underpin utilitarian ethics. 
The problem with the ethics of addiction, however, is 
that its transgression and its protest, differently 
from the Sadean transgression, fail to produce a 
subjectivity and thus negates, rather than guarantee, 
all autonomy and freedom for the subject. The 
jouissance of addiction, in fact, is not articulated 
to a subject within the signifying structure of 
fantasy: at most, the addict can articulate pain to 
the lack of the prosthetic filler but, once produced, 
this lack is always more likely to be filled in by a 
new administration or by a different prosthesis rather 
than being metaphorised and repressed. The ethics of 
addiction thus oscillates between a complaint against 
the utilitarian order of the Other, an attempt to 
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secure a jouissance without conditions and beyond the 
thresholds of the good, the useful, and the 
pleasurable, and the failed attempt to create a 
certain margin of freedom and autonomy that never goes 
beyond the production of an unsymbolised lack. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to approach the 
liminal character of the ethics of addiction from the 
opposite perspective, and emphasise the way in which 
the ethics of addiction is included within the limits 
of the ethics of contemporary life. We have shown how 
the ethical position of addiction is consistent with 
the prosthetic impulse of utilitarian ethics, and can 
even serve to illustrate the shift of contemporary 
social discourse towards information and the 
imperative to treat lack as a fault in the efficient 
transmission of information rather as a structuring 
principle within a signifying system. From this 
perspective, addiction does not emerge as an ethical 
transgressive protest or complaint against the Other 
but simply as a pathology and as a discontent (a 
malfunctioning) of the prosthetic ethics of 
contemporary utilitarianism. 
Addiction can thus be associated to the delegitimation 
of the symbolic function that marks contemporary life 
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and, generally, also to the mechanism of inhibition 
that we have identified in the last chapter as the 
distinctive trait of the discontent of contemporary 
civilization. Seen as the pathological underside of 
prosthetic utilitarianism, addiction rejoins the 
discontents of contemporary life: the inhibition of 
the symbolic function caused by the excess of surplus 
jouissance made available to the subject in the social 
discourse of contemporary life becomes an addiction to 
the prosthesis as the sole regulator of jouissance for 
a subject that becomes more and more cut off from the 
Other, from desire, from love, from knowledge and from 
the possibility of his freedom, autonomy, and 
singularity. 
5. Treatments of Addiction in Contemporary Life 
I would like to finish this chapter with some remarks 
on the treatment of addiction, which is, I will 
suggest, a privileged field not only to verify the 
limits and internal contradictions of contemporary 
utilitarianism, but also to define the coordinates of 
an alternative ethical stance, one that would pass 
neither through a(n addictive) right to jouissance nor 
through a (religious) duty of abstinence. Once again, 
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I will try to ground these remarks on some indications 
offered by Eric Laurent in his already quoted 
introductory address to the 2008 WAP congress. 
Laurent claims that while addiction isolates the user 
from the social bond and from the Other, there are 
four possible types of treatment of addiction which 
represent four possible ways of re-socialising and re- 
inscribing the subject/user in the Other. These four 
treatments correspond, in turn, to the four functions 
of social discourse defined by Lacan: knowledge, the 
signifier, the object and the subject. Laurent thus 
distinguishes between: 1) A "treatment by knowledge, " 
which consists in confronting the subject with 
knowledge about the drug as well as in extracting such 
knowledge from the subject, who will then learn to 
negotiate his "disorder" in relation to this 
knowledge; 2) A "treatment by the signifier, " which 
consists in asking the subject to identify as an 
"addict" and to become the member of a community of 
"addicts" who commit to support each other and to 
follow a common set of rules; 3) A "treatment by the 
object, " which consists in substituting the drug or 
addictive behaviour with a legal object, i. e., a 
medication or legal drug, as in the case of methadone 
prescription; 4) A "treatment by the subject, " which 
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consists in leading the subject to find a way to 
signify his jouissance and to "leave place for his 
subjective division and for the jouissance of speech" 
("Stakes"). In all these different cases, the addicted 
subject can re-inscribe himself within the social 
link, as a subject of knowledge, as a subject of the 
signifier, as a subject of an object (that is, as a 
consumer), or as an autonomous subject who assumes 
responsibility for the law that determines his desire 
and that led to the loss of his jouissance. 
My first remark will be that the first type of 
treatment of addiction, the treatment by knowledge, 
clearly answers to and applies the utilitarian ethics 
of contemporary life. This means that this type of 
treatment of addiction works according to a 
utilitarian logic, but also, and more subtly, that the 
treatment itself is instrumental to the utilitarian 
concerns of the contemporary Other, that it represents 
an intervention of the Other on the internal threat 
that addiction poses to its utilitarian order. Laurent 
explains that this type of treatment works on the most 
basic level as a simple imposition of knowledge about 
the negative consequences of an addictive behaviour 
(e. g. "Smoking gives you cancer, " etc. ). We may add, 
however, that, on a more specialised level, the 
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treatment by knowledge is also characteristic of 
different forms of therapeutic "conditioning, " such as 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), rational 
emotional behavioural therapy (REBT) and neuro- 
linguistic programming (NLP), which in the UK are 
currently being administered on a mass scale through 
the NHS and all the major health charities, not only 
for addiction but for many other types of "ordinary" 
mental suffering (including depression, anxiety, 
eating disorders, etc. ). 
These treatments generally attribute addiction to a 
cognitive disorder that can be traced down to specific 
"dysfunctional" and "maladaptive" thoughts and beliefs 
and then corrected by isolating and reinforcing 
"useful" and "adaptive" cognitions by means of 
different types of repetition and conditioning 
techniques (Beck 118-21). To the extent that it is 
actually administered by the Other, the treatment by 
knowledge can then be seen not only as an application 
of utilitarian ethics but also as a form of social 
control, a resource used by the utilitarian Other to 
correct any dysfunctional disorder in its perfectly 
functioning system. Significantly, a review of the 
official literature issued by the Government and by 
its collaborating research institutions (including the 
341 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and 
the London School of Economics) shows that the public 
expenditure that goes towards the free supply of this 
type of treatments through the NHS is routinely 
justified precisely in utilitarian terms, by saying 
that these interventions, for being cost-effective in 
terms of measurable behavioural change, are also 
effective in enabling patients to return to work, to 
stop claiming benefits, and to stop burdening the NHS 
and the criminal system by becoming ill and by getting 
involved in illegal activities as a consequence of 
their drug use (Evans 143-45). 
We may also suggest, therefore, that the treatment by 
knowledge is not merely a treatment of addiction but 
the dominant form of socialisation and social 
inscription in contemporary life: in a way, addicts 
are treated simply by being asked to do what everyone 
else is asked to do: becoming a member of society not 
by identifying with a collective ideal but by using 
knowledge (cognitions, thoughts, beliefs) in a way 
that allows adaptation to the utilitarian order of the 
contemporary Other. More precisely, Jacques-Alain 
Miller has pointed out that this type of inscription 
in the social implies that the subject is asked to 
identify with the quantitative knowledge of statistics 
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and to become a "man without qualities, " "a 
quantitative man" (someone who can fit in a form and 
who can reduce himself to a ticked box), since the 
conversion of surplus jouissance into countable 
surplus value that marks, as we have seen, the 
utilitarian discursive logic of contemporary life, is 
also, rather clearly, an attempt to master and 
quantify the singularity of the jouissance of the 
subject by using knowledge ("Era" 34-35). 
If we consider now the second and the third type of 
treatment of addiction defined by Laurent 
- 
the 
treatment by the signifier and the treatment by the 
object 
-I think it is possible to say that these two 
treatments respond not to a utilitarian ethics but, 
rather, to the ethics of religion and to the ethics of 
addiction in their tendency to function as limits of 
utilitarianism, and particularly, in this case, in 
their tendency to put their rejection of utilitarian 
hedonism at the service of the utilitarian order 
itself. The treatment by the signifier, as we have 
seen, asks the subject to identify as an addict in 
order to constitute a community of identified addicts 
who support each other towards abstinence - as in 
Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) or Narcotic Anonymous (NA) 
meeting societies, or as in group therapy sessions 
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delivered in rehab centres. In these groups or 
communities, the "signifier" that treats the subject 
is not the word "addict" or "recovering addict" (which 
functions more as a collective ego identity shared by 
the members of the group, as in Freud's Group 
Psychology) but the signifier of a powerful Other 
evoked by a formalised and fixed set of rules 
- 
commonly referred to as the "12 steps" 
- 
which 
prescribe the different modes of relation to this 
Other (accepting help, following rules, delegating 
power, confessing wrongdoings, etc. ). Standard guides 
to 12 steps treatment explain that different types of 
clinical setting generally push for different 
interpretations of this signifier, so that the 
powerful Other (a "Power greater than ourselves") that 
the 12 steps refer to can be presented as the 
Christian God, as the recovery programme itself, or as 
anything that the recovering addict may want to put in 
its place (Williams 140-41). 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, however, this 
signifier can only be seen as a name of the father -a 
semblant that signifies a lack in the (maternal) Other 
and allows for a sacrifice of jouissance in the name 
of the powerful (paternal) Other that this signifier 
constitutes. The treatment of addiction by the 
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signifier is thus always an application of religious 
ethics, regardless of how this signifier might be 
interpreted, since it implies a rejection of 
jouissance (of the surplus jouissance of the drug) for 
a higher ideal that can create a community and thus 
re-inscribe the subject in the social link. 
From the completely opposite position, the treatment 
of addiction by the object does not reject the 
jouissance of the drug, but rather uses it as a way to 
achieve the same effect of re-inscription in the 
Other. This form of treatment includes not only the 
administration of substitutive legal drugs, like 
methadone for heroine addicts or librium for alcohol 
dependent subjects, but also the new generation of 
experimental drugs that operate on neuron receptors to 
reduce or eliminate "cravings, " and, of course, the 
different types of anti-depressants and tranquillisers 
routinely prescribed by GPs to alleviate withdrawal 
and sustain the "recovering" addict. As we have seen 
above, addiction can be seen as a regression to a 
prosthetic relation to the maternal Other, which means 
that addiction can also constitute the Other, not the 
symbolic Other that demands a sacrifice of jouissance, 
but the pre-symbolic Other that fulfils all the 
demands of the subject. In this way, if the social 
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link can act as this second, maternal and pre-symbolic 
Other by giving access to legal drugs and medications 
to replace and control addiction, the addicted subject 
can also be included in the social link as a legal 
user/consumer of jouissance. Paradoxically, therefore, 
the ethics of addiction can be applied, if not to the 
treatment of addiction as such, at least to the 
treatment of some of its effects, including the social 
isolation of the addict. 
In the course of this chapter we have considered how 
the ethics of religion and the ethics of addiction 
can, in their particular way of approaching 
jouissance, disturb the utilitarian ethics of 
contemporary life. In their application to the 
treatment of addiction, however, these two ethical 
orientations demonstrate how they can also work to 
enable the efficiency of utilitarian discourse by 
sustaining the addicted subject in its re-inclusion in 
the Other. For this reason, it should not be 
surprising that both the treatment by the signifier 
(12 steps) and the treatment by the object 
(pharmacological) have a central place next to the 
treatment by knowledge (cognitive behavioural 
therapies) in the official clinical guidelines issued 
by the UK Government, as shown, for example, in the 
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Models of Care report by the National Treatment Agency 
for Substance Misuse (62-90). In particular, it is 
apparent that while the treatment by the object can 
guarantee to the utilitarian Other a direct control 
over its human resources (to the point that the 
pathological and "maladaptive" affects of addiction 
may be resolved by chemical administration but the 
subject's addiction to the substance and to the 
enabling Other maintained for the sake of social 
control, order and economic efficiency), the treatment 
by the signifier can also reinforce the subject's 
vulnerability and dependence on the Other by insisting 
on a particular type of identification ("to be an 
addict"), which makes the identified addict 
conveniently responsive to the Other's prohibitions as 
well as the Other's ability to answer his demands. 
The question of the treatment of addiction thus shows 
the internal contradictions of contemporary 
utilitarianism, the fact that it can include and turn 
to its own advantage two ethical positions which are 
also external, and at times even opposed to its 
concern with the maintenance of a productive and 
functional hedonism. Moreover, if the ethics of 
religion and the ethics of addiction represent, as we 
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have seen, an attempt to deal with the discontents of 
contemporary utilitarianism, and particularly with the 
anxiety generated by the production of surplus 
jouissance, and, on the other hand, with the 
imperative of efficient productivity, we may say that 
the way in which these ethical orientations are 
applied to the treatment of addiction also demonstrate 
the ultimate failure of these attempts. 
Utilitarianism deals with the discontent generated by 
its own production of surplus jouissance by promoting 
an adaptation to scientific knowledge; the ethics of 
religion seek to treat this discontent by using the 
signifier but ends up constituting a symbolic Other 
that might sustain, if not the use of surplus 
jouissance, at least the process of production of 
surplus jouissance; the ethics of addiction, on the 
other hand, seems to avoid utilitarian concerns and go 
for an unrestrained right to jouissance, but 
eventually can also sustain a "treatment by the 
object" that turns against its own excess and re- 
inscribes the subject in the utilitarian social link 
by constituting an Other that responds to the 
subject's demand. 
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To conclude, we are left with the last type of 
treatment of addiction proposed by Laurent, the 
treatment by the subject. Even structurally, at the 
level of discourse, this treatment suggests the 
possibility of an ethical alternative to the 
utilitarian ethics of contemporary life, as well as 
the possibility of a way to deal with the discontent 
of contemporary life which will not result in a 
reinforcement of the utilitarian order of the Other. 
This type of treatment applies the ethics of 
psychoanalysis and might be compared to the treatment 
by the subject to the extent that it also proceeds by 
introducing a semblant that signifies a lack in the 
Other and thus allows to break the endless circuit of 
supply and demand. On the other hand, however, the 
treatment by the subject is also radically and 
ethically different from the treatment by the 
signifier, since in this case the semblant is provided 
by the subject and thus serves not to constitute and 
give consistency to the Other, but to affirm the 
autonomy of the subject, who is re-inscribed in the 
social link but not dependent on the Other and on 
surplus jouissance. This type of solution clearly 
illustrates the classic coordinates of psychoanalytic 
ethics as we have reconstructed them in the first part 
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of this thesis. More specifically, however, it also 
illustrates the place of psychoanalytic ethics in 
relation to the contemporary Other and opens the 
question of the development of psychoanalytic ethics 
in relation to contemporary discourse, which we will 
explore in the next chapter. 
Chapter VI 
The Ethics of the Sinthome 
and Contemporary Life 
1. Psychoanalytic Ethics and Contemporary Life 
The ethics of psychoanalysis can be defined in many 
ways: as an ethics of the real, an ethics of desire, 
of love, of the subject and of discourse. As we have 
seen in the first part of this project, the ethics of 
psychoanalysis is fundamentally an ethics of the real 
because it orients the subject towards the real of 
his/her jouissance. It is also, however, essentially 
an ethics of desire because this jouissance must be 
assumed by the subject as lost or lacking, an ethics 
of love because it is through the unconditional 
commitment of love that desire can be sublimated from 
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its attachment to imaginary forms, and, finally, an 
ethics of the subject because it is only through the 
paths of desire and love that the subject can assume 
his constitutive division and find the dignity of his 
autonomy and freedom. This is why psychoanalytic 
ethics is also an ethics of discourse, or, to put it 
differently, an ethics that necessitates a particular 
form of social exchange: love, the psychoanalytic 
transference between analyst and analysand, and the 
artistic sublimation that relates subject and object 
to each other in the aesthetic space. 
Lacan's discussion of Kant, Sade and Antigone in 
Seminar VII has allowed us to develop a critical 
illustration of all these aspects, while at the same 
time drawing our attention to yet another trait of 
psychoanalytic ethics: the criminal. Lacan's 
presentation of Sade and Antigone as paradigmatic 
ethical figures defines psychoanalytic ethics not 
simply as an ethics of desire, love, or discourse, but 
also as a criminal ethics, because desire, love, and 
the type of social exchange that ground psychoanalytic 
ethics all imply an act of separation from the common 
good, a separation that often takes the form of a 
criminal destruction or sacrifice of common social 
values, reasons or interests. It is at this point that 
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Lacan's definition of psychoanalytic ethics reveals 
itself most explicitly as a response or as a reading 
of Freud's critique of civilization. The category of 
the criminal, in fact, allows Lacan to identify the 
position of psychoanalytic ethics in relation to the 
social norms that define and structure civilized life. 
Psychoanalytic ethics is criminal not so much because 
it is against, but because it is not concerned with 
the norms of civilization and it can thus offer to the 
subject another ethical measure for his actions 
whenever these norms fail and he is confronted not 
with the benefits of civilization but with its 
discontents. 
The real, desire, love, the subject, discourse and the 
criminal (understood as an indifference towards the 
ethics of the other or ethics of the common good) are 
the constant defining concepts of psychoanalytic 
ethics. They form a set of stable ethical principles 
which orient the whole of Lacan's teaching and ground 
all Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and practice. In my 
discussion of the malaises of contemporary life 
(Chapter IV) and of the limits of contemporary ethics 
(Chapter V) I have assumed that the validity of these 
fundamental ethical principles is not affected by the 
discursive permutations of contemporary life. This is, 
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indeed, another case of that consistency that 
characterises the Lacanian approach to ethics and 
civilization from Seminar VII, L'ethique de la 
psychanalyse, onwards, and that I have more than once 
underlined in my discussion. Even if its fundamental 
principles remain unchanged, however, psychoanalytic 
ethics as a whole was also subjected to constant 
revisions and re-elaborations by Lacan. These changes 
were motivated both by theoretical developments and by 
the need to adapt the practice of psychoanalytic 
ethics to the discursive changes of contemporary life. 
It is possible today to find two main critical 
accounts of the transformation of psychoanalytic 
ethics from L'ethique de la psychanalyse to the later 
phase of Lacan's teaching. The first account 
emphasises the shift from an ethics of "pure" desire 
to an ethics centred on the drive as the final goal of 
analysis. This account is associated especially with 
the work of the Slovenian Lacanian theorists gathered 
around Slavoj Zizek and tends to privilege the idea of 
an "internal" theoretical development in Lacanian 
ethics rather than the idea of an adaptation of 
psychoanalytic ethics to social change. The second 
account emphasises the shift from a transcendental to 
a pragmatic model of ethical action based on the late 
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Lacan's concepts of savoir-faire (know-how) and mi- 
dire (half-saying). This account is associated 
particularly with Jacques-Alain Miller and the 
analysts of the Lacanian School and tends, on the 
other hand, to see the theoretical developments of 
Lacan's later teaching from the point of view of the 
definition of a new ethical praxis attentive to the 
historical transformations of the social link. In this 
chapter I will try to unravel the logic and the 
significance of these two different explanations of 
the development of Lacanian psychoanalytic ethics. 
Moving from a critique of the position defined by the 
Slovenian theorists, but without contesting the 
validity of their account of a transition towards the 
centrality of the drive in Lacanian ethics, I will 
argue in favour of Miller's understanding of a new 
"contemporary" psychoanalytic ethics as a practice 
still grounded on the classic principles of Lacanian 
ethics but also attentive to the problems and demands 
of contemporary subjects. 
2. From Desire to the Drive? 
The idea that Lacan moves from a structuralist phase 
centred on the symbolic to a post-structuralist phase 
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centred on the real has become today almost a 
commonplace in Lacanian studies. This is no doubt due 
to the popularity of the work of the Slovenian group 
of Lacanian theorists 
- 
Slavoj Zizek, Alenka Zupancic, 
Renata Salecl, Madlen Dolar 
- 
who have imposed an 
acknowledgement of the distance between these two 
moments of Lacan's teaching by explicitly presenting 
themselves as followers of the later, rather than of 
the early, Lacan. For these theorists, the trajectory 
of Lacan's teaching can be described in terms of a 
transition from an ethics of desire, that is, from an 
understanding of the analytic cure that sees the 
"purification" or sublimation of desire from the good 
as the goal of analysis, to an ethics of the drive, 
which identifies the goal of analysis with a 
"liberation" of the jouissance of the drive from the 
symbolic structure that sustains and "rules" over the 
subject. 
Lacan's 1964 seminar, Seminar XI, Les quatres concepts 
fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, is the text that best 
illustrates this shift and also one of the most quoted 
and discussed by the Slovenian group in general. In 
particular, it is Lacan's double claim that 1) "the 
desire of the analyst [e. g. desire purified from 
fantasy at the end of analysis] is not a pure desire" 
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(SXI 307), and that 2) "the subject who has traversed 
the fundamental fantasy" is called to find a new way 
to "live out the drive (vivre la pulsion)" (SXI 304) 
that offers to the Slovenian-Lacanians the privileged 
reference for their understanding of what constitutes 
the position of the later Lacan. In Ethics of the 
Real, for example, Alenka Zupancic explains the logic 
of the transition from desire to drive in Lacanian 
ethics precisely as the consequence of the realization 
that desire cannot be purified completely from a 
persisting and ubiquitous remainder of jouissance (or 
surplus jouissance) (241). If the early, structuralist 
Lacan conceived jouissance as something forever lost 
and lacking, and could thus justify an ethics based on 
the fidelity to and acceptance of this lack of 
jouissance through pure desire, the later Lacan, as 
Zupancic puts it, "tries to find a conceptualization 
of the status of enjoyment which would simultaneously 
embrace these two features: that jouissance does not 
exist, and that it is found everywhere" (Ethics 242) 
. 
The ethical goal of analysis, consequently, cannot be 
conceived anymore as a mere purification of desire and 
is redefined as the enjoyment of the drive, as the 
enjoyment of that "nothingness" that emerges as a 
remainder after the purification of desire that 
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projects the subject outside the frame of his fantasy 
(Zupancic, Ethics 244). 
Despite its popularity, the Slovenian-Lacanian account 
of this shift in Lacan's teaching has also met with 
some criticism. In her recent book Amorous Acts: 
Lacanian Ethics in Modernism, Film and Queer Theory, 
for example, Frances Restuccia engages in a useful, 
although wisely cautious, polemic with what she refers 
to as the "New Lacanians, " and particularly with 
Slavoj Zizek, on the ground of their supposed 
"misreading" of Lacanian ethics (XI; XIII). Restuccia 
considers the opposition between ethics of desire and 
ethics of jouissance and blames, at different points 
of her argument, not only Zizek and his followers, but 
the most prominent Lacanian analyst working in the 
U. S., Bruce Fink, for suggesting that the teaching of 
the later Lacan may be approached in terms of a shift 
from the first to the second type of ethics. 
Although she more than acknowledges that Lacan "moves 
beyond metonymic desire" and that in his teaching of 
the 1960s and 1970s "the drive's pursuit of objet a as 
well as the desiring subject's relation to the Real 
become central" (41), Restuccia also insists that: 
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a subject entirely in the Real is an oxymoron. 
A subject might confront momentarily his or 
her annihilation, meet the gaze, but this 
would be a moment of desubjectivation 
-a 
provisional state of disarray like the 
analytical state Lacan talks about as 
necessary for subsequent emergence of desire 
predicated on knowledge of death 
- rather than 
a desirable permanent condition. [... ) Though it 
must be granted that Lacan through traversal 
of one's most basic fantasy allows the subject 
to live out the drive, this proposition does 
not translate into a drive of one's own, 
glorification of jouissance, or the 
jettisoning of desire. (41-42) 
Restuccia's polemic is, as I said, justly cautious as 
both Fink and dizek are clearly aware of such a 
distinction and the fault she finds in their positions 
is mainly one of emphasis, motivated, I would add, by 
the distinctive focus of their arguments: Zizek's 
"glorification of jouissance" is motivated by his 
radical-political concern with the transformative 
potential of negativity; Fink's insistence on the 
"ability to live out the drive" comes from a clinical- 
therapeutic concern with the loosening of the grip of 
the ego-ideal at the end of analysis. 
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In their best moments, moreover, the "'New Lacanians" 
are also clearly aware that the emphasis put by Lacan 
on the drive does not imply an overcoming of his 
classic formulation of an ethics of desire. Zupancic 
is, for instance, very explicit on this point when she 
states that in Lacan the concept of the drive 
"supplements" but never "replaces" that of desire as 
the central concept of the analytic process because 
"in order to arrive at the drive one must pass through 
desire and insist on it until the very end, " that is, 
until the moment when desire carries us beyond the 
symbolic frame of fantasy (Ethics 239). Bruce Fink 
makes an even stronger case against a misunderstanding 
of what "living out the drive" may imply when he 
insists that the subject who arrives at the end of 
analysis is never "brought to the point of altogether 
jettisoning the symbolic constraints on the drives" 
(Clinical 211), so that the divided and desiring 
status of the subject is never completely given up in 
favour of a complete "objectivation" in the drive. 
In spite of these corrections and clarifications, 
Restuccia's point remains, however, an important and 
useful one to make insofar as it is indeed a fact that 
the work of a theorist like Zizek does often and at 
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many points suggest that the last word of Lacanian 
ethics is a total identification with the drive as an 
"organ without body" which would take on a life of its 
own and act independently as a transformative 
revolutionary agency (Organs 176). This position must 
be distinguished from Lacan's own understanding of 
what "living out one's drive" means, since for Lacan 
the drive as such never replaces the divided subject 
as an ethical agent, even when the subject becomes a 
subject in the real and a subject of the drive. 
Even if we accept their account of Lacan's transition 
from one to another ethical paradigm, however, we must 
also consider two limitations inherent to the 
particular way in which the Slovenian theorists 
present this shift. In the first place, it is 
essential to recognise that the integration of the 
notion of the drive within Lacan's understanding of 
psychoanalytic ethics is a development that takes 
place over a rather short period of time and at a 
relatively early phase of Lacan's teaching. As we have 
seen, the subjective ability to "live out the drive" 
beyond fantasy becomes the ethical goal of analysis 
already in Seminar XI, Les quatre concepts 
fondamentaux de la psychanalyse. 
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This seminar was given by Lacan in 1964, that is, only 
four years after Seminar VII, L'ethique de la 
psychanalyse, where Lacan's original definition of 
psychoanalytic ethics as a "purification" of desire is 
first introduced. This means that what is presented by 
the Slovenian theorists as the "late Lacan" is in fact 
the Lacan of the mid `60s 
- 
and it is, indeed, rather 
rare to find in these theorists extensive references 
to the Lacan of the `70s (the only exception being 
Seminar XX, which is, however, generally recalled only 
for its definition of sexuation). We might therefore 
say that a first major problem with critical accounts 
that chart the development of a Lacanian ethics from 
desire to the drive is that they do not consider what 
happens to Lacan's understanding of psychoanalytic 
ethics in the 1970s. Their account of Lacan's 
"supplementation" of desire with the drive is, 
therefore, certainly correct, but also limited and 
eventually misleading, since it overemphasises the few 
years between 1960 and 1964 and glosses over the other 
major developments in Lacan's ethical position that 
took place throughout the 1970s. 
The second problem with the model proposed by the 
Slovenian theorists is that Lacan's redefinition of 
the terms of psychoanalytic ethics is approached as a 
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mere theoretical development, motivated, that is, only 
by the internal logic of Lacan's thought. This 
approach, which can be seen as a reflection of their 
own discursive position as academic theorists, allows 
only a limited grasp of the development of 
psychoanalytic ethics insofar as it fails to 
acknowledge the specificity of Lacan's discursive 
position as an analyst and the discursive-historical 
logic behind the shifts in his theory of ethics. As we 
have already seen, the driving force of analytic 
discourse is not a passion for pure critical or 
theoretical enquiry but an engagement with the 
unfathomable real of the symptoms that the theorist 
encounters in his analytic practice (as an analysand 
or as an analyst). This means that theoretical 
elaboration never develops and proceeds on its own; 
rather, it follows and responds to the incidence of 
symptoms, or "discontents, " which are always produced 
at the level of the structure of civilization and of 
its historical permutations. As Jacques-Alain Miller 
has put it: 
Theory, when we try to produce it 
- 
theory in 
the present 
- 
is nothing more, at least for 
psychoanalysis, than a sinuous trail, a trail 
we blaze to try to catch up with what has 
already taken place and which is going forward 
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on its own. Theory and practice in 
psychoanalysis are not symmetrical or 
parallel. There is in psychoanalysis, it 
cannot be ignored, a lagging of the theory 
that is not contingent, not accidental, but 
probably structural, at least as far as its 
elaboration is concerned. ("Milanese 1" 5) 
In Lacan, therefore, theoretical elaboration follows 
the experience of the ethical practice in which 
analyst and analysand engage with the real of the 
symptom. This ethical practice is never the same and 
needs to be adapted and changed, not only because of 
the singularity of each subject's symptom, but also 
because of the ways in which the mechanism of 
repression changes in the historical shift from 
traditional civilization to contemporary life. 
The development of (Lacan's theoretical elaboration 
of) psychoanalytic ethics can thus be appreciated only 
if it is linked to the incidence of the discourse of 
contemporary life on the symptoms of contemporary 
subjects and cannot be reduced to a simple theoretical 
revision. Typically, the work of the Slovenian 
theorists is motivated not by clinical practice but by 
a critical engagement with other thinkers (mostly 
Hegel or Kant as far as ethics is concerned), and 
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although it also constantly refers to contemporary 
social, cultural or political issues, it also refuses 
to acknowledge the impact of the real of civilization 
(the discontents or symptoms of contemporary life) on 
its own Lacanian theoretical framework. 
The limited and incomplete account of the shift in 
Lacan's conceptualization of ethics that marks the 
work of the Slovenian theorists is a consequence 
precisely of this separation of the theoretical from 
the domain of an ethical praxis in the real, not 
simply in the sense that their approach ignores the 
real cause of Lacan's theoretical shift from desire to 
drive (that is, the discontent of contemporary life), 
but also in the sense that their account excludes that 
part of Lacan's later work where a new theoretical 
elaboration of ethics is more explicitly linked to an 
alteration in the nature of contemporary symptoms. 
3. From a Transcendental Ethics to a Pragmatic Ethics 
In their own, very different, theorization of the 
development of Lacanian ethics, Jacques-Alain Miller 
and the other theorists of the Lacanian School 
emphasise a conceptual shift that is much later - we 
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are talking of the early 1970s 
- 
than that which led, 
in the mid 1960s, to the ethical ideal of "living out 
one's drive, " and which, as we have seen, constitutes 
the core of the Slovenian definition of the "later 
Lacan. " We can find a useful summary of all the main 
tenets of this particular reading of Lacan's later 
understanding of psychoanalytic ethics in a recent 
paper (2007) by Miller, significantly titled 
"Psychoanalysis in Close Touch with the Social. " 
Miller's paper is significant because it underlines 
how this later conceptual shift is not (as in the 
Slovenian theorists' account) motivated merely in 
terms of a theoretical change in Lacan's understanding 
of the status of jouissance, but, rather, in terms of 
a change in the social status of jouissance. 
A very clear and explicit link, therefore, is 
established between the re-elaboration of the ethical 
paradigm of psychoanalysis and the needs of a society 
where the ready availability of jouissance means that 
the ethical practices of "transcendence" necessary to 
realise a "pure desire" or "a drive beyond fantasy" 
are no longer viable, and where analysts are called to 
respond to the malaise caused by the frenetic 
consummation of jouissance of our civilization, rather 
than persist in what Miller refers to as an "obsolete 
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pleading for the right to each one's jouissance" 
("Psychoanalysis"). 
In this way, according to Miller, the redefinition of 
psychoanalytic ethics which marks the last decade of 
Lacan's teaching entails an overcoming not only of 
Freud's position, but also of Lacan's own classic 
formulations of ethics as a matter of "purifying one's 
desire" or "living out one's drive, " and results in a 
shift towards a very peculiar form of "ethical 
pragmatism: " 
The Freudian moment is behind us. The Lacanian 
moment is not less behind us. It was both, in 
a baroque conjugation, existentialist and 
structuralist, that is, scientistic. Lacan 
himself left this moment behind him, and he 
sketched out for us the configuration of the 
contemporary moment, which is pragmatic. Yes, 
we are pragmatic as everyone is today, but 
somehow still apart, 
- 
paradoxical pragmatists 
who do not practice the cult of "it works. " 
The "it works" never works. Our good humour 
probably comes from the fact that we know that 
it misses the mark, but we believe we hit on 
the side of the target in the right way. 
("Psychoanalysis") 
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We can thus sum up the main points of Miller's 
position as follows: 1) the psychoanalytic ethics put 
forward by the later Lacan is a form of pragmatism; 2) 
it is a pragmatism grounded on the notion of failure 
or impossibility; 3) it is distinct from all Lacan's 
earlier formulations of psychoanalytic ethics (either 
as desire or as drive); 4) it was elaborated or 
"sketched" by Lacan in response to a change in the 
status of jouissance which was first social (e. g. 
discursive) and then theoretical; 5) it provides a 
model for an ethics suited to the discursive structure 
and the regime of jouissance of contemporary life. 
The best way to understand what Miller means by 
"paradoxical pragmatism" is to consider the link 
between Lacan's later conceptualization of jouissance 
and his theory of the symptom as sinthome. Lacan's 
earlier transition from desire to drive was motivated, 
as we have seen, by the acknowledgement that desire 
can never be purified from a remainder of jouissance 
or surplus jouissance. According to Miller, this 
earlier transition corresponds to the middle phase of 
Lacan's teaching when he "places the accent on what 
fills the lack rather than on the lack itself" 
("Milanese 1" 14), "what fills the lack" being, of 
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course, the remainder of jouissance referred to by 
Lacan as surplus jouissance or objet a. 
In the later phase of Lacan's work, this emphasis on 
surplus jouissance is carried to its extreme 
consequences so that, as Miller puts it, jouissance 
becomes the "essential term" and "loses its contrary" 
in the signifier which is not conceived as a 
"mortifying" agent of repression anymore but as an 
"operator of jouissance" ("Milanese 1" 14). It is 
precisely the introduction of the idea of a jouissance 
that has no contrary and no opposite that determines 
the setting aside of the system of boundaries and 
oppositions that had marked Lacan's earlier 
structuralist approach and leads to the redefinition 
of psychoanalytic ethics as a form of pragmatism 
because, in Miller's own words, "the end of analysis 
is [now) stripped of the pathos of the beyond, of 
transcendence, of the passage, and the accent is put 
on the changes in the regimes of jouissance that can 
be found in the cure" ("Milanese 1" 15). 
The pragmatism of psychoanalysis is thus a matter of 
making changes in the regimes of jouissance of each 
subject by operating at the level of their symptom, 
given that it is the symptom that, by definition, 
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primarily functions to regulate jouissance by 
processing it through the symbolic system of 
signification. As a consequence, the ethical goal of 
analysis is no longer formulated either as a 
sublimation of desire or as an ability to experience 
the drive beyond the symbolic constraints of fantasy, 
but as a reduction of the symptom to the point where 
"jouissance loses its contrary" and the symptom 
becomes a sin theme, "a new name to indicate the 
symptom that has no contrary or no longer has one" 
(Miller, "Milanese 1" 15). 
It is possible, at this point, to appreciate how the 
new ethical pragmatism of psychoanalysis in no way 
implies a rejection of Lacan's earlier promotion of 
desire or drive as ethical targets for the subject. 
The pragmatic reduction to the sinthome, in fact, 
closes the ethical trajectory of the subject at a 
point of fundamental articulation of the real, the 
imaginary and the symbolic orders, but is still 
conditional on the subject's ability to follow the 
path of desire and overcome the jouissance of fantasy 
in the drive. The novelty of this approach to 
psychoanalytic ethics, and particularly its completely 
new rejection of transcendence and emphasis on 
pragmatic know-how, need, however, to be marked 
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clearly because, as we will see, psychoanalytic ethics 
owes its ability to engage with contemporary life 
precisely to these revisions. 
The logic of Lacan's later formulation of 
psychoanalytic ethics as a type of pragmatism has also 
been illustrated in a much more detailed way by 
Veronique Voruz 
- 
another analyst member of the Ecole 
Freudienne. Voruz has shown how a "definite 
modification in Lacan's ethical position, " which, in 
her own words, "no longer strives to define a 
transcendental aim for psychoanalysis but rather leans 
on the side of pragmatism, " is strictly concurrent 
with a conceptual shift which "takes the emphasis away 
from the signifier and places it on the letter" (113). 
As Voruz points out, Lacan's turning to the letter 
was, in turn, motivated by an increasing awareness of 
how jouissance is embedded within discursive (that is, 
signifying) structures and by the resulting 
undermining of his traditional understanding of the 
psychoanalytic cure as a process grounded on the 
structural coordinates of discourse: "Lacan's project 
of speaking from a given position of enunciation in 
order to have a determined effect on [or through] the 
Real is undermined" because "the only Real attainable 
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by means of discourse is a Real tainted by the 
symbolic" (114) 
. 
Lacan's solution, as Voruz explains, is to decompose 
the signifier into letters as simultaneously symbolic 
and Real units of "intransitive jouissance" and "pure 
drive-objects, " so that the analysis proceeds not by 
isolating a transcendental discursive position, but by 
"using what in Language is material, non-calculable, 
in order to learn how to make do with the Real" in a 
truly pragmatic fashion (114). In concrete, clinical 
terms, this means that jouissance is isolated from 
within the signifier by introducing a "cut" which 
reverses the process of interpretation and stops the 
attribution of meaning rather than encouraging 
meaning-making, so that eventually the subject is 
always returned to the "opacity of his jouissance" and 
the jouissance of the letter is separated from the 
jouissance procured through meaning and fantasy 
(Miller "Interpretation in Reverse" 9). 
The end-product of this process of reduction is what 
Lacan refers to as a sinthome in Seminar XXIII, that 
is, a symptom without fantasy, defined by Voruz as "a 
letter, mark of the Real in language, coupled with the 
signifier that represents the subject, articulated by 
372 
lack" (Voruz 126). As Voruz and another analyst, 
Bogdan Wolf, have insisted elsewhere, the reduction of 
the symptom to sinthome implies a "radical decrease of 
the suffering" produced by the jouissance of the 
fantasy, and reaffirms the classic Lacanian ethical 
goal of separating the subject from the fantasy that 
gives consistency to the Other and commands the 
subject's alienation (xiv). Presented as the endpoint 
of analysis, however, the sinthome also introduces 
something new in Lacan's understanding of the 
direction of the treatment, which now aims not merely 
at a point of transcendence and emancipation (via 
symbolic death, sublimation, negativity, etc. ), but 
also at providing the subject with a structure, not 
the structure of the Other but the structure of the 
sinthome as the unique and original "invention" of the 
subject that anchors him or her in language (Voruz and 
Wolf xiv), the sinthome as the fundamental support of 
the subject's own liberated subjectivity and desire. 
We now have all the elements to understand why the new 
pragmatism of psychoanalytic ethics is also a 
"paradoxical" pragmatism grounded on the notions of 
failure and impossibility. This idea, which is given 
much emphasis by Miller, can be traced back to Lacan's 
own very explicit indication - in 1972 - that the 
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failure of his earlier attempts to sustain the 
position of the analyst through the mere logic of the 
signifier "is not essential, because we know very well 
from analytic experience what a failure [un echec] is: 
it is one of the forms of success" ("Du Discours" 7). 
How can failure be one of the forms of success? In a 
way, the successful reduction of the symptom to 
sinthome needs to be also, and at the same time, the 
acknowledgement of a failure, insofar as the logic of 
the symptom is the logic of signification, and the 
logic of signification is based on the fact that the 
signifier fails to represent the subject directly and 
is thus referred indefinitely to another signifier. 
The success of signification and the success of the 
sinthome thus depend on failure and the ethical 
pragmatism involved in writing, knotting or reducing 
the sinthome can only be a paradoxical pragmatism that 
aims, as Miller's puts it, at ""hitting the side of the 
target in the right way" ("Psychoanalysis"). 
Moreover, from the moment that in the later Lacan the 
signifier is not, as we have seen, simply the 
"opposite" of jouissance but becomes an "operator of 
jouissance, " the failure that marks the inscription of 
the sinthome is further qualified by Lacan as a 
374 
"sexual" failure, as a failure of the sexual 
relationship. This means that, as Lacan famously puts 
it, "there is no sexual rapport" because the subject 
only enjoys his or her own symptom. For the later 
Lacan the symptom 
- 
as symptom or as sinthome 
- 
is 
therefore always a "symptom of non-rapport" (Miller, 
"Fantasy" 14). As Miller has pointed out, the 
principle of the impossibility of the sexual 
relationship 
- 
essential for the later Lacan 
- 
is thus 
also very close to the principle of pragmatism itself, 
because it is precisely the "definitive obliteration 
of the norm" and of any idea of a necessary structure 
capable of guaranteeing a rapport between the sexes 
that opens up the space of "norm-less creativity" 
where the subjective invention of the symptom as a 
mode or regime of jouissance can take place ("Milanese 
1" 15). 
Incidentally, we should also note that the necessary 
connection between the failure or impossibility of 
sexual rapport and the ethical pragmatism of the 
sinthome has a significant further effect on 
psychoanalytic ethics insofar as it pushes Lacan to 
redefine the ethical limit of analysis and to give new 
emphasis on the idea of love. As Veronique Voruz has 
pointed out, in fact, even if the jouissance of the 
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sinthome emancipates the subject from the jouissance 
of fantasy that alienates him in the other, it 
nevertheless also "locks him up in solitary jouissance 
and obliterates the possibility of love, " so that the 
reduction of the sinthome needs to be taken as the 
starting point of the new ethical task of knowing how 
to live with and love the other (132-134). In other 
words, since jouissance cannot be conceived as a 
social-structural limit any longer, the new limit for 
psychoanalytic ethics must be found in another 
jouissance, or, rather, in another's jouissance, in 
the jouissance of somebody else. 
For the later Lacan, therefore, the ethical limit 
becomes the social as such, the dimension of rapport, 
the relationship with an absolute Other, that is, the 
Other sex beyond the isolation of the jouissance of 
the body. We have already seen how in L' ethique de la 
psychanalyse Lacan accords to the love of the 
neighbour a central place in his ethical theory. In 
his later teaching, however, and particularly in 
Seminar XX, Encore, love seems to be less to do with 
recognising one's own jouissance in the other than 
with acknowledging the isolation that this jouissance 
produces. Love is now defined as what can make up for 
the absence of a sexual relation (SXX 59), the affect 
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that can tear away the sexed speaking being from the 
isolation of its solitary jouissance. In Lacan's own 
words: 
There is no sexual relation because the 
jouissance of the Other as a body is always 
inadequate 
- 
perverse on one side [the 
masculine side], insofar as the Other is 
reduced to objet a, and mad and enigmatic on 
the other [the feminine side]. Is it not from 
the acknowledgment of this impasse, of this 
impossibility which defines the real, that 
love can be put to the test? Of one's partner, 
love can only realise what I've called [... ] the 
courage in front of this fatal destiny. But is 
it courage or a trajectory of recognition? 
This recognition is nothing but the way in 
which the so called sexual relationship 
- 
which becomes here a subject to subject 
relationship [... ] 
- 
stops not being written. 
(SXX 183). 
We don't, therefore, simply love the other because we 
recognise in him or her our estranged and lost 
jouissance, or because, to recast Lacan's earlier 
definition of neighbourly love in the language of the 
later Lacan, we recognise in him or her our own 
symptom. We can love the other because we can continue 
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to love him or her even after we acknowledge that our 
love is fundamentally narcissistic, so that this 
acknowledgment, when mutual, can actually result in a 
relationship. 
3. The Ethics of the Sinthome and the Contemporary 
Other 
As we have already anticipated above, one of the 
fundamental aspects of the Millerian account of 
Lacan's development towards ethical pragmatism is the 
fact that this shift is presented as the outcome of a 
theoretical elaboration of the concept of jouissance 
that reflects and responds to a real modification in 
the social status of jouissance. In Miller's account, 
Lacan's basic gesture of positing a jouissance 
"without opposite" and a signifying structure that 
functions as an "operator of jouissance" are seen as 
attempts to reflect and elaborate conceptually the 
logic of a new social structure that, in the early 
1970s, at the time of Lacan's inauguration of the last 
phase of his teaching, had started to impose itself 
precisely as an apparatus of mass consumption and 
enjoyment, rather than as an apparatus of repression. 
The new pragmatic ethics of the sinthome, therefore, 
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does not emerge from a mere theoretical revision but, 
rather, it strives to define a way to realise the 
classic principles of psychoanalytic ethics 
- 
the 
freedom and autonomy of the divided and desiring 
subject oriented towards the truth of his jouissance 
- 
in a new historical context marked by a profound 
alteration in the structure of the symbolic Other qua 
social structure. 
We have already examined this alteration in detail in 
Chapter IV, and we have presented it as the underlying 
structural logic of contemporary life. It will be now 
sufficient to recall that for Lacan the discourse of 
contemporary life is marked by a change in the 
mechanism of repression, whose productive side 
- 
its 
ability to produce surplus jouissance ciphered in 
symptoms 
- 
comes to subordinate its once primarily 
defensive function in relation to jouissance, so that 
the processes of prohibition and production of 
jouissance end up feeding on each other in an endless 
self-consuming loop. Lacan's social critique of 
contemporary life is thus already an account of the 
conceptual breakdown of the boundary between signifier 
and jouissance that leads to the ethical pragmatism of 
the sinthome. And this means, of course, that the 
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ethics of the sinthome is elaborated from the 
structure of the contemporary Other. 
The connection between the theory of jouissance that 
informs Lacan's later thinking and the status of 
jouissance in the contemporary social domain is 
illustrated by Jacques-Alain Miller in the second 
"Psychoanalysis in the City" session of his 2002 
seminar, The Lacanian Orientation. 
For Miller, this connection is necessary given Lacan's 
understanding of the nature of the signifying 
structure. As Miller reminds us quoting Lacan's famous 
Ecrit on Daniel Lagache ("Remarque sur le rapport de 
Daniel Lagache: `Psychanalyse et structure de la 
personnalite), for Lacan the structure is "neither an 
ordered description of reality, nor a theoretical 
model elaborated apart from experience" but must be 
conceived as something that "is produced within 
reality itself and determines its effects there, " 
these effects being "effects of truth, effects of 
jouissance, effects of subject" ("Milanese 2" 5). If 
the structure is produced within social reality, then 
all theory of the structure needs to be considered as 
a theory of social reality and cannot be approached 
simply as an independent and autonomous intellectual 
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elaboration. For Miller, this necessary homology 
becomes apparent through the Lacanian logic of the 
"not-all" or non-totalization which appears to inform 
both Lacan's most abstract speculations of the 1970s 
and the structure of the contemporary Other. While the 
logic of the "all" functions within a structure that 
"comprises an all with a supplementary and antinomic 
element that poses a limit, and which allows the all 
to be constituted precisely as such, " the logic of the 
"not-all" refers to a "series in development without 
limit and without totalization" (Miller, "Milanese 2" 
9). The "all" and the "not-all" can be used to 
describe the way in which the signifier sets itself up 
respectively as a limit or as an operator of 
jouissance in Lacan's later theory of sexuation. 
They can also, however, serve very well to illustrate 
the underlying logic of the contemporary Other, where 
the "not-all" takes, as we have seen, the form of a 
breakdown of the opposition between repression and 
production, and also, as Miller insists, the form of 
the dissolution of all sorts of symbolic and imaginary 
boundaries in the process of globalization ("Milanese 
2" 9). Moreover, just as it motivates a theoretical 
shift to the individuation, inventiveness and 
pragmatism of the sinthome, the "not-all" also 
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motivates a social push to the individuation of 
"dispersed" and "unfixed" contemporary subjects 
presented with the ever growing "social duty and 
subjective imperative" to "invent and enhance their 
own individual styles of life" through the 
"constitution of micro-totalities [... ] that offer, 
within the not-all, pockets, shelters, a certain 
degree of systematicity, stability, codification, and 
that permit the restitution of mastery" (Miller, 
"Milanese 2" 11-12). 
It is perhaps at this level, the level that defines 
the structure of the Other in its relation to social 
reality, that we can locate the most significant 
difference between the Millerian and the Slovenian- 
Zizekian account of the later Lacan. The shift from 
desire to drive emphasised and popularised by the 
Slovenian theorists could, of course, also be related 
to an earlier phase of the same modification of the 
social status of jouissance that leads to Lacan's 
later elaboration of the ethics of the sinthome. For 
the Slovenian theorists, however, the trajectory of 
Lacanian thought is not motivated by a transformation 
in the social Other. The Lacanian theorization of the 
Other they extract predominantly from the Lacan of the 
mid-160s is used by them as a stable theoretical model 
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to read the Other of contemporary culture but it is 
never subject, as such, to the real permutations of 
contemporary discourse. 
Their characteristic reluctance to acknowledge a major 
conceptual shift in Lacan's teaching of the 1970s may 
be explained through the fact that it is during this 
phase that the link between Lacan's conceptual 
revisions and the new arrangement of the Other of 
contemporary life are more explicit. This different 
approach to the Other of contemporary life becomes 
even more apparent if we look at Zizek's own critique 
of Miller's position. Zizek, in fact, blames Miller 
precisely for giving in to the "temptation" of 
historicizing Lacan's theoretical framework. According 
to Zizek: 
Today, in a time of continuous rapid changes, 
[... ] thought is more than ever exposed to the 
temptation of "losing its nerve, " of 
precociously abandoning the old conceptual 
coordinates. Against this temptation, [... ] one 
should ask the difficult question: how are we 
to remain faithful to the Old in the new 
conditions? ONLY in this way we can generate 
something effectively New. And the same holds 
for psychoanalysis: [... ] psychoanalysts are 
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"losing their nerve, " laying down their 
(theoretical) arms, hastening to concede that 
the Oedipal matrix of civilization is no 
longer operative, [... ] that the concept of 
repression is of no use in our permissive 
times. Unfortunately, even such an astute 
theoretician as Miller seems to succumb to 
this temptation, [... ]. Miller's description of 
Lacan's last paradigm of jouissance 
exemplifies the failure of conceptual thought, 
whose lack is filled in by hasty pre- 
theoretical generalizations. (On Belief 32-33) 
In a way, Zizek is right in marking the difference 
between himself and Miller as the difference between 
the theoretical and the "pre-theoretical. " As we have 
demonstrated above, however, Miller's "pre- 
theoretical" approach has nothing to do with a 
"failure of conceptual thought" and is motivated, 
instead, by the necessity of prioritizing the real of 
psychoanalytic experience in relation to its 
conceptual elaboration. Far from being simply "hasty 
generalizations, " Miller's conceptual elaborations of 
analytic experience not only display a level of 
theoretical rigour that is arguably higher than that 
of Ziiek's own inconsistent and endlessly digressive 
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discourse, but also recognise that psychoanalysis 
cannot separate theory from social change because the 
theoretical coordinates that psychoanalysis elaborates 
are also the symbolic coordinates of the social Other. 
The idea of an uncompromising fidelity to "theory, " 
therefore, at least from a psychoanalytic point of 
view, does not make much sense and is definitely at 
odds with the principle of Lacan's own "return to 
Freud, " where a fidelity to the psychoanalytic message 
depends on continuous revision and challenging of 
former positions. Ironically, this is precisely what 
escapes Zizek, since Lacan's later ethics of the 
sinthome as described by Miller is exactly a way to 
realize Zizek's project of "remaining faithful to the 
Old in the new conditions, "a way, that is, to remain 
faithful to the classic principles of psychoanalytic 
ethics in the new discursive conditions of 
contemporary life. 
In his haste to dismiss Miller's proposal of a new 
"pragmatic" ethics of psychoanalysis, Zizek does the 
most obvious thing, that is, he compares Miller's 
position with the position of postmodern thinkers like 
Rorty and Ulrick Beck for whom, in the absence of a 
transcendental understanding of language as a 
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transcendental a priori of society, "all patterns of 
interaction, from the forms of sexual partnership to 
ethnic identity itself, have to be 
renegotiated/reinvented" (On Belief 27). We have, 
however, seen how Miller's "paradoxical pragmatism" 
and the ethics of the sinthome are extremely far from 
the postmodern ideal of groundless pragmatic self- 
invention, opposing to the easy invention and 
consumption of ready-made lifestyles and "micro- 
totalities" the hard task of returning the subject to 
his freedom and to the truth of his desire by means of 
a reduction of his own pragmatic invention. 
Zizek's project clearly aims at preserving the 
possibility of such subjective transformation by 
insisting on the given transcendental incidence of an 
unchanging structure, and this is why the construction 
or "knotting" of the sinthome is never an ethical 
matter for him. This may indeed be merely a matter of 
perspective, but it seems to me that in this way 
Zizek's approach risks misrecognising the type of 
ethical intervention required by the structure of the 
contemporary Other. This misrecognition is never only 
a matter of mere transcendence and liberation but 
also, and significantly, a matter of construction and 
orientation. I will consider this point, and 
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illustrate how the ethics of the sinthome provides a 
privileged answer to the discontents of contemporary 
life, in the conclusion. 
Conclusion 
In the introduction I defined psychoanalytic ethics as 
comprising two different sets of values. I described 
the first set of values as the "what" of 
psychoanalytic ethics and the second as the "how. " The 
"what" are the values that ground and orient 
psychoanalytic practice and, in this sense, also 
constitute the primary effects of psychoanalytic 
experience. They include the autonomy and freedom of 
the subject from the Other, the subjective ability to 
remain faithful to desire, to enjoy the drive outside 
the constraints of fantasy and to become responsible 
for the fundamental choices that govern and determine 
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our lives. The 
on the other 
psychoanalytic 
"know-how" of 
handling of 
interpretation, 
sinthome. 
"how" of the ethics of psychoanalysis, 
hand, are the values that inform 
practice as such, the prescriptive 
psychoanalysis. They include the 
transferential love, sublimation, 
and the "writing" or "knotting" of the 
Interrogating the development of Lacan's theory of 
ethics from Seminar VII to his later work, we have 
observed that the foundational and defining values of 
psychoanalytic ethics 
- 
the "what" 
- 
remain 
essentially stable and consistent throughout Lacan's 
teaching. The ethics of the later Lacan is still, in 
fact, an ethics that values the autonomy and the 
freedom affirmed by the absolute contingency of what 
reveals the subject and his unconscious desire. This 
is, as Alexandre Leupin has pointed out, essentially 
and consistently throughout Lacan's teaching, an 
ethics of singularity, an ethics for which "the only 
responsibility is to take upon oneself one's position 
as a subject" (65). The "criminal" negation of the 
Laws of the Other that had informed Lacan's early 
reflections on Sade and Antigone thus remains an 
essential component of what the subject needs to 
accomplish on his ethical path. 
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However, if the "what" of psychoanalytic ethics remain 
constant, we have also recognised that Lacan's ethics 
undergoes a series of crucial revisions at the level 
of the "how" that shape its practice. It has become 
apparent, moreover, that these revisions are motivated 
by a more general change in Lacan's understanding of 
the status of jouissance in the symbolic order and 
that this new understanding of jouissance aims first 
and foremost at conceptualising a radical historical 
transformation in the discursive structure of 
contemporary culture. 
The "ethics of the sinthome" that marks the final 
articulation of Lacan's ethics should be understood in 
this sense as a development of psychoanalytic ethics 
at the level of the "hows" rather than at the level of 
the "what. " The clinical practice of constructing or 
reducing the subjective symptom to a sinthome 
preserves, as we have seen, the primary ethical task 
of emancipating the subject from the constraints of 
the fantasy that constitutes the Other and holds the 
subject under the sway of the Law and of its 
dialectical transgression. The novelty of the sinthome 
thus lies not in leaving behind the classic tenets of 
psychoanalytic ethics but in offering a new practice, 
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an ethical practice which operates at the level of 
signification and which Lacan describes as a "duty of 
speaking well" [devoir du bien dire] (Television 526). 
This is a practice that may assist the subject not 
simply in the old and still valid task of finding its 
freedom from the Other, but also in the new task of 
finding, by constructing it or by retrieving it from 
the unconscious, a unique orientation and a unique 
support for his own freedom in the articulation of the 
sinthome. 
The second point that we have stressed and that we 
need to remember now is that this new ethical task is 
historical, that it is an ethical task for the subject 
of contemporary civilization and that it has gained 
urgency because of the particular regime of jouissance 
that structures and defines contemporary civilization 
and its discontents. The utilitarian ethics of 
contemporary life, in fact, promotes the production of 
surplus jouissance and the ready availability of 
jouissance results, as we have seen, in an inhibition 
of the subject's ability to process jouissance through 
signification (e. g. though symptoms). 
This arrangement underlies a "crisis of desire" that 
assumes today mass proportions via the ever growing 
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incidence of depressive and anxious lifestyles and 
ultimately also undermines the possibility of 
presenting the contemporary "desireless" subject with 
the old ethical injunction of interpretation, 
sublimation and "purification" of his desire. In this 
context, it is the pragmatic work of construction and 
reconstruction of the sinthome that becomes the 
essential task of psychoanalytic ethics and the 
prerequisite for realizing the classic values of 
psychoanalytic ethics in the contemporary world. The 
ethics of the sinthome thus becomes even more than a 
simple clinical practice and can be endorsed as a 
viable and concrete response to the devastating 
effects of contemporary utilitarian capitalist ethics 
as well as an alternative to the equally devastating 
"repression of the symptom" pursued by the neo-Kantian 
ethics of fundamentalism and by the neo-Sadean ethics 
of addiction. 
The grounding values of psychoanalytic ethics have 
long been recognised by contemporary theory and the 
same can be said also for Lacan's theory of 
jouissance. Lacan's understanding of the subject's 
ethical relation to his lost kernel of jouissance and 
the idea of jouissance as a remainder of the process 
of symbolization have been the object of much 
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discussion and have proven influential in many fields 
of contemporary research. This recognition is due 
mostly to the popularity of theorists like Slavoj 
Zizek and Alain Badiou and to their ability to 
motivate an interest for Lacanian theory outside 
"specialised" analytic circles. 
One aspect that is significantly missing from current 
academic investigations and debates on Lacanian 
thought, however, is an awareness of the way in which 
Lacan's ideas were originally articulated in response 
to historical alterations of the social structure and, 
more specifically, in response to the confrontation 
with the social and historical real of the symptoms 
and "discontents" addressed within psychoanalytic 
practice. By neglecting this point contemporary theory 
tends to ground, more or less explicitly as we have 
seen, Lacanian thought on the sole auctoritas of 
Lacan's (or Freud's) original theoretical insight, 
while Lacan's thought was grounded, in reality, on the 
sole auctoritas of the real of social discourse as it 
presented itself in analytic practice. 
I have insisted on this point because it seems to me 
that it is only by acknowledging this primacy of 
praxis over theory that psychoanalytic theory can not 
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only, following Lacan's own example, renew itself in 
response to the changes of contemporary life, but also 
formulate an effective and viable ethical practice 
rooted in the specificity of contemporary culture and 
suited to the needs of contemporary subjects. Many 
contemporary Lacanian theorists seem to be stuck in 
the attempt to apply or translate an 
-abstract Lacanian 
"model" to different types of social 
- 
political or 
aesthetic practices 
- 
with results that rarely go 
further than an advocacy or pursuit of miraculous 
spontaneous "acts" or "events" of radical 
transformation and change. My suggestion is that 
Lacanian theory would benefit greatly from looking 
more seriously at the work of contemporary analysts 
and from adjusting its focus to the practice of 
psychoanalysis itself in its radical social and 
political effects and in its ongoing and open 
theorization from within the constraints of 
contemporary culture. 
Works Cited 
Adams, Parveen. Ed. Art: Sublimation or Symptom. New 
York: Other Press, 2003. 
---- 
The Emptiness of the Image. Psychoanalysis and 
Sexual Differences. London: Routledge, 1996. 
Adorno, Theodor W. "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of 
Fascist Propaganda. " The Culture Industry. 
Ed. J. M. Bernstein. London: Routledge, 2001. 
132-57. 
Altiman, Jorge. "Presentation. " Lakant. Ecole de la 
Cause freudienne. Paris : Ecole de la Cause 
freudienne, 2003.17-26. 
Andre, Serge. L'imposture perverse. Paris: Seuil, 
1993. 
Badiou, Alain. Ethics. An Essay on the Understanding 
of Evil. Trans. Peter Hallward. London: 
Verso, 2001. 
---- 
"Philosophy and Politics. " Trans. Oliver Feltham 
and Justin Clemens. Infinite Thought. Ed. 
Olivers Feltham and Justin Clemens. London: 
Continuum, 2003.69-78. 
Bataille, Georges. Eroticism. Trans. Mary Dalwood. 
London: Calder, 1962. 
395 
---- 
La litterature et le mal. Oeuvres completes de 
Georges Bataille. Vol. 9. Paris : Gallimard, 
1979. 
Baudelaire, Charles. Artificial Paradises. Trans. 
Stacy Diamond. New York: Citadel Press, 
1996. 
Baudrillard, Jean. The Transparency of Evil. Trans. 
James Benedict. London : Verso, 1993. 
Beck, Judith S. Cognitive Theraphy : Basics and 
Beyond. London : The Guilford Press, 1995. 
Blanchot, Maurice. Lautreamont and Sade. Trans. Stuart 
and Michelle Kendall. Stanford : Stanford 
University Press, 2004. 
Braunstein, Nestor. La jouissance. Un concept 
lacanien. Paris : Point Hors Ligne, 1992. 
Butler, Judith. Antigone's Claim : Kinship Between 
Life and Death. New York : Columbia 
University Press, 2000. 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. The Major Works. Ed. H. J. 
Jackson. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
2008. 
Copjec, Joan. Imagine There's No Woman: Ethics and 
Sublimation. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002. 
---- 
Read My Desire. Lacan against the Historicists. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994. 
De Quincey, Thomas. Confessions of an English Opium 
Eater. London: Penguin, 1997. 
Deigh, John. "Freud's Later Theory of Civilization: 
Changes and Implication. " The Cambridge 
Companion to Freud. Ed. Jerome Neu. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
287-308. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus. 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. London: 
Athlone Press: 1984. 
396 
Derrida, Jacques. Glas. Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr, and 
Richard Rand. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1985. 
---- 
The Post Card. From Socrates to Freud and beyond. 
Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987. 
---- 
Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. 
London: Routledge, 1978. 
Di Ciaccia, Antonio. "Ethics in the Era of 
Globalization. " Trans. Julia Richards. 
Mental Online. 11 (2002): 17-22.27 January 
2009 <http: //www. mental- 
nls. com/MentalOnlinell. pdf>. 
Ecole de la Cause freudienne. Lakant. Paris : Ecole de 
la Cause freudienne, 2003. 
Elliott, Anthony. Social Theory & Psychoanalysis in 
Transition. London: Free Asociation Books, 
1999. 
Fink, Bruce. A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. Cambridge Mass: Harvard UP, 
1997. 
Evans, Julia. "Well-Being and Happiness as Used by the 
UK Government. " Psychoanalytical Notebooks. 
16 (2007): 143-56. 
Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The 
Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Trans. 
and ed. James Strachey. Vol. 18. London: 
Hogart Press, 1955.7-67. 
---- 
Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. David 
McLintock. London: Penguin, 2004. 
---- 
"The Dynamics of Transference. " The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud. Trans. and ed. James 
Strachey. Vol. 11. London: Hogart Press, 
1957.99-108. 
---- 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. 
Trans. James Strachey. Civilization, Society 
and Religion: Group Psychology, Civilization 
and Its Discontents and Other Works. Ed. 
397 
Albert Dickson. Harmondworth: Penguin, 1985. 
91-167. 
---- 
The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes. " The Freud 
Reader. Trans. James Strachey. Ed. Peter 
Gay. London: Vintage Books, 1995.562-67. 
---- 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Trans. Alix 
Strachey. London: Hogart Press, 1936. 
---- 
"Observations on Transference Love. " The Freud 
Reader. Trans. James Strachey. Ed. Peter 
Gay. London: Vintage Books, 1995.378-87. 
---- 
The Question of Lay Analysis. The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud. Trans. and ed. James 
Strachey. Vol 20. London: Hogart Press, 
1959.177-258. 
---- 
Project for a Scientific Psychology. The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud. Trans. and ed. James 
Strachey. Vol 1. London: Hogart Press, 1966. 
283-392. 
---- 
"Repression. " The 
Strachey. Ed. 
Books, 1995. 
Freud Reader. Trans James 
Peter Gay. London: Vintage 
568-72. 
---- 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The 
Freud Reader. Trans. James Strachey. Ed. 
Peter Gay. London: Vintage Books, 1995.239- 
92. 
---- 
Totem and Taboo. The Freud Reader. Trans. James 
Strachey. Ed. Peter Gay. London: Vintage 
Books, 1995.481-513. 
Geberovich, Fernando. No satisfaction. Psychanalyse du 
toxicomane. Paris: Albin Michel, 2003. 
Grigg, Russel. "Absolute Freedom and Major Structural 
Change. " Paragraph. 24 (2001): 111-24. 
Gueguen, Pierre-Gilles. "The Battle of Psychoanalysis 
in the Twenty-First Century. " Trans. 
Francesca Pollock and Sylvia Winter. 
Psychoanalytical Notebooks. 14 (2005): 132- 
36. 
398 
Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman. 
Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Haraway, Donna. "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century. " Simians, Cyborgs 
and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New 
York: Routledge, 1991.149-81. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Trans A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1977. 
---- 
Philosophy of Right. Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1942. 
---- 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Trans 
R. F. Brown. Ed. Peter C. Hodgson. Vol. 2. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Trans. John Cumming. New 
York : Herder and Herder, 1972. 
Irigaray, Luce. Speculum of the Other Woman. Trans 
Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca : Cornell University 
Press, 1985. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Basic 
Writings of Kant. Trans. Thomas k. Abbot. 
Ed. Allen W. Wood. New York: Moden Library, 
2001.225-71. 
---- 
Critique of Judgement. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. 
Kay, Sarah. Zizek. A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003. 
Klossowski, Pierre. Sade My Neighbour. Trans. Alphonso 
Longis. London: Quartet Books, 1992. 
Kristeva, Julia. Black Sun. Depression and 
Melancholia. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 
---- 
New Maladies of the Soul. Trans. Ross Guberman. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
Lacan, Jacques. "Acte de fondation. " Autres ecrits. 
Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994.229-42. 
399 
---- 
"L'aggressivite en psychanalyse. " Ecrits. Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1966.101-24. 
---- 
"Les complexes familiaux dans la formation de 
l'individu. " Autres ecrits. Paris: Editions 
du Seuil, 1994.24-84. 
---- 
"La direction de la cure et les principes de son 
puovoir. " Ecrits. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1966.585-645. 
---- 
"Du discours psychanalytique. " Ecole Lacanienne. 
3 July 2009 <http: //www. ecole- 
lacanienne. net/pastoutlacan7O. php>. 
---- 
"Intoduction theorique aux fonctions de la 
psychanalyse en criminologie. " Ecrits. 
Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966.125-49. 
---- 
"Kant avec Sade. " Ecrits. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1966.765-92. 
---- 
"Lituraterre. " Autres ecrits. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1994.11-22. 
---- 
"Preface a une these. " Autres ecrits. Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1994.393-402. 
---- 
"Remarque sur le rapport de Daniel Lagache: 
`Psychanalyse et structure de la 
personnalite'. " Ecrits. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1966.647-84. 
---- 
"Le seminaire sur "La Lettre volee. " Ecrits. 
Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966.11-61. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre VII. 
L'ethique de la psychanalyse. 1959-1960. Ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1986. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Laca. Livre VIII. Le 
transfert. 1960-1961. Ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2001. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre X. 
L'angoisse. 1962-1963. Ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004. 
400 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XI. Les 
quatre concepts fondamentaux de la 
psychanalyse. 1964. Ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XVI. D'un 
autre ä 1'Autre. 1968-1969. Ed. Jacques- 
Alain Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
2006. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XVII. 
L'envers de la psychoanalyse. 1969-1970. Ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1991. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XVIII. D'un 
discours qui ne serait pas du semblant. 
1970-1971. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 2007. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XX. Encore. 
1972-1973. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1975. 
---- 
Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XXIII. Le 
sinthome. 1975-1976. Ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2005. 
---- 
"Subversion du sujet and dialectique du desir 
dans l'inconscient freudien. " Ecrits. Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1966.793-828. 
---- 
Television. Autres ecrits. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1994.509-46. 
---- 
Le triomphe de la religion precede de Discours 
aux catholiques. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. 
Paris: Seuil, 2005. 
---- 
"La troisieme. " Ecole lacanienne. 3 July 2009 
<http: //www. ecole- 
lacanienne. net/pastoutlacan70. php>. 
Laclau, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 1996. 
Laplanche, Jean and J. -B. Pontalis. The Language of 
Psychoanalysis. Trans. Donald Nicholson- 
Smith. London: Hogart Press, 1973. 
Laurent, Eric. "Symptom and Discourse. " Trans. Russell 
Grigg. Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of 
401 
Psychoanalysis. Ed. Justin Clemens and 
Russel Grigg. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006.229-53. 
---- 
"The Stakes of the 2008 Congress. " Trans. Thomas 
Svolos. VI Congress of the World Association 
of Psychoanalysis. 10 October 2008 
<http: //www. amp2008. com/en/template. asp? text 
os/presenta bn/laurent. html>. 
Leader, Darian. Stealing the Mona Lisa. What Art Stops 
Us From Seeing. Boston: Shoemaker & Hoard, 
2002. 
---- 
The New Black. Mourning, Melancholia and 
Depression. Hamish Hamilton: London, 2008. 
Leclaire, Serge. Psychoanalyzing. On the Order of the 
Unconscious and the Practice of the Letter. 
Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. 
Lemaire, Anika. Jacques Lacan. Trans. David Macey. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. 
Leupin, Alexandre. Lacan Today. Psychoanalysis, 
Science, Religion. New York: Other Press, 
2004. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. "God and Philosophy. " Trans. 
Richard A. Cohen and Alphonso Longis. The 
Levinas Reader. Ed. Sean Hand. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989.166-89. 
Loose, Rik. The Subject of Addiction: Psychoanalysis 
and the Administration of Enjoyment. London: 
Karnac Books, 2002. 
Macey, David. Lacan in Contexts. London: Verso, 1988. 
Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A 
Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud. London: 
Ark, 1987. 
McGowan, Todd. The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques 
Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment. 
New York: SUNY Press, 2003. 
---- 
and Sheila Kunkle, eds. Lacan and Contemporary 
Film. New York: Other Press: 2004. 
402 
Miller, Jacques-Alain. "The Era of the Man Without 
Qualities. " Psychoanalytical Notebooks. 16 
(2007): 7-42. 
---- 
Fantasy. " Lacanian Praxis. Trans. Thelma 
Sowley. 1 (2005): 6-17.10 September 2008 
<http: //www. mental- 
nls. com/LacanianPraxisOl. pdf>. 
---- 
"Une incroyable exaltation. " Lakant. Ecole de la 
Cause freudienne. Paris : Ecole de la Cause 
freudienne, 2003.27-41. 
---- 
"Milanese Intuitions 1. " Mental Online. 11 
(2002): 9-16.10 September 2008 
<http: //www. mental- 
nis. com/MentalOnlinell. pdf>. 
---- 
"Milanese Intuitions 2. " Trans. Thelma Sowley. 
Mental Online. 12 (2003): 5-16.10 September 
2008 <http: //www. mental- 
nls. com/MentalOnlinel2. pdf>. 
---- 
"On Shame. " Trans. Russell Grigg. Jacques Lacan 
and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis. Ed. 
Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006.11-28. 
---- 
"Paradigms of Jouissance. " Trans. Jorge Jauregui. 
Lacanian Ink. 17 (2000) : '8-47. 
---- 
"Psychoanalysis in Close Touch with the Social. " 
Trans. Thelma Sowley. Lacan. com. 15 May 2009 
<http: //www. lacan. com/jamsocial. html>. 
---- 
"Religion, Psychoanalysis. " Trans. Barbara P. 
Fulks. Lacanian Ink. 23 (2004): 6-38. 
---- 
"Turin Theory of the Subject of the School. " 
Trans. Heather Menzies and Vincent Dachy. 
London Society of the New Lacanian School. 3 
July 2009 <http: //www. londonsociety- 
nls. org. uk/pdfs/Turin. pdf>. 
Mitchell, Juliet. Psychoanalysis and Feminism. London: 
Allen Lane, 1974. 
Modern Language Association of America. MLA Handbook 
for Writers of Research Papers. Comp. Joseph 
Gibaldi. 5th ed. New York : The Modern 
Language Association of America, 1999. 
403 
Noys, Benjamin. "One More 
Lacan, Encore. Ed. 
issue of Film-Philc 
vii. 15 August 
philosophy. com/ 
2007/index. html>. 
Effort... " Introduction. 
Benjamin Noys. Spec. 
>sophy. 11.3 (2007): i- 
2008 <http: /www. film- 
archive/volll- 
Parker, Ian. Slavoj 2i2ek: A Critical Introduction. 
London: Pluto Press, 2004. 
Poe, Edgar Allan. "'The Purloined Letter. " Tales of 
Mystery and Imagination. Ware: Wordsworth 
Editions, 1993.203-6. 
Pommier, Gerard. L'Ordre sexuel. Paris: Flammarion, 
1995. 
Rajchman, John. "Lacan and the Ethics of Modernity. " 
Representations. 15 (1986): 42-56. 
Restuccia, Frances L. Amorous Acts. Lacanian Ethics in 
Modernism, Film and Queer Theory. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2007. 
Rose, Jacqueline. Introduction. Jacques Lacan and the 
Question of Analytic Training. By Moustapha 
Safouan. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.11- 
47. 
Roudinesco, Elizabeth. Jacques Lacan. Trans. Barbara 
Bray. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997. 
Sade, D. A. F. Three Complete Novels : Justine, The 
Philosophy in the Bedroom, Eugenie de 
Franval, and Other Writings. London : Arrow 
Books, 1991. 
---- 
Juliette. Trans. Austryn Wainhouse. London 
Arrow Books, 1991. 
Salecl, Renata. On Anxiety. London: Routledge, 2004. 
------- 
(Per)versions of Love and Hate. London: Verso, 
1998. 
Smith, Marquard, and Joanne Morra, eds. The Prosthetic 
Impulse. From a Posthuman Present to a 
Biocultural Future. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 2006. 
404 
Sophocles. Antigone. Trans. Don Taylor. Plays I: 
Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, 
Antigone. London: Methuen, 1986.129-88. 
Stavrakakis, Yannis. Lacan and the Political. London: 
Routledge, 1999. 
Thurston, Luke. "Sinthome. " An Introductory Dictionary 
of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. By Dylan Evans. 
London: Routledge, 1996.99-101. 
Trobas, Guy. "Depression 
... 
of Repression and Modern 
Symptoms. " Psychoanalytical Notebooks. 15 
(2006) : 85-95. 
Turkle, Sherry. Psychoanalytic Politics. Jacques Lacan 
and Freud's French Revolution. London: Free 
Association Books, 1992. 
United Kingdom. Dept. of Health. National Treatment 
Agency for Substance Misuse. Models of Care 
for the Treatment of Drug Misusers. London: 
NTA, 2002. 
Voruz, Veronique, and Bogdan Wolf. Itroduction. The 
Later Lacan. An Introduction. Ed. Veronique 
Voruz and Bogdan Wolf. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2007. vii- 
xvii. 
---- 
"Acephalic Litter as a Phallic Letter. " Re- 
inventing the Symptom. Essays on the Final 
Lacan. Ed. Luke Thurston. New York: Other 
Press, 2001.110-40. 
Williams, Caroline. "Twelve Steps Approaches. " Working 
with Substance Misusers. A Guide to Theory 
and Practice. Ed. Trudi Petersen and Andrew 
McBride. London: Routledge, 2002.134-43. 
World Health Organization. "Depression. " World Health 
Organization. 15 August 2009. 
<http: //www. who. int/mental health/management 
/depression/definition/en>. 
Zizek, Slavoj. Enjoy Your Symptom! London: Routledge, 
1992. 
---- 
Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle. London: Verso, 2003. 
---- 
The Metastases of Enjoyment. London: Verso, 2005. 
405 
---- 
The Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997. 
---- 
On Belief. London: Routledge, 2001. 
---- 
Organs Without Bodies. On Deleuze and 
Consequences. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Zupancic, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan. 
London: Verso, 1999. 
---- 
"What Love's Got to Do with Id. " New Formations. 
23 (1994): 55-68. 
